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SUMMARY 
The world is rapidly evolving as are the future potential combat environments. As 
the military shifts focus from counter insurgency warfare to near-peer adversaries in a 
multi-domain operating environment, many modernization efforts will be required. These 
modernization efforts include repurpose existing systems and systems of systems (SoS) for 
multi-domain operations, changing the ways by which existing systems are employed, or 
acquiring new systems.  
These modernization efforts must take place across multiple systems and SoS with 
dozens of different stakeholders, often working on parallel efforts despite the inevitable 
interaction of the complex SoS in future combat environments. Timelines to develop these 
systems are in terms of years not decades and are compounded by ever-changing budgetary 
constraints and geopolitical variations.   
The current means to track and document system and SoS developments is the 
Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF). DoDAF is a model-based 
systems engineering framework used to provide visualization of system elements, 
interfaces, complexities, functions, operational purposes and connections through various 
viewpoints, models, tables, and graphs in lieu of traditional paper-based accounting 
methods. For end user and decision-maker orientation, operational viewpoints (such as the 
OV-1) that are unique to DoDAF are used to provide overall picture and insights into how 
SoS will be employed and interact within an operating environment. 
 xxiv 
However, while the DoDAF models are a valuable tool for documenting 
requirements, the static products are complex and difficult for the average end user to 
understand and challenging to use for decision-making. In some cases, DoDAF products 
are treated like a bookkeeping measure and are completed after a decision has already been 
made. Additionally, the static nature of the architecture fails to demonstrate or determine 
the efficacy of means or ways trades in against operational measures of performance and 
effectiveness and little or no guidance exists on when or how to generate executable 
architecture. Typically, decision makers rely on subject matter expert (SME) estimates to 
determine requirements and operational impacts. However, SME estimates alone lack 
scientific backing for requirements development and can prove to be costly if incorrect or 
not holistic. Alternative means include complex simulations, wargames, and experimental 
organizations/exercise but these methods are expensive and time consuming. Additionally, 
simulations that are data in data out lack the learning and interactive benefit. 
A need exists for a user-friendly, rapidly developed, computationally inexpensive, 
and interactive executable architecture (EA) framework that can provide for various means 
and ways trades to inform strategic-level prioritization and investment decisions. The 
framework must provide insights into interactions, second-and third-order effects, and 
feedback and be capable of being developed with partial or missing information. This 
framework must be adaptable and include elements that are difficult to capture in discrete 
event type modeling used in the past. It must also serve as a medium to play games, 
facilitate learning and understanding that are missing in data-driven simulations.  
Ongoing research in the field of executable architecture includes the means to be 
automatically generated from DoDAF products. However, there is no standard format to 
 xxv 
create DoDAF products. While Systems Modeling Language (SysML™) is the most 
common means, DoDAF products for existing systems are in a variety of formats such as 
PowerPoint™, Microsoft Visio™, and Sparx System Enterprise Architect™ making auto-
generated executable architecture difficult if not impossible to tailor to end user 
performance metrics.  
A framework for the development of holistic executable architecture for complex 
systems-of-systems as a method to analyze means and ways trades across the DOTmLP-P 
(Doctrine, Organization, Training, materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Policy) spectrum 
in support of CBA (Capabilities Based Assessment) is proposed. The Aerial Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AISR) system-of-systems architecture, complete with 
reachback for the Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) of intelligence 
products, and utilizing a generic Unmanned Aircraft System in support of long-range 
precision fires as part of a Decide-Detect-Deliver-Assess (D3A) operation was used a case 
study to experiment and test the framework. 
AISR and long-range precision fires (LRPF) has proven to be a critical component 
of multi-domain warfare. The demand for AISR and rapid development and acquisition of 
these assets, particularly Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) has grown exponentially over 
the past decade. While research and development focus on UAS, these assets are only part 
of a complex system-of-systems (SoS) architecture that connects the forward deployed 
UAS (sensor) to aircraft operators (pilots) who fly the aircraft and intelligence analysts 
who conduct federated PED of collected data in sanctuary around the globe.  
 xxvi 
This complex SoS architecture was originally designed and developed with the 
static DoDAF and with limited use of discrete event simulation type executable models. 
However, rapid acquisitions to support global requirements over the past decade created 
an AISR fleet that expanded faster than DoDAF could support. The DOD has outlined a 
roadmap for future technological improvements to the AISR and PED architecture in 
addition to additional procurement of UAS over a period from 2017-2042 making it a 
viable candidate for demonstration of the framework. 
Initial application of systems thinking via the use of Systems Tests, Sector 
Diagrams, Causal Loops, and Model Boundary Chart was utilized reduce system 
complexity through fundamental understanding of elements, connections, and functions of 
the SoS. System Dynamics was selected as an appropriate modeling and simulation 
paradigm using VensimTM software. Static DoDAF models were mapped to key 
characteristics of a System Dynamics stock-and-flow model with causal loops to create 
executable architecture to assess feedback loops and interactions over time.  
To evaluate the ability of the executable architecture to evaluate and compare 
changes to system structure, a baseline PED system model with standardized inputs was 
recreated from previously published research. The EA was used to demonstrate the ability 
to evaluate structure, policy, and manning changes to the architecture using Monte Carlo 
Simulations, Sensitivity Analysis, and Powell optimization. The PED model was then 
incorporated into the larger executable architecture which included the AISR and D3A fires 
systems.  
 xxvii 
Parametric analysis was conducted on the variables of interest. Random distribution 
functions were applied to replicate the effects of combat and assess the system-of-systems 
against operational measures of performance and effectiveness. An interactive dashboard 
environment was created to enable interactive learning for stakeholders via the use of 
sliders on parametric variables over assumed ranges with instantaneous graphical displays 
of effects on operational measures of performance and effectiveness over time. This 
dashboard can be used to conduct manual univariate or multivariate sensitivity It also 
serves a platform to visualize the effects of various courses of action for a pseudo-tabletop 
wargaming discussion. 
Due to combinatorial and dimensional complexity and stochastic enemy effects, 
space filling design of experiments with point repetition was applied to sample the input 
space and accounting for noise variations. This enabled the creation of surrogate models 
for statistical assessments of complex interactions between the elements of interest against 
desired operational outputs.  
The experiments successfully supported the use of System Dynamics as a means to 
holistically assess complex systems-of-systems in a rapidly developed, interactive 
environment that enables trades and could alternatively be used as a gaming and learning 
tool for stakeholders and decision makers.  Findings concerning benefits and limitation are 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Persistent and Evolving Global Uncertainty 
1.1.1 Setting the Stage 
The world and the threats therein are volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous 
(VUCA), all the while, technology is advancing rapidly. This situation is not unlike that 
faced by the U.S. Army in the 1970s following the war in Vietnam, as the Army 
transitioned from draftees and insurgency warfare to a professional army facing potentially 
quantitatively superior enemies in both the Soviet Union and China [2]. In regards to 
technical disruption, today’s environment bears striking resemblance to the interwar 
periods between World War I and World War II when new innovations such as radar and 
sonar coupled with rapid advancements in aircraft, armored vehicles, and aircraft carriers 
forced strategists and planners to develop new tactics and strategy in the face of massive 
uncertainty in regards to the effects of these developments and of future war [3]. 
The current U.S. military has been fixated on counterinsurgency and asymmetrical 
warfare for nearly 18 years at great financial expense. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army 
modernization efforts were put on hold for several years as the Army “focused its shrinking 
budget on maintaining readiness” [4]. During this period, its near-peer adversaries and 
“Our Army must regain our overmatch and competitive advantage against emerging 
threats…we must modernize our capabilities to increase our lethality against emerging 
regional and global near-peer advisories.” 
General Mark A. Milley 
Modernization Priorities for the United States Army[1] 
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pacing competitors have studied its doctrine and observed its tactics, all the while, 
advancing their own militaries in both manning and materiel capabilities [5]. Much like 
after Vietnam, these requirements have degraded the U.S. Army’s technical and tactical 
proficiency in near-peer combined operations, leaving it woefully unprepared for war not 
only against sophisticated nations like Russia and China, but also against threats like Iran 
and North Korea who are benefactors of technological innovations diffused from the larger 
nations [6]. Innovations like artificial intelligence, unmanned air and land vehicles, 
autonomy, and machine learning have the potential to revolutionize future battlefields [5]. 
As a result the U.S. has fallen behind and must modernize rapidly, but modernization 
requires both acquiring new capabilities and determining how to employ them [1, 3, 7-9]. 
To compound matters further, the U.S. Army currently has roughly 180,000 troops 
in 140 countries, which still only satisfies approximately 40-50 percent of the demand from 
combatant commanders and almost 70 percent of unexpected emergent demands [7]. This 
means that U.S. military has sunk cost into existing systems and capabilities and despite 
near-pear threats, has a continued need for these existing systems and capabilities in “hot 
spots” around the world short-of-full-conflict. Hence. a complete replacement of existing 
systems or systems-of-systems is unrealistic, and in many cases, unnecessary. Stakeholders 
must be able to rapidly assess and adjudicate changes (technological, numerical, 
employment methodology, etc.) to existing systems-of-systems to make them viable in the 




1.1.2 Third Offset Strategy 
On a Joint scale, the Department of Defense has developed the Third Offset 
Strategy. This strategy, according to former Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorary 
Robert Work aims to “pursue next-generation technology and concepts to assure U.S. 
Military superiority, but the real focus is strengthening U.S. conventional deterrence” to 
prevent wars from occurring [8]. The term ‘offset’ is defined as “a consideration or amount 
that diminishes or balances the effect of a contrary one” [10]. The offset strategies will 
focus on potential competitors who are reaching parity with the United States in a military 
area deemed to be critical. This offset plan includes a focus not only on improved 
technology but on leveraging the option of conduct of war at the operational level 
(theater/campaign) as a conventional deterrent [8]. Inspired by the Strategic Capabilities 
Office, Third Offset aims to repurpose previous investment efforts and use them in new 
innovative ways or integrate individual systems into systems-of-systems. 
1.1.3 Multi-Domain Operations 
In response to the Third Offset Strategy and the great power competition, the U.S. 
Army has developed the U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) 2028 concept. This 
concept provides the skeletal structure of future doctrine and proposes solutions to how the 
Army, as part of a Joint force, will retain strategic depth, operational advantage and 
offensive capability necessary for power projection globally as to both deter conflicts and 
win wars if necessary. The adversaries of the United States will attempt to mitigate its 
advantages by leveraging layered standoff in all five domains “to separate U.S. forces and 
our allies in time, space, and function in order to defeat us” [5]. This strategy will require 
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the insertion of “more and more unmanned systems technology…into operational and 
organizations constructs” to both preserve life and possibly prevent unnecessary escalation 
in the event of a shoot down [11, 12]. 
UAS and ISR will play a pivotal role in the Third Offset Strategy and MDO but will be 
vulnerable to attack in multiple domains. Its employment and architecture must be 
analyzed.  
Figure 1: Key Takeaway 
 
To deter enemies and compete in operations just-short-of-armed-conflict, the MDO 
concept focuses on the premise that all domains of warfare must be rapidly and 
continuously integrated. Should deterrence fail and all-out warfare become inevitable, 
Army elements as part of the Joint Force must: 
penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems; 
exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to defeat enemy systems, formations 
and objectives and to achieve our own strategic objectives; and consolidate 
gains to force a return to competition on terms more favorable to the U.S., 
our allies and partners [5]. 
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Figure 2: Multi-Domain Operations Concept of Operations from [5] 
All future ‘challenges’ that pose a risk to the Army’s ability to match competitors 
and mitigate standoff in addition to the technological and doctrinal ‘opportunities’ that 
allow the U.S. to achieve MDO effects will be evaluated in their ability to ‘compete,’ 
‘penetrate,’ ‘dis-integrate,’ ‘exploit,’ and ‘re-compete’ [13]. The U.S. Army had devised 
three core tenants to achieve this end: calibrated force posture, multi-domain formations, 
and convergence. These tenants ensure the U.S. Army, as part of the Joint Force is 
positioned to maneuver across strategic distances, possess the endurance, capability and 
capacity to employ effects across all five domains, and converge and integrate these effects 
rapidly across time and space to defeat the enemy [5]. This new strategy will look across 
the entire U.S. Army enterprise, to include: doctrine, organization, training, material, 
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leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTmLPF-P) [14]. (See Table 
1 [15-17].)  
Table 1: Elements of DOTmLPF-P 
Doctrine 
Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements 
thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is 
authoritative but requires judgment in application. 
Organization 
The way a unit is organized to accomplish a common mission, 
cooperate systematically, or provide support to joint warfighting 
capabilities. 
Training 
Training includes that of individuals, units and staffs on the necessary 
doctrine and TTPs necessary to execute their assigned or anticipated 
missions 
Materiel 
All items necessary to equip, operate, maintain and support military 
activities for either combat or administrative purposes (includes ships, 
tanks, aircraft, repair parts, etc. but not real property/facilities) 
Leadership 
Influencing people by providing purpose direction and motivation. This 
element includes the professional education required to prepare leaders 
to lead the fight 
Personnel 
The individuals (military or civilian) required to accomplish the assigned 
mission 
Facilities 
A real property entity consisting of one or more of the following: a 
building, a structure, a utility system, pavement, and underlying land 
Policy 
Any policy issues (DOD, interagency, or international) that may 
prevent effective implementation of changes to the other seven 
DOTmLPF-P elemental areas 
 
The Third Offset Strategy and Multi-Domain Operations rely upon both American 
technological prowess and tactical/strategic ingenuity. Military leaders will have to 
experiment in order to shape TTPs; doctrine; training; and exercises that allow Joint forces 
to leverage the technologies developed or perceived as necessary to gain the advantage [6, 
8]. If the wargames, models and simulations are creative and rigorous, they can help resolve 
complex military challenges by reducing the complexity in order to identify the few 
important factors that constrain friendly forces and systems [3].  
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With limited resources and competing demands, the military is required to do the 
most with what it has to accomplish the mission for a given set of requirements, constraints, 
and assumptions. When unexpected emergent demands arise (contingency operations, 
natural disasters, civil unrest, etc.) with near-peer conflict possible, it is imperative that 
Army planners send the right balance of capabilities to support the required mission set 
given the limited supply and high demand of personnel and materiel elsewhere around the 
globe. 
1.1.4 Future Approach to Acquisitions  
The Army established the Army Futures Command (AFC) in 2018 to place all 
future development, acquisition and testing of future technology under one unified 
command structure.[13] Within the AFC, the Army established eight cross-functional 
teams to focus on specific capabilities: Long-range precision fires (LRP), Next generation 
combat vehicle (NGCV), Future vertical lift (FVL) Network command, control, 
communication, and intelligence, Assured positioning, navigation, and timing (A-PNT), 
Air and missile defense (AMD), Soldier lethality (SL), and Synthetic training environment 
(STE) [18]. These CFTs are focused on the development of new equipment and doctrine 
necessary to prepare for future high intensity conflict against near-peer threats while 
simultaneously deterring additional threats and conducting irregular warfare throughout 
the globe.  
As part of the emerging AFC processes, there is a major effort to rework the CBA 
and JCIDS process from bottom-up process to a top-down Futures Development Process 
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to prioritized work efforts that have the highest payoff for improving the Army’s 
capabilities. 
In Task of this emerging process, CFTs must “develop an approach to enable work 
prioritization that considers challenges, opportunities, and senior leader issues that 
incorporates outputs from models and simulations, wargames, and experimentation to 
create the initial rankings” [13]. A rapid method would aid this analysis as much as it would 
the traditional CBA and JCIDS process; especially if the method is more flexible than 
traditional data-driven, playback approaches. 
1.1.5 Observations 
The future of warfare will span all five domains: air, land, sea, cyber and space; 
much of which is wrought with uncertainty and difficult to quantify. The strategic 
environment is changing too fast for the Army to dedicate to a single specific operational 
concept like Air-Land Battle of the 1980s [9]. Myopic focus on a single scenario and 
strategy has resulted in failures of past acquisition efforts which still hang heavy over the 
Army. Failed or canceled underperforming programs such as the Future Combat System, 
the Armed Aerial Scout, the Comanche helicopter, and the distributed Common Ground 
System-Army cost tax-payers tens of billions of dollars. The Comanche helicopter program 
alone cost $5.9 billion [7, 9, 19]. Both Congressional and Army leaders have recognized 
this as problem. Therefore, it is “imperative to combine theory and practice, for doing either 
in isolation carries the risk of favoring the demands of today over the requirements of 
tomorrow” [2]. This task will require the ability to visualize and model complex systems 
and requirements. 
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Ideally, developers and stakeholders would have unlimited time and monetary 
resources to develop systems and make informed decisions regarding the acquisition and 
employment of new capabilities or the modification of existing systems. The real-world, 
however, is one of bounded rationality: information is limited; the human mind’s ability to 
process information is inadequate; and time is constrained [20]. Therefore, stakeholders 
require an efficient and holistic means to rapidly visualize systems, foster exploration and 
conduct informed, traceable, and repeatable means and ways trades for strategic-level 
financial, structural, and human investment decisions. 
 
The U.S. military must be able to visualize and model complex systems to both acquire 
new capabilities and determine how to employ them efficiently and effectively. 
Figure 3: Key Takeaway 
 
Clearly no method can predict the future, especially in a dynamic environment for 
which the enemy actions and random occurrences can have significant impact on the 
results. However, this fact does not diminish the value of assessments and evaluations to 
provide valuable insights. Current methods, discussed in subsequent chapters rely upon 
subjective reasoning of subject matter experts, advanced simulations, trial-and-error, and 
wargames to evaluate a proposed technology’s ability to improve desired operational 
measures of performance and operational measures of effectiveness [21]. 
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What are the limitations and benefits of these methods? Which methods can be used 
to explore the benefits of integrating systems into systems-of-systems or using them in new 
and different ways? How can all or some elements of the DOTmLPF-P spectrum be 
included? Clearly, no single method is enough to solve all problems, and the method 
utilized depends on the specific problem at hand and the question being evaluated. This 
leads one to consider alternative methods that are not currently employed to provide rapid 
assessment, the ability to make trades and play games, and conduct analysis of complex 
systems that may yield results to confirm subjective assessments or provide insights that 
might otherwise be overlooked due to the complexity of the problem set or method applied. 
Subsequent chapters will provide a summary of current methods based on literature review 
and discussions with subject matter expert practitioners in the field.  
1.2 Thesis Format 
This chapter introduced the need to develop an efficient, holistically model methods 
to generate executable architecture for existing complex systems-of-systems to inform 
generation of a capabilities need statement. A gap was identified in the ability to use 
simulation to aid both the wargaming and large-scale modeling processes This thesis will 
use the AISR and PED process to experiment and evaluate doctrine and capabilities; gap-
filling technologies; future technology and associated tactics; doctrine and policies to 
leverage these things against future threats evaluated against operational measures of 
performance (MOP) and operational measures of effectiveness (MOE).  
The second chapter will include a discussion from the initial literature review on 
the DoD Processes and Activities, the use of Model-based System Engineering (MBSE), 
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the use of Models and Simulation (M&S) in the DoD, and the challenges and gaps 
associated with these current methods. The chapter will also identify the relevant 
stakeholders, identify the overall problem, and the overall research objective, along with 
supporting research questions and hypotheses.  
The third chapter of this dissertation will present a more directed literature review 
on the relevant topics of Systems Thinking methods and M&S paradigms that will be useful 
in the development of a rapid methodology to support interactive strategic decision-
making. 
The fourth chapter will be an introduction to the overall framework and approach 
via the use of a real-world case study for demonstration purposes. It will provide more 
detail into MBSE used by DoD, specifically DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF).  
Using System Thinking methods, key variables and measures of effectiveness and 
performance are identified. A comparison of M&S paradigms is conducted to the preferred 
method for a fit-for purposed framework. It will then map the relevant DoDAF models to 
the creation of the M&S environment used for the evaluation of subsequent research 
questions. In this chapter the author will also walk through the development and validation 
of the M&S, its key attributes, and address relevant assumptions used in the creation.  
The fifth chapter addresses the second research question focused on the ability of 
the methodology to be rapidly modified to evaluate structural changes of a SoS. 
The six chapter addresses the third research question focused the ability of the 
methodology to conduct sensitivity analysis to holistically inform the most influential 
elements of a system-of-systems across the DOTmLPF-P via the use case of AISR PED. 
 12 
This chapter also demonstrates the method to create surrogate models for rapid exploration 
and comparison techniques. 
The seventh and final chapter summarizes the research problems and questions and 
provides a summary of the work completed, experiments performed, findings for each of 
the research questions, conclusions and contributions of the research and identifies area for 
future work.   
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CHAPTER 2. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
2.1 Existing Methods 
2.1.1 DoD Processes and Activities 
Following the Cold War, the U.S. Army emphasized a threat-based acquisition 
paradigm where concepts drove capabilities. In other words, the Army decided how it 
wanted to fight against a specific threat environment and invested in technology that would 
support it to that end, rather than having technological developments dictate how it fights 
[9]. During the War on Terror, however, the Army changed its acquisitions efforts to a 
capabilities-based paradigm under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS) a ‘bottom-up’ effort generated by Army centers of excellence and end 
users as part of the larger DoD Processes and Activities shown in Figure 4. Of these 
overlapping processes and activities, the most tightly interactive are the Defense 
Acquisition System (DAS), the management process; the Planning Programming 
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE), the funding process; and JCIDS, the end user 
requirements process utilizing the Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA). 
These processes are complicated by the asynchronous timelines involved with each. 
Specifically, the PPBE cycle is calendar driven and is a once-a-year process in four distinct, 
but interconnected phases that consider the current year, the following (budget) year and 
the four out-years beyond the budgeting year. JCIDS however, is needs driven and can 
vary based on the current threat or projected threat (asymmetric versus symmetric; counter-
terror versus conventional warfare) based on international politics and world order. Lastly, 
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the DAS is event-driven and requires data, testing, and design to be ready for specific 
milestones that require Milestone Decision Authority approval to advance to each of its 
five phases [22]. 
 
Figure 4: DOD Processes and Activities Interactions from [23]  
Trying to synchronize these efforts and timelines in conjunction with DOTmLPF-
P, changing strategic guidance, dynamic threats, and ongoing global operations is 
extremely complicated. Force by bounded rationality, short-sighted decisions may result 
in capabilities that provide little or no operational benefit for the given investment or, if 
prolonged in a quagmire of bureaucracy, are no longer relevant or needed when finally 
fielded. 
Furthermore, while Capabilities-Based Assessments are intended to identify and 
rank the most dangerous gaps, they do so at the lower-level under the assumption that 
bridging lower-level critical gaps will affect the strategic result end state. However, this 
often leads to hundreds if not thousands of identified gaps that need to be bridged with 
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technical or tactical solutions. Hence, a need exists for a method of modeling to inform 
decisions to address lower-level capability gaps with the ability to demonstrate and inform 
higher level operational outcomes; this method must agile, traceable, and repeatable. 
Ideally this method would include the ability to evaluate the means, or the capabilities and 
technologies used to conduct a mission; and the ways; or policies; by which those means 
are utilized. Additionally, the method should have the ability to incorporate elements from 
across the DOTmLPF-P spectrum to consider policy changes namely in how it chooses to 
man, train, organize, and organize the forces under consideration in accordance with the 
Army’s Vision Statement. [24]. 
2.1.2 Model-Based System Engineering  
M&S often plays an important role in military acquisition efforts by helping manage 
complexity especially given the focus on delivering integrated, network-centric systems-
of-systems [25-27]. Because military acquisitions requires collaboration amongst multiple 
stakeholders, M&S can often serve as an effective means of communication and facilitate 
shared understanding and insights. In the late 1990’s M&S was envisioned under the name 
of simulation-based acquisitions. In the systems engineering field, this concept has been 
deemed model-based systems engineering. By using M&S, systems engineers can help 
manage complexity and interactions at a granular level and then “presenting aggregated 
impacts and higher-level measures of merit to decision makers” [26]. The International 
Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines MBSE as: 
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Definition: Model-Based Systems Engineering is “the formalized application of 
modeling to support system requirements, design, analysis, verification and validation, 
beginning in the conceptual design phase and continuing throughout development and 
later life cycle phases” [28]. 
MBSE is part of a larger trend towards model-centric approaches rather than the 
document-centric approaches of the past. In the DoD, this document approach is part of the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and the DoD Architecture Format 
(DoDAF) [26-28]. 
2.1.3 DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) 
 The rapid development and expansion in use of computers and advanced 
communications made the battlefield more connected and more complex than ever before. 
Decision makers in the DoD and in other branches of the government recognized the need 
to standardize the methods used to develop the critical information systems domain under 
a joint unified vision to ensure interoperability and cost-effective systems. Created in 1996, 
it was deemed the Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Architecture Framework [29]. This goal of this architecture was 
to describe architectures using multiple views to answer operator questions, support the 
acquisition efforts, to ensure interoperability. It includes four architecture views (all, 
operational, system architecture and technical (which included functional, and physical)) 
executed in three phases (analysis, synthesis, and evaluation) as a means to map operational 
concepts to measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) for the 
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system (Figure 5). It is important to note that these MOP and MOE used to evaluate the 
system were for specified system requirements that were assumed to have a benefit on 
operational performance, not operational MOP and MOE explicitly [30]. 
 
Figure 5: Three Phases of Original C4ISR Architecture Development from [30] 
 
This architecture framework includes a dynamics model to characterize the 
dynamic behavior of the architecture. These models included state transition diagrams, 
event traces, and state charts. It is important to note that these were not executable models 
but static models to depict dynamic behavior of the architecture over time. Executable 
models were later created to analyze the dynamics of the architecture and identify errors 
that the static displays of dynamic behavior could not illustrate or detect. At the time, 
graphical methods and computer simulation methods were employed. Graphical methods 
included “Colored Petri Nets (Figure 51), Finite State Machines, and Behavior Diagrams” 
[30]. 
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 In February 1998, the DoD mandated the use of C4ISR Architecture Framework 
on all C4ISR architectures and directed the development of a new architecture to be used 
on all defense architectures. In 2003, the DoD replaced the C4ISR Architecture 
Framework with DoDAF Version 1.0 which included additional guidance and was to be 
applied to all DoD system architectures. The most current version is DoDAF 2.02 
introduced in 2010. According to the DoD, the purpose of the DoDAF is to :define 
concepts and models usable in the DoD’s six core processes: JCIDS, PPBE, Defense 
Acquisitions, Systems Engineering, Operational Planning and Capabilities Portfolio 
Management [31].  
 
Figure 6: DODAF 2.02 from [31] 
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DoDAF includes eight types of viewpoints (All, Capability, Data and 
Information, Operational, Project, Services, Standards, and Systems) totaling 50 different 
model views [31]. Not every view is required for every project, but each is an available 
tool to facilitate conversation depending on the use of the architecture. 
The primary official means to create these DoDAF products is through the 
utilization of SysML™, a software modeling tool that was created as a “dialect” of the 
Unified Modeling Language (UML). This modeling language is meant to provide a means 
to automatically generate the multitude of interlinked “blueprint” DoDAF products to a 
very high granularity to ensure consistency in format and detail across all engineering 
process included in a complete project. In general, the most common and least rigorous 
usage of SysML™ is to create “pretty pictures” with more advance applications using 
SysML™ as model simulation to parametrically analyze dynamic behavior with the ability 
to exercise some behavioral diagrams, including Activity, Sequence, and State Machine 
diagrams. [32] SysML™ has limited, and rarely used, executable system architecture 
capability behavioral and parametric specifications able to be simulated, with limited 
ability to partially execute system interfaces to ensure operation. This execution is done 
with the help of a simulation engine plug-ins such as MagicDraw Cameo Simulation 
Toolkit (CST™) or Papyrus Moka™.[33] However, in many cases in the DoD, DoDAF 





2.2  Modeling and Simulation in the Military 
2.2.1 Military Modeling Concepts 
Military analysts rely on modeling and simulation to approach the innumerable 
issues and uncertainty that the military faces; from personnel management and training to 
materiel acquisitions to combat operations. In general, there are three functional areas for 
military modeling: analysis, training, and acquisition.[35] Major decisions in the military 
affect human lives, can determine the allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars, and 
could have global geo-political implications. Modeling and simulation, in some form or 
another, has existed in the military as long as the military itself; be it in the form of training 
scenarios with actual force-on-force engagements of foot soldiers, map-based rehearsals, 
wargaming, mathematical models or advanced computer simulations.  
Current DoD simulations fall into three distinct categories: live, virtual, and 
constructive. As the name implies, live simulation involves real systems and real people 
such as in field exercises. Virtual simulations involve using real people to operate 
simulated systems such as in vehicle and aircraft simulators. Virtual simulation also 
includes incorporating simulated people or systems interacting with real people such as 
used in large scale theater military exercises to predict results, fabricate enemy movements, 
etc. Finally, constructive simulations are like those discussed in the preceding sections such 
as mathematical models, advance computer simulations, and wargaming and will be the 
focus of this discussion and research [36]. 
 Figure 7 from the DoD Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) User’s Guide 
provides a visualization of the DoD spectrum of analysis approaches. As one moves left 
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on the spectrum, the abstraction, fidelity, and cost decrease while convenience and 
accessibility increase. As one moves right on the spectrum, the abstraction decreases and 
operational realism increases, however, so to do costs. It is also important to note that this 
spectrum is not a menu of options for every system or every problem to be analyzed and 
addressed. Some problems and systems cannot be analyzed using models either due to 
modeling limitations or high associated risk due to uncertainty (loss of life, large 
investment, etc.). Likewise, not all problems or systems may be analyzed using exercises 
or other live simulation due to complexity or unavailability (future technology, limited 
resources, deployed operations, etc.). 
 
 
Figure 7: DOD Spectrum of Analysis Approaches from [37] 
 
No method is without its shortcomings. Starting from the left, the normative models 
are prescribed models to evaluate alternatives to suggest what should be done. 
Optimization models use rules and mathematical optimization to search a large set of 
alternatives for local optimums and provide a recommended solution based upon trying to 
minimize or maximize a given set of quantitative objectives within a given set of 
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assumptions and constraints, hence the abstraction from reality. Game theory models are 
similar but include the multi-sided competitive nature of combat. The evaluative methods 
on the right side of the spectrum begin with mathematical models that are used to 
quantitatively evaluate systems and operations analytically; such as the classic Lanchester 
Equations and variations thereof.[38] Monte Carlo simulations are an attempt to generate 
stochastic response by running multiple cases (typically around 10,000) with changing 
variable inputs to determine the statistical impacts of random events. Man-in-the-loop 
simulations involve a human player versus computer or machine. Typically, A human on 
human multi-sided simulation is typically referred to as a wargame, though one-side 
wargames are one of the many wargame types. Finally, exercises, though more 
representative of real operations have no ground truth as they are subject to human 
judgement and unpredictable human decisions leading to lack of repeatability for 
experiments and statistical issues [37]. 
All the methods are bounded by their own limitations on what they can and cannot 
include given a problem, constraints, and assumptions; echoing the “all models are wrong” 
principle. More realism means more human involvement and bias and unrepeatable 
uncertainty due to the variability and randomness in human behavior. Additionally, 
methods involving humans must run in real time making large number of alternatives 
impossible. For problems requiring the evaluation of tens if not thousands of alternatives 
be analyzed require increased speed and hence abstraction and modeler bias. 
2.2.2 Wargaming 
2.2.2.1 Wargaming Defined 
The Joint Planning Process vaguely defines wargames as “representations of 
conflict or competition in a synthetic environment, in which people make decision and 
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respond to the consequences of those decisions.”[39] The Army’s MDMP handbook also 
vaguely defines war-gaming as a “conscious attempt to visualize the flow of operations 
given the friendly force’s strengths and disposition, the enemy’s capabilities and possible 
[courses of action] COAs” [40]. Still, FM 6-0 Command and Staff Organization and 
Operations, defines war-gaming as a “disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt 
to visualize the flow of the operation” [41]. It goes on to detail eight specific steps and 
three methods (belt, avenue-in-depth, and box) using either maps of the area of operation 
or lines of effort. The most basic form of this process is manual and uses a tabletop 
approach with maps, matrices, and templates, while the more sophisticated methods may 
use computer-aided modeling and simulation Regardless, a wargame should follow an 
action, reaction, and counteraction methods force interactions and can be applied to any 
type of operation. According to the Center for Army Analysis Strategic Wargaming 
Division, wargaming designer LTC Brian Wade, PhD: “the analytic value of the wargame 
is more about insights from the players than from the actual outcome of the game. The 
increased detail required to fully explore the outcome of interactions is usually more 
appropriate for follow-on computer simulations” [42]. 
While wargaming has existed in some form or another since centuries before the 
establishment of the United States and has been in continuous use throughout the existence 
of the U.S. Army, recent focus (within the past 20 years) has been on campaign analysis, 
especially regarding modeling and simulation. The difference between wargaming and 
campaign analysis is subtle but important. Typically what differentiates a wargame from 
an exercise or a mere simulation is the existence of a thinking opponent and the inclusion 
of competition, though modern wargaming includes one-sided variants [43]. Campaign 
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analysis will typically use fixed scenarios and varies the numerical and technological 
components each time it is run, which is good for procurement decision by allowing 
campaign comparisons and determining the most cost-effective mix of capabilities and 
forces. Campaign analysis essentially focused on making trades of means with each 
iteration without altering the ways to quantitatively compare results. By contrast, 
wargaming focuses on experimenting with the scenario itself including where the conflict 
occurs, who is participating, and the strategies involved; essentially varying the ways and 
the means to determine a better way to approach a problem [6]. According to DepSecDef. 
Work and General Paul Selva: 
Having human players deciding their best actions, given their circumstances 
and expectations of what their adversary will do in response, is essential to 
effective wargames. In this, they are distinct from the typical mathematical 
or campaign modeling that largely seeks to remove dynamic human action 
from consideration [3]. 
Wargames in general should have three characteristics; they should focus on war 
or military activities, there should be some game or competitive aspect, and there should 
be some form of educational facet. Wargaming can be beneficial in evaluating the effects 
of difficult to quantify elements such as policy, technology, tactics, and political effects 
influence the desired result. Fundamentally, a wargame is simply a “tool for exploring and 
informing human decision-making” [44]. Therefore, the wargame can be supplemented by 
modeling and simulation, but must be in a way that allows decision-makers and planners 
to experiment with and visualize the effects of their decisions in the face of uncertainty.  
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The best wargames duplicate the realm of human judgement in conditions of 
uncertainty and unpredictability that utilize qualitative analytical techniques to allow for 
the exposure of idea and insights that are not readily obtainable through typical quantitative 
modeling, simulation, and optimization techniques. Players must be able to decide their 
actions with incomplete and imperfect knowledge and observe the response feedback to be 
effective. The games should not be rigged to a specific outcome nor create “self-fulfilling, 
self-congratulatory, self-deluding, or self-limiting prophecies” [3].  
Strategic and high-operational wargames should eliminate non-important 
complexities while still modeling complex behavior. No two wargames are alike and there 
is no defined single-standard method for conducting a wargame.  
2.2.2.2 Brief History of Wargames 
Modern wargaming can trace its roots to the reductionist ideals of the 
Enlightenment period, the premise of which is that one can describe complex phenomenon 
by analyzing its fundamental constituent pieces. This thought lead to the precursor of 
modern wargaming developed by Scotsman John Clerk who used model ships to step 
through battles and analyze the influence of ship arrangements, ship maneuvers, wind, and 
naval firepower had on combat effectiveness. However some experts contend that while 
providing valuable insights, his efforts, due to the lack of a thinking opponent were actually 
early modeling (representation of reality) and simulation (representation of reality over 
time) not wargames [43]. Nevertheless, Clerk’s method of attempting to solve military 
problems using linear, deductive mathematics is the precedent of modern, quantitative 
methods still in use [45].  
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Lieutenant William McCarty Little who helped found the Naval War College in 
1884, introduce wargaming there in 1887 using blackboards, maps, and miniature ships. 
Wargames have been conducted at the Naval War College annually since. Soon thereafter, 
wargames had a direct influence on the Navy’s budget and helped convince Congress to 
fun the Cape Cod Canal [43]. 
Lieutenant Little was an early systems thinker; he saw the value of looking at the 
whole messy, complicated processes and forced players to consider the broader complex 
problems holistically rather than to characterize the systems by their individual parts. This 
holistic systems-thinking was particularly innovating since the Industrial Revolution was 
underway and reductionist and technology focused solutions were in vogue. In 1899, the 
Army created its War College and with the help Lieutenant Little, introduce wargaming 
into its program as well [45].  
2.2.3 Evolution of Models and Simulation in the Military 
With the rapid increase in technological developments wargaming instead gave 
way to the field of operations research (OR), which focused on, probability, statistics, 
numerical optimization and the newly expanding fields of modeling and simulation in its 
methods. These methods, while valuable, eschew the quantitative features in favor of game 
theory and other classic Cartesian-Newtonian methods based on reductionism, 
disciplinarity and multidisciplinarity [45]. The Cartesian-Newtonian scientific method 
attempts to divide complex problems into different parts which are investigated to gain 
insight into the behavior as a whole; assuming their behavior is the same when aggregated. 
The problem that arises is that the element of warfare are interdependent and therefore 
problematic, “a set of problems in which one problem arises though other problems which 
then support it” [46]. Like attempting to optimize individual elements at the risk of failing 
to optimize the whole, solving one problem may make the others worse. However, that is 
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not to say that OR was not beneficial nor successful, as it was able to determine ways to 
allocated scarce Allied resources in the Battle of the Atlantic in WWII, amongst other 
successes, which led to the creation of the RAND Corporation in 1948 and OR’s continued 
and heavy use today in all branches of service. 
 When Robert McNamara took office as the Secretary of Defense under President 
John F. Kennedy in 1961, the former CEO of General Motors attempted to merge proven 
OR techniques (namely M&S) with management methods from civilian sector. His aim 
was to improve DOD acquisition efforts by completing a “life cycle cost analysis to learn 
what a proposal would really cost and then use OR techniques to estimate military utility” 
[43]. This method was the precursor to what would later be codified as the DOD Planning 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) and was used to develop the concept of 
an air-mobile division in the Army, amongst other innovations.  
 ‘Wargaming” of the 1980s and 1990s became increasingly technical and 
simulation-dependent with a heavy reliance on commercial war-gaming software. These 
software packages allowed for quicker development of wargames to develop plans without 
the use of maneuver troops. The models were attrition focused, and while they could 
predict attrition rates, they were unable to adjudicate the strategic impacts, nor did they 
allow decision makers to see the complex interactions of their decisions [45].  
 The Department of Defense spent more money on modeling and simulation 
“wargaming” in the 1990s than they did in the previous decades combined. However, as 
noted in his reflective paper “Army Operations Research—Historical Perspectives and 
Lessons Learned”, Dr. Seth Bonder, arguably one of the greatest contributors to Army OR 
and a Military Operations Research Society Fellow, “millions, if not billions of dollars, 
have been spent on the development of JSIMS, WARSIM, and JWARS over a number of 
years without, unfortunately ,any appreciable use” [38]. These, like all of the simulation-
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dependent Global Wargames of the time “focused on analytical outcomes…rather than on 
the deliberative processes employed by the players and their adversaries, which are equally 
important [45]. At the time, RAND identified the idea that “a more comprehensive 
adjudication of armed conflicts” was required and without such, more computing power 
would just produce more incorrect answers with better graphics with different software 
looking at individual regimes an giving different answers to the same questions [43]. This 
trend of substituting computing power for human effects and system impacts has continued 
to the present day; leading to DepSecDef Works’ concerns that the DOD has lost its ability 
to conduct effective wargames [3]. 
2.2.4 Modern Military M&S Hierarchy 
The Defense Modeling and Simulation Coordination Office maintains a catalogue 
of thousands of previously produced models designed and used for a variety of problem 
sets, though most are not maintained and require specific used in their development [47]. 
Many of the models and simulations were designed as specific acquisition tools or for 
operations research. These models may range from large-scale combat modeling and 
simulation to estimate outcomes to specific engineering performance models. Other 
modeling and simulation methodologies used include war game simulations, agent-based 
simulations, stochastic, models, linear programming, and other tools from the realm of 
operations research [48]. 
Figure 8 depicts the DOD modeling hierarchy in terms of warfighting scope. The 
base of the hierarchy is engineering models with very high resolution and very low 
aggregation. These are modeling physical systems and system characteristics such a single 
radar system or missile and great care must be taken to include detailed, accurate physics. 
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These are usually a snapshot in time or focus on the order of only a few minutes of 
operation. Engagement level models would be a force-on-force scenario of only a few 
numbers of systems or small units. While engagement level models will still include 
relevant physics, they are primarily concerned with tactics of the engagement and 
determining strengths and weaknesses against enemy capabilities. 
 
Figure 8: DOD Modeling Hierarchy from [35] 
 
These engagement simulations depict only a few minutes [35] to a few hours. Mission (or 
Raid) level simulations would contain larger force-on-force simulations for a longer period 
of simulated time (hours or a few days). Physics are limited to only key contributors at 
lower fidelity, usually through the employment of data generated by models lower in the 
hierarchy if they exist. Campaign analysis is the highest level of abstraction and lowest 
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resolution meant to depict an abstract representation of an entire war on the order of weeks 
to months [37].  
In the past few years, the U.S. Air Force has invested in a new “framework” rather 
than a single model to join the existing Air Force Standard Analysis Toolkit (AFSAT). 
This framework, the Analytic Framework for Simulation (AFSIM), is an agent-based 
simulation framework developed by Boeing and now managed by the Air Force Research 
Laboratory [35]. AFSIM is used by over 150 organizations to include the Army. However, 
AFSIM, while a framework for capable of rapid scenario composition is currently limited 
to engineering through mission level simulation and lacks the capability to model a 
campaign needed to incorporate every aspect (logistics, communications, space, cyber, 
intangibles, etc.) over a series of related major operations. To do so would not only be an 
overwhelming task in an agent-based simulation, but would be costly monetarily and 
computationally, requiring intensive computation power and time for multiple (if not 
thousands) iterations to run [49]. 
2.2.5 Modern M&S Challenges 
The Modeling and Simulation Guidance for The Acquisition Workforce emphasizes 
that the current M&S methods can “model many things quite credibly today, such as 
physical capabilities, natural phenomena, and physics-based interactions, it is much more 
difficult to reliably represent things we understand less well, such as human behavior, 
reliability, and emergent behaviors of complex systems” [26].  
As will be expounded upon in Section 3.3.2, Discrete Events Simulation (DES) 
allows users to track events through time and explore progress through the system but use 
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a fixed structure to do so. While it is good for analyzing processes and can include 
stochastics, it is primarily concerned with process details and does not overtly seek to 
analyze feedback loops or emergent behavior and has difficulty capturing and quantifying 
the effects of human behavior.  
Agent-based modeling (expounded upon in Section 3.3.3) can be constructed 
without a priori knowledge regarding global interdependencies and given a set of 
preprogrammed rules, can inform emergent complex dynamic behavior at the global level. 
However, these agents are brittle and will fail when presented with unusual data or 
unpredictable human behavior. Additionally, these types of models must be heavily 
aggregated at each level to reduce computational expense. Changes must be made to agent 
behavior and the entire model run again, limiting the number of means and ways trades 
that can be made. Additionally, like the Rand publication suggests, ABM tend to only 
recreate a playback of a scenario and are not an interactive simulation. The lack of 
interaction results in a loss of learning by the players and insights gained from the players 
that traditional wargaming provides. 
All three commonly used military M&S paradigms are challenged with the ability 
to include difficult to quantify variable such as IO, space, and cyber effects. However, 
inclusion of such factors is a current topic of research with some approaches such as the 
Implicit Model Development Process augmentation to the Model Development Process 




2.3 Defining the Problem 
2.3.1 Stakeholders 
There are many stakeholders that can benefit from having a rapid means to execute 
and analyze complex system-of-systems architecture. Ideally in a holistic systems-thinking 
manner can provide a balance between purely manual methods and fully virtual simulation 
methods. There is not currently an overarching model for analysis of this entire system to 
provide a common architecture and foundation for communication between all these 
entities. 
A sample lists of stakeholders includes Army operational commanders and planners 
at every echelon from strategic commanders down to brigades responsible for conduct of 
operations (STRATCOM FORSCOM, COCOMs, INSCOM), doctrine developers and 
training organizations (TRADOC, TCM), acquisition and modernization organizations 
(AMC, FUTURES, PEOs), original equipment manufacturers, industry vendors, 
Operations Research personnel, Congress, and senior leaders (DOD, JCS, Service). 
Table 2: Stakeholders Benefit from Rapidly Developed Executable Architecture 
Stakeholder Group Needs and Uses 
Developers Generate future capabilities 
Improve existing capabilities 
Develop doctrine, strategy, TTPs 
Researchers Conduct Analysis 




Conducted operations and PED 
Develop strategy and TTPs 
Decision Makers Balance system effectiveness against 




Developers include developers of technology, training, and doctrine. In the realm 
of technology development, this group includes those involved in research and 
development (R&D) of new technologies, Army Futures Command (FUTURES) who 
generates requirements, Army Acquisitions personnel who must assess technological and 
material alternatives to satisfy capability needs and gaps, and the original equipment 
manufacturers and vendors that develop and supply the material solutions.  
A complex system-of-systems architecture has a multitude of stakeholders in the 
acquisition realm alone. For example, air vehicles themselves are designed, delivered and 
sustained by PM UAS under PEO Aviation, while sensor systems and data processing 
systems fall under PEO Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors (IEW&S) and are 
managed by one of the PMs within that organization (PM Aircraft Survivability Equipment 
(ASE); PM-DCGS-A; PM Sensors Aerial Intelligence (PM-SAI); PM Tactical 
Exploitation National Capabilities-Army (PM-TENCAP), or PM Electronic Warfare & 
Cyber (PM-EWC). TRADOC Capabilities Managers (TCMs) act as the centralized 
manager for all DOTmLPF-P solutions for the Army to ensure their integration into the 
overall employment strategy for the Army. They serve as the liaison between operational 
commands who will use the materiel solutions and the developers, testers and PMs 
responsible for the acquisition of said equipment. As one would expect, there are multiple 
TCMs involved in this complete AISR architecture, to include TCM Intel and Sensor, TCM 
Senor Processing, TCM UAS subordinate to the Intelligence and Aviation Centers of 
Excellence.  
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These entities must be able to evaluate the combat effectiveness of current 
capabilities against existing doctrine and against future threats; in absence of actual 
technology or material solutions being available these assessments are conducted using a 
variety of modeling and simulation. However, the most common means of modeling and 
simulation allow for technology trades to compare effects on capabilities related to 
customer requirements but not in operational environments. Other modeling and 
simulation allow for comparison of material solutions in a fixed environment that allows 
means trades but often has fixed ways of employment and do not include difficult to 
quantify factors to reduce noise for comparison. 
2.3.1.2 Researchers 
Researchers includes Army Operations Research personnel whose primary 
responsibility is to conduct studies and analysis to inform acquisitions and decision-making 
processes. This community informs acquisitions, manpower, modernization, and strategic 
decisions using numerical optimization, data analysis, machine learning, and modeling and 
simulation. It is this responsibility of this community to develop, maintain, and run the 
primary simulations in use today at every level (engineering, engagement, mission/battle, 
and theatre/campaign). The community uses advance models that can me massively time 
consuming and computationally expensive to run for each iteration. They are currently 
looking for ways to better conduct campaign level analysis that allows for means and ways 
trades that can incorporate difficult to quantify factors (cyber, space, training, etc.) could 
benefit from a methodology that allows initial analysis at a high level of aggregation and 
lower complexity that can aid in the identification of the most influential factors and 
validate assumption that are used in their high fidelity computational expensive models 
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and wargames. Theoretically, this will reduce computing time and expense and improve 
estimates that are used for the larger combat models rather than estimates of ISR 
effectiveness. 
2.3.1.3 Operational Commanders and Planners 
Operational Commanders and Planners extends from joint Combatant Commands 
(COCOMs) and Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) down to battalion level 
commands conducting tactical-level operations (flying aircraft, conducting PED, and 
coordinating fires). These commands develop plans for all noncombat and combat 
operations utilizing the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) to inform the Army 
Design Process and aid the commander in making and executing decisions. This detailed 
process includes the generation of multiple courses of action (COAs) and the analysis of 
these COAs via wargaming (either by lines of effort or map-based maneuver), to not only 
select the best COA but create decision points with branches and sequels to allow 
commanders to adapt plans and mitigate risks to the mission with changing conditions and 
enemy actions.  
The results of this analysis should better inform total assets combination required, 
the critical shortfalls in the existing system, identify vulnerabilities, and inform changes to 
the architecture routing in the development of new doctrine of the MDTF. Commanders 
are currently limited by the existing system and manual MDMP that are either reactionary 
or limited by the human inability to recognize non-linear causality that is typical of a 
dynamically complex problem and could benefit from systems thinking and M&S tools to 
make complex trades and improve their organizational standards.  
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Figure 9: Overlapping Stakeholder Gaps and Needs 
 
2.3.1.4 Decision Makers 
Decision makers are senior civilian including the Secretary of Defense, Service 
Secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the respective service component department 
level staffs. These senior leaders in the Department of Defense enact policy for the Joint 
force to accomplish strategic and transformative goals and ensure that the overarching U.S. 
strategic guidance created by the president and funded by congress is supported throughout 
each of the DOTmLPF-P domains within each branch of service. These senior defense 
leaders liaise with Congress to obtain funding for training and acquisition programs. They 
are tasked with balancing capabilities given finite resources while ensuring the U.S. 
military dominance in warfare and influence in peacetime global contingency operations. 
These decision makers must set requirements to balance system effectiveness against 
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affordability, schedule, and risk. M&S is just one of many ways that these senior leaders 
make informed decisions, but the M&S must aid in the communication, support, and 
understanding of those decisions. 
2.3.2 Challenges 
2.3.2.1 Complexity 
As the battlefield and the interconnected systems-of-systems utilized by the military 
become increasing complex so too do the associated DoDAF viewpoints. These DoDAF 
products are an important means to track, compare, and assess systems and changes to 
systems. These products/models are necessary to document, in detail, the essential 
elements and characteristics of a system and systems of system. Most importantly, 
architecture is used by the DoD “to understand what technology is needed and when to 
invest in that technology” [28]. However, the increasing complexity of large systems can 
lead to DoDAF products that are so large and so interlinked over so many viewpoints that 
the resulting products are difficult, if not impossible, for the average decision maker to 
comprehend let alone visualize the impact of technology or where to implement it.  
2.3.2.2 Bookkeeping 
Furthermore, with constantly evolving requirements and operations, existing 
DoDAF products may be incomplete or out of date. In addition, multiple systems that may 
have to interact on the battlefield are treated separately in terms of DoDAF creation, as 
they are managed by separate entities. The development of these products can be tedious, 
and at times are done after-the-fact as a bookkeeping measure rather than as part of systems 
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engineering design. Often this is the result of a misconception that DoDAF architecture 
products serve as a required bureaucratic exercise with no real long-term use [28]. Clearly 
this lack of updated and complete documentation presents difficulty when trying to make 
informed decisions on monetary investments, technology improvements, employment 
methodology, and the evaluation of alternatives against desired operational MOP and MOE 
across systems.  
2.3.2.3 Static Architecture in a Dynamic World 
In large part, this difficulty is compounded by the fact that these products are static 
whereas real combat systems-of-systems also have high levels of dynamic complexity and 
combinatorial complexity that arises from multiple systems interactions over time [51]. 
Decision-making and assessing dynamic systems are cognitive skills. Dynamic decision 
making requires the ability to process interrelated decisions and subjective uncertainty with 
the aim of attaining and maintaining a goal state with the ability to explore alternate courses 
of action and explore the system [52]. The human mind cannot easily synthesize multiple 
complex, interlinked static models. Static DoDAF viewpoints and models used for the 
design and analysis of the complex DoD system-of-systems, lack an efficient and holistic 
executable framework necessary for key decision-makers to rapidly foster exploration and 
conduct informed, traceable, and repeatable means and ways trades across the DOTmLPF-
P spectrum for strategic-level financial, structural, and human investment decisions 
evaluated against operational measures of performance. 
The ability to view executable dynamic simulations and results in real-time to 
observe how and why things change over time can provide much better insight into what 
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variables influence desired output behavior. This ability is improved further if decision 
makers can interact and make changes in a hands-on manner [53]. This is one of the reasons 
the military uses wargames and large-scale simulations to aid decision making. Static 
architecture cannot provide feedback information that is critical to the learning and 
decision-making process- especially for complex systems with potential interactions that 
are beyond human ability to visualize.  
DoDAF products are intended to be the foundations systems-of-systems and 
interoperability. Unfortunately the DoDAF architecture framework does not require 
inclusion nor provide guidance on a means to create executable dynamic simulation in 
conjunction with the creation of system architecture [28]. A static MBSE environment 
doesn’t include trade-off analysis, Monte Carlo simulations, game theory or other complex 
modern modeling and simulation tools to support analysis [54].  
In fact, Dr. Saurabh Mittal [55], of the Arizona Center of Integrative Modeling and 
Simulation (ACIMS) at University of Arizona identifies six primary shortcomings of static 
DoDAF, many of which have been discussed thus far. They are as follows: 
1) DoDAF mentions “executable architectures” but there is no 
methodology recommended to facilitate the development of executable 
DoDAF models. 
2) DoDAF overlooks the model-driven development approach. 
Consequently, there is no formal M&S theory that DoDAF mandates. 
3) DoDAF fails to address performance issues at the OV level. 
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4) DoDAF fails to include measures of effectiveness (MoEs) that can be 
evaluated at the OV stage. If any performance measures are considered 
at all, they are at the SV level. System parameters and performance is at 
a totally different resolution than MoEs. 
5) There is no mechanism to perform verification and validation (V&V) at 
the OV stage. 
6) It fails to address M&S as a potent evaluation and acquisition tool. 
2.3.2.4 Exclusion of M&S 
Executable simulations also take time to create, are often expensive (in terms of 
computing power and money) and can face questions of validity. The DoD Capabilities 
Based Assessment Users Guide, recognizes this fact and states that the “chain of command 
knows that analysis, modeling, and simulation can be very time consuming and expensive, 
and that many huge DoD analyses have produced little or no return” [37]. Additionally, the 
DoD Modeling and Simulation Guidance for the Acquisition Workforce, further provides 
that the “credibility, i.e., trustworthiness, of M&S is a paramount issue. If M&S cannot 
provide credible insights, the program is ill-served and the M&S investment wasted” [26]. 
As a result, simulation can often be excluded in favor of traditional static MBSE products 
and standardized decision making processes based on assertions and historical precedent, 
particularly with so many systems being developed under tight time lines by different 
organizations focused on different programs that, while being developed independently 
will eventually interact on the battlefield. 
2.3.2.5 Poorly Crafted and Supported Requirements 
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Exclusion of M&S is especially common during the end-user driven capabilities-
based assessment (CBA) and development of the initial capabilities document (ICD). 
(Figure 10) This exclusion is likely contributed to the Army Operations Researchers and 
Acquisitions observation that the ‘process does not strictly enforce the need for evidence-
based assessments” and that “some capability gap rankings [are] based on SME input only 
that may or may not be informed by a large body of evidence” [13].  
A reasonable, supportable estimate and justification of required changes should be 
made prior to the commitment to a materiel solution and the formal analysis of alternatives. 
At that point, many more systems, functions, detailed interactions, stakeholders, schedules, 
and budgets, must be considered as the capability is being developed. The systems and the 
SoS must be assessed in a representative joint operational environment. Without 
sufficiently reasonable estimated benefits of operational performance, the only means of 
assessment is live testing. However, live testing is expensive and “the scarcity of real 
equipment, range limitations, security, and safety concerns place significant limitations” 
on the process [26]. Therefore, it is far better to have reasonable assurances on the benefits 
prior to committing to this phase. The key to successful acquisitions is getting the first step 
correct: defining requirements and generating the ICD [22]. Getting this correct from 
complex static architecture is a significant challenge. Poorly written requirements 
(operational and technical) can lead to failure.  
The sponsor/end-user must be able to identify capability gaps in operational 
scenarios and estimate the impact of those gaps in terms of operational MOP and MOE. 
Additionally, they should be able to characterize the reasons for the gaps such as policy 
limitations, insufficient forces, or ineffectiveness of capability in a given scenario.[37] An 
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analytical approach is critical to articulate these gaps and the proposed DOTmLPF-P and 
requested material solutions. The user must be able to justify which gaps are the most 
critical and back it up with evidence and be able to articulate it to senior stakeholders to 
convince them that the CBA built off of DoDAF provides “reasonable estimates for 
warfighting causes and effects.”[37] With so many potential focus areas and combinations 
that could lead to desired operational benefit, the end user must have a way to convince 
and support their request.  
 
 
Figure 10: DoD Needs Identification and Solution Process recreated from [37]  
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The inability to identify key areas upon which to focus technological developments, 
monetary investments, and material, training, and human resources can have a few 
potential outcomes. First is the inability to convince key decisionmakers that money should 
be invested, leading to a failure to invest funding or research into a potentially beneficial 
technology or DOTmLPF-P solution. Alternatively, money and effort could be invested in 
an area, based upon solely upon subjective SME assessments and decisions to ensure 
specified requirements are met. This can lead to event-oriented decision-making that 
address only immediate concerns without the ability to observe actual benefits, trends, 
feedback, and effects over time and does not provide the operational benefit for which they 
had anticipated.  
2.3.2.6 Overlooking Elements of DOTmLPF-P 
Lastly, if analysis focuses only on the technical or material solution, as is done in 
the material solution phase (analysis of alternatives) it could fail to capture additional 
manning, resourcing, and training requirements that are required to augment the material 
solution to make it fully viable as well as the means by which the resources will be 
employed. Though the ‘m’ is intentionally small in DOTmLPF-P to indicate it is only part 
of the solution and the last resort, history shows that it can often be the first solution at the 
expense of the other DOTmLPF-P variables.  
2.3.3 Gap Identification 
Creating executable system architecture is an ongoing area of research and 
development efforts. The approaches to generate executable architecture have been broad 
and attempt to capture the latest trends in simulation and optimization techniques. In 2008, 
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researchers from Missouri University of Science and Technology, introduced a paradigm 
for creating executable architecture for utilizing SysML™ software to translate SysML™ 
inputs to colored petri nets for dynamic system analysis [56]. In 2011, Dr. Griendling and 
Dr. Mavris introduced an architecture-based approach to identifying system-of-system 
alternatives utilizing DoDAF products deemed “ARCHITECT” (Architecture-based 
Technology Evaluation and Capability Tradeoff) for use in early development of systems 
of system acquisition efforts [57, 58]. In 2012, researchers at the U.S Air Force Institute of 
Technology conducted a study of executable architecture from DoDAF utilizing 
MATLAB’s SIMULINK™ to evaluate completeness and effectiveness [34]. Finally, in 
2015, researchers from Purdue University proposed a methodology for creating executable 
agent-based simulations for early phases of systems engineering analysis of alternatives 
utilizing MATLAB™ to simulate systems-of-systems architecture by modeling each 
function of the system as an agent [59].  
In 2014, Dr. Steven H. Dam, who participated in the development of C4ISR 
Architecture Framework and the subsequent DoDAF, published his book DoD 
Architecture Framework: A Guide to Applying System Engineering to Develop Integrated, 
Executable Architectures. In this book he highlights the challenges associated with creating 
executable architecture, available techniques to create them, and recommended criteria for 
selecting a technique. In his book, he highlights four major reasons that architecture is often 
not evaluated as executable: 1) a majority of system architects are not versed in M&S; 2) 
M&S people don’t speak “architecture”; 3) the MBSE community caters to system 
architecting professionals; and 4) current architecting tools to not allow for robust M&S 
(namely discrete event simulation, the in-vogue simulation method at that time) [28].  
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From the previous section, one tends to ponder what aspects of executable 
architecture could possibly be improved upon. Because of the large disparity of methods 
by which DoDAF architecture products are created and maintained and for the diverse 
military functions for which they are created, no single solution is adequate, and none of 
the touched upon methods suggest they are the ultimate solution. However, a few shortfalls 
are evidence by real world experience. 
The methods are mostly intended to analyze alternatives in early phases of 
acquisition. The point of analysis of alternatives is too far invested into the commitment of 
JCIDS process and far too detailed, takes too long to create then simulate, do not account 
for incomplete documentation nor crossed referenced documentation from other systems. 
Additionally, the methods allow for technology trades and some attempt to account for 
tactics and actions of agents, they do not include strategic-level leader considerations 
across the DOTmLPF-P spectrum such as the employment policy of assets, personnel 
manning, skills, training, and other difficult to quantify elements of real operations.  
As Dr. Dam notes in his book, a system engineer has two primary functions: 
technical orientation (transform requirements into solutions, generate information for 
decision-makers, and inform follow-on phases) and management orientation (informs 
controls needed to balance all system elements in the architecture) [28]. The methods are 
data driven and fail to acknowledge the management orientation. Additionally, these 
methods face the similar challenged that other M&S have faced in terms of their ability to 
transparently communicate information to stakeholders and decision makers. As noted in 
the Rand publication, Making the Soldier Decisive On Future Battlefield, “[c]urrent 
systems that claim to take a data-driven approach tend to only recreate a playback of a 
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scenario as opposed to creating an interactive simulation” [60] Many of the existing 
models, focus on output values as opposed to trends or policy, and tend to be abstract, 
making them difficult to explain to senior audience which could lead to lack of trust in 
validity of model outputs, however valid.  
Table 3: Desirable Attributes of an Executable Architecture 
Desirable Attributes of an Executable Architecture  
Easy to understand and communicate, visual and interactive 
Able to capture aspects across the DOTmLPF-P spectrum in a comparative, 
traceable, reproducible manner. 
Able to evaluate effectiveness of solutions in an operational environment 
Able to be rapidly modified and allow the ability to make trades and play games 
Provide insight into second and third order effects due to complex feedback structure. 
Computationally inexpensive and rapidly developed so it is more likely to be 
included. 
Produced using existing DoDAF products to develop interactive simulation 
regardless of format used to create architecture. 
Allow for the integration of separate systems with different DoDAF products  
 
Ideally, an executable architecture model that could be constructed quickly and in a 
manner that is easy to understand and could be created in the early phase of CBA by 
existing architecture regardless of format and create something that provides a common 
operating picture, the equivalent of the ubiquitous OV-1 (Operational Viewpoint 1) 
diagram-something everyone can understand look at and understand. However, unlike that 
simple picture, the model has underlying mathematical complexity that allows simulation 
nearly instantaneously with a means to explore millions of trades and can be used to play 
games to inform policy and acquisition decisions.  
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2.3.4 Overall Problem Statement 
Chapter 1 and the preceding sections of this chapter reviewed the basic principles 
of the DoDAF and the need for an executable architecture for existing complex systems-
of-systems along with the challenges and desirable attributes associated with it.  A 
crosswalk of relevant stakeholders, perceived gaps, and identified need is shown in Error! 
Reference source not found.. From these summaries, an overall problem statement can 
be developed as follows: 
Static DoDAF viewpoints and models used for the design and analysis of the complex 
systems-of-systems, lack an efficient and holistic executable framework to foster rapid 
exploration and conduct means and ways trades across the DOTmLPF-P spectrum 
evaluated against operational MOP/MOE. 
Figure 11: Overall Problem Statement 
From this overall problem statement, an overall hypothesis must be proposed. The 
subsequent sub problems and an case study using Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (AISR) with reach-back Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination 
(PED) with Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF) system-of-systems in a notional Decide-
Detect-Deliver-Assess (D3A) targeting operation will be used to defend the hypothesis to 




2.3.5 Overall Hypothesis 
Figure 12: Overall Hypothesis 
 
It is the authors belief that there is a middle ground fit-for-purpose solution that can 
be rapidly developed to inform decisions. From the authors perspective, through an 
objective analysis of commonly available simulation methodologies, System Dynamics 
provides a “goldilocks” simulation method that can serve as the simulation equivalent of 
the ubiquitous OV-1 High Level Operational Concept Graphic: something that 
communicates well to all audiences and provides high-level technical orientation and 
management orientation.  
The objective of this research is to explore an efficient alternative means to 
developing executable architecture for early capabilities needs assessment on existing 
systems-of-systems There is a need for a new approach to enable to efficiently assess 
critical systems that serve as the ‘brain center’ of the military and encompasses hundreds, 
if not thousands, of interacting systems yet are too large to envision without executable 




If a complex system-of-systems is modeled with a holistic executable architecture (EA) 
it can be used to sufficiently identify the critical elements necessary for further analysis 
to better assess its overall behavior and structure and inform higher-level decisions.  
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2.3.6 Overall Research Objective 
Figure 13: Overall Research Objective 
 
This method will demonstrate the ability to aid the modelers and decisionmakers in 
the identification and implementation of feedback systems thinking and reduce complexity 
of an existing complex system-of-systems architecture that is constantly evolving. This 
method can be used to visualize dynamically complex problems or scenarios wrought with 
interdependencies and simplify them with the aim of qualitatively and quantitatively 
evaluating the effect of decisions and policy on measures of performance or effectiveness 
for a given operational task while testing new policies and strategies. This method allows 
for human decision-making but also provide an insight into emergent behaviors of new 
techniques and tactics to refine assumed relationships for better understanding and focus. 
2.4 Problem 1: Evaluating Existing Complex System of System Architecture 
During primary development, the C4AISR Architecture Framework and the later 
DoDAF models considered only computers and software. Therefore, M&S were of discrete 
events and thusly the discrete modeling paradigms (Petri-Nets, DES, etc.) were the default 
Develop and demonstrate an efficient and holistic framework for a complex system-of-
systems to allow for means and ways trades and enable multiple stakeholders to conduct 
electronic design reviews on an existing system-of-systems in order to analyze 
technological benefits, limitations and policy impacts for future investment and strategy. 
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for executable dynamic models [30, 56]. However, this notion fails to account for the 
emergent behavior inherent to the assets that collect the intelligence in real-world 
operations and assumes linear relationships between variables with a fixed structure. Real-
world military systems-of-systems are more complex. They include not just in the 
employment of the assets but in the manpower requirements to operate equipment and to 
conduct operations. Additionally, traditional methods neglect the possibility of enemy 
actions to disable the network or eliminate assets. Rather than evaluate a system-of-
systems’ effectiveness against stated performance requirements for a system design 
specification, it is useful to mapped to operational MOP & MOE to better evaluate the 
ability to satisfy the warfighters’ needs. 
Figure 14: Problem 1 Summary 
 
Existing DODAF models are static and while they can be updated over time to 
reflect changes, most changes that are made to an existing system-of-systems are difficult 
to assess. Recommendations for changes usually come from gaps identified by end users 
through operational use though no means exists to efficiently evaluate changes of policy 
and technology improvements to system structure to the impact to larger DOTmLPF-P 
considerations against operational force constraints and against operational MOE/MOP. 
Current proposed means to develop executable architecture are cumbersome, manually 
created simulations to assess specific elements of architecture connectivity and design 
MOP.  
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While methodologies such as the Architecture-base Technology Evaluation and Capability 
Tradeoff (ARCHITECT) have been proposed to improve agility in defense acquisitions 
these methods, like the DODAF models themselves are aimed at the early phases of design 
and acquisition. Dr. Kelly Griendling, creator of ARCHITECT, stated that “a better 
treatment of both the consideration of the ease of integration of solutions into the existing 
SoS and exploration of verification are both also areas which would benefit greatly from 
further research”[58].  
Figure 15: Objective 1 
2.4.1 Research Question 1.1 
Figure 16: Research Question 1.1 
Typically, the construction of a model and simulation can be accomplished through 
a combination of data, observations of an existing system and developing the system 
structure through interviewing SMEs. Military systems have the unique requirement of 
MBSE DoDAF models that can be used as the foundation of the creation of the model, 
even if not all DoDAF viewpoints may be available or even used for an existing system. 
Demonstrate the ability to efficiently execute and evaluate an existing dynamic system-
of-systems architecture (via AISR PED use case). 
What means are available to aid in the use of systems thinking to understand the system 
structure as the first step of conceptualizing the model? 
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2.4.2 Hypothesis 1.1  
Figure 17: Hypothesis 1.1 
However, as discussed in Sections 2.1.3 and 4.3 on DoDAF architectures, there are 
over 50 architecture viewpoints/models, only some of which exist for the current system.  
 
Figure 18: DODAF 2.0 Overview from [31] 
 
Existing DoDAF models of a system or system-of-systems can be used to initially 
describe and construct the fit for purpose executable architecture. Interviews with SMEs 
and data can then be used to close the gap and adjust to real-world dynamics.  
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This fact raises the question of which of the 50 DODAF models are needed and can be 
mapped to a M&S. Section 4.3 will discuss which viewpoints are most valuable for the 
creation of the executable architecture and the rationale for use.  
2.4.3 Research Question 1.2  
Figure 19: Research Question 1.2 
Section 3.3 will provide a review reviewed the most common modeling and 
simulation paradigms. Section 2.2 will provide a review of military modeling and 
simulations history, the philosophy behind military, simulation types currently in use, and 
most importantly, why the military uses the methods it does and the benefits of each. The 
answer may not be a single method; it may be combination of methods. It certainly depends 
on the questions being explored.  
Additionally, the DoD Capabilities-Based Assessment Users Guide stresses that the 
approach must fit the problem rather than be driven by availability of a particular tool or 
any claim that an existing model is already validated [37]. Dr. Seth Bonder, emphasized 
that statistical models that use data are intrinsically tied to current systems and are best 
used in retrospective analysis and that process models of relevant phenomena will better 
facilitate prospective analysis (i.e., planning and prediction). Models of military 
operational phenomena are tools with which to “provide useful information and insights to 
Which simulation methods are suitable to create an executable architecture of a complex 
system-of-systems? 
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assist decision makers in areas where direct experimentation is expensive and, many times, 
impossible” though they are “not accurate predictors of the future” [38]. 
The model should ideally be able to capture aspects such as human behavior, 
reliability, and emergent behaviors of complex systems. It should be interactive to inform 
decisions and provide insight rather than provide a simple playback. It should allow rapid 
trades of means and ways. It should be traceable, repeatable, and rigorous. It should be 
reduced to the minimum complexity required to evaluate the specific problem for which it 
is being applied. It should be inexpensive both in cost, in computing power required, and 
in time as the political environments, threats and funding can change rapidly. It should be 
easily modified to evaluate different structures and policies. The proposed model should 
be able to identify critical elements of the system that contribute most to overall MOE and 
MOP to identify current shortfalls and inform future acquisitions and DOTmLPF-P 
solutions or recommendations. 
2.4.4 Hypothesis 1.2  
Figure 20: Hypothesis 1.2 
To construct this M&S, we must first seek to apply systems thinking. Regardless 
of the modeling methodology pursued, we must first seek to understand the system 
structure so that we can recognize interconnection and identify and understand feedback 
System Dynamics can provide an overarching M&S architecture that can capture key 
aspects of the system and enable understanding of technology benefits and limitations, 
policy impacts, and the likely outcome of future investment strategies. 
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which is also part of the first step of Forrester’s modeling process (Figure 47: Forrester's 
6-Step SD Modeling Process recreated from [69])  
2.5 Problem 2: Changes to Policy and System Structure 
Decision-makers need a means to identify are the most influential elements in obtaining 
the desired performance over time relative to operational MOPs/MOEs to properly 
allocate resources and assets with structural changes. 
Figure 21: Problem 2 Summary 
 
Stakeholders are under constant pressure to prioritize technological improvements 
and investments. It is difficult to ascertain, especially in complex systems-of-systems, if 
existing policies, structures, assets and resource allocations (training, personnel, monetary 
investments, etc.) will have a large, if any, desired benefit to actual operations This can be 
further complicated by changes to actual structure of a system-of-systems which is more 
difficult to capture in many M&S paradigms without major revisions.  
 
Demonstrate the ability of the executable architecture to assess variations in system 
structure and holistically integrate various DOTmLPF-P solutions for sensitivity 
comparison. 
Figure 22: Objective 2 
 
 56 
2.5.1 Research Question 2.1 
With limited data available to assess system-of-systems architecture, what method 
provides the best means to determine which elements of the system are most influential? 
Figure 23: Research Question 2.1 
 
For many DoD SoS (particularly in AISR and PED), obtaining accurate statistical 
data can be difficult to obtain, can be unreliable as it is predicated from the presumption of 
accurate unit recording and reporting, or may even be classified. Therefore, it can be 
difficult to ascertain which elements of the system-of-systems is the most influential so 
that structural changes and effects can be evaluated. The methodology must allow for 
variability of input values.  
2.5.2 Hypothesis 2.1  
A Monte Carlo Simulation for univariate and multivariate sensitivity analysis 
(parametric analysis) can sufficiently determine the sensitivity of the model behavior to 
variations in parameter values. 
Figure 24: Hypothesis 2.1 
 
Previously the idea that sensitivity analysis via Monte Carlo Simulation has been 
identified as lacking in static architecture MBSE. For the interests of this study, the intent 
is to demonstrate the framework as an ability to analyze existing systems-of -systems with 
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a use case of AISR PED at the open source UNCLASSIFIED level. Therefore, actual data 
will not be used, but estimated values that can then be varied parametrically to demonstrate 
dependencies and influence of input variables on the system behavior and values over time.  
Monte Carlo analysis is a technique that allows the model builder to randomly 
assign input values based upon a probability distribution assigned to said input variable to 
account for epistemic uncertainty. By running tens of thousands of cases, it allows the 
simulation to output the results a histogram and can be displayed as probability density 
functions (PDFs) and/or cumulative distribution functions (CDFs). This also allows the 
modeler to take a deterministic model and make it into a probabilistic model that can 
probabilistically display the results over time.  
2.5.3 Research Question 2.2 
Changes in structure and policies can add difficulty in the creation of an executable 
architecture. For the use case, the introduction of the MDTF creates an alternative 
structure. Decision makers need to determine how information and resources should be 
tasked to the MDTF PED system to improve effectiveness relative to operational 
MOPs/MOEs. 
Figure 25: Problem 2.2 Summary 
An executable architecture that requires a complete reconstruction of the simulation 
for changes in structure and policy (which are common) is less likely to be utilized due to 
cost and time constraints. Flexible modifications of the executable architecture are 
paramount for rapid strategic-level decision making. Section 4.2.2 will introduce Army’s 
development of the Multi-Domain Tas Force (MDTF)  and the intent to integrate the 
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MDTF into the existing AISR PED architecture as a means to expedite actionable 
intelligence from the sensor to the shooter to effectively engage enemy targets. While the 
Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) already provides a way for tactical and 
operational intelligence analysists to access UAS feeds and posted intelligence products 
from the federated PED (see Appendix A) the experimental unit, in an attempt to combat 
fast moving multi-domain operations, intends to have its own PED internal to the 
organization to rapidly process information on actionable targets to form quicker targeting 
packages while the primary PED process larger-scale, specialize PED for long-term target 
development and strategic intelligence fusion. However, this begs questions such as: ‘How 
should personnel be allocated to this new structure? How much intelligence must be routed 
through the MDTF PED?; ‘Will such a change in structure increase or decrease the 
amount of intelligence products processed?’; and “How much growth (DOTmLPF-P) is 
required?”  
Using the AISR PED enterprise as a use case, demonstrate the ability to develop an 
alternative system structure to include the MDTF and determine how much intelligence 
it must be able to process to increase the operational effectiveness. 
Figure 26: Objective 2.2 
 
For the AISR PED use case, how do the additional structure of the MDTF and additional 
DOTmLPF-P changes affect the PED system? How should resources be allocated? 
Figure 27: Research Question 2.2 
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This research question will serve to demonstrate the ability to vary system structure 
in the executable architecture to evaluate its effect on the desired performance over time 
against operational MOP/MOE. Trivial solutions would include simply increasing the 
number of personnel and assets, but the real-world is constrained. 
2.5.4 Hypothesis 2.2 
Adding the MDTF will improve the operational MOP/MOE by reducing delays only if 
it is allocated the appropriate number of personnel and technical improvements.  
Figure 28: Hypothesis 2.2 
 
The major contributor to dynamic behavior is a result of delays.[51, 61] Changes to 
SoS structure and policy can have negative effects despite the best intentions of the 
decision makers. There is a need to inform policy and structural decisions in an executable 
fashion. Adding complexity to the structure could serve to create additional bottlenecks of 
reporting if the appropriate information is not routed properly to the expedited system. 
Additionally, DOTmLPF-P considerations will have a direct impact. For example, if 
manpower and workstations are simply transferred from the federated PED to the MDTF, 
the result may be delayed strategic products and increased intelligence backlog at the 
federated PED. An executable architecture allows decision makers to explore alternatives 
in an interactive manner to visualize the effects. 
2.6 Problem 3: Asset and Resource Allocation 
2.6.1 Research Question 3 
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Event-oriented thinking that is commonplace within large organizations and is very 
typical in decisive minded leaders. This is because the real-world environments in which 
they must make decision is one of bounded rationality where information is limited and 
often unreliable, the human mind is limited in capacity to evaluate and process the available 
information, and there is a limited amount of time to decide. This just as true in combat 
operations as it is in the ever changing geopolitical and fiduciary landscapes. 
dissemination, tactical relays, satellite gateways, network operations, and lastly, platforms.  
 
Can the executable architecture be used to identify elements and values of the SoS 
architecture that have the greatest impact on operational MOP/MOE in the larger 
operational construct?? 
Figure 29: Research Question 3 
 
For the use case, the AISR PED enterprise architecture use case will continue to be 
under significant strain to satisfy increasing demands for intelligence used for planning and 
targeting. The Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 2017-2042 identifies four primary 
areas of emphasis for UAS improvement: interoperability, autonomy, network security, 
and human-machine collaboration [11]. The DOD has proposed improvements to the 
enterprise in five blocks through FY2024 depicted in the Table 4 and Figure 30.  
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Figure 30: UAS Integration Roadmap Schematic from [11] 
 
The UAS Roadmap phased materiel initiatives provide an ideal example of the urgent need 
to rapidly evaluate proposed materiel solutions along with other elements from across the 
DOTmLPF-P spectrum for complex systems of systems. Stakeholders must be able to 
prioritize requirements and asset allocations to meet the increasing demand in a fiscally 
constrained environment. 
The reader should refer to Appendix A that outlines the addition of UAS assets 
occurring throughout this entire period This linear treatment implies that some thought 
process was put in to prioritizing these efforts; it could be limited by budgetary constraints 
or technology availability. However, as this information is not readily available to the 
public and DOD Unmanned Systems Integration Roadmap 2017-2042 provides little detail 
as the reasoning behind the sequence of the phased block improvements. Therefore, one 
could also presume, based on experience in the field, that the order is driven by demands 
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from end users who are identifying sources of their particular “bottle necks’ without 
looking at the holistic system. 
 
Table 4: UAS Integration Roadmap Initiatives from [11] 
Block Element FY Purpose/Plan 
1 Dissemination 21 
Programmed capability to ingest and distribute 
sensor/video data in near real-time on US classified 
networks 
2 Tactical Relay 22 Add LOS-only platforms to Defense Information System Network (DISN)for global distribution 
3 Satellite Gateways 23 
System of universal gateways will support global 
distribution of sensor data via DISN 
4 Network Operations 24 
Integrate current disparate NETOPs activities and 
establish COP for sensor data transport 
5 Platforms 24 
Life-cycle upgrades, multi-band satellite 
capabilities, improved survivability in A2AD, NSA 
encryption to prevent intercept/tampering 
 
Obviously, the block improvements consider the entire system, but over a fiscal 
year timeline. This begs the question ‘what if money runs out or the budget is cut?’ as often 
occurs in the PPBE cycle. There is also a question of if the U.S. will get involved in another 
global engagement or escalate demands in one of the other areas in which it is already 
operating. Which of these initiatives are the most influential on the behavior of the system-
of-systems and should be prioritized if technology allows? These block initiatives exist 
because decision makers and end users need more AISR than is currently available. The 
Roadmap2017-2042 refers to machine learning and artificial intelligence throughout the 
document as the largest initiative to improve PED. Will PED technology alone improve the 
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system-of-systems and how much (in terms of amount of intelligence processed resulting 
reducing delays from sensor to shooter) is needed? 
2.6.2 Hypothesis 3 
The EA can be used to generate surrogate models to identify the most important aspects 
and optimal values of the SoS variables against operational MOP/MOE to inform 
exploration and investment. 
Figure 31: Hypothesis 3 
 
2.7 Research Intent and Summary 
The intent of this research is to explore an efficient alternative means to developing 
executable architecture for early capabilities needs assessment on existing systems-of-
systems. Given the authors extensive background in aerial intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance, and the C4ISR origins of the DoD Architecture Framework, such a use 
case to demonstrate this methodology seems appropriate. 
This method must be able to holistically evaluate higher-level DOTmLPF-P 
considerations for the current, transition, and future states of the enterprise. It should 
provide decision makers with insight as to the trend effects resultant of decisions, operating 
methods, and enterprise structure. It should be capable of being used as a training tool much 
like war gaming; a laboratory to play games and foster explorations. It should aid in 
identification of vulnerabilities and potential for improvement. Ideally the simulation 
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would be computationally inexpensive. The results should be traceable and repeatable to 
provide scientific backing to requirements and decisions.  
An executable dynamic simulation is often needed to fully assess, visualize, and 
understand a complex architecture framework, yet DoDAF guidance provides little to no 
guidance on executable simulation. The primary simulation methods used in modern 
military simulations tend to be computationally expensive which leads to lack of use or 
limits use to subsystems analysis. As a result, simulation developers may fail to capture the 
complexity of the system-of-systems or may not fully explore the design space to evaluate 
many possible alternatives across the DOTmLPF-P spectrum against operational 
MOP/MOE. Other methods include the use of war games, expert seminars/workshops, or 
the infusion of experimental organizations into costly large-scale exercises. These methods 
provide valuable insight, but the results are not repeatable. A “middle ground” between no 
simulation and highly detailed simulation must exist that can adequately enable an 
executable architecture capable of providing technical orientation and management 
orientation [28]. 
The power of modeling is its ability to aid in the identification of macro-interaction 
and trends expected of systems-of-systems and/or be used to inform high-fidelity 
simulations. The intent of this study is to demonstrate the applicability of modern computer 
assisted methods to assist in providing previously difficult or impossible to identify 
dynamic and complex second and third order feedback loops at the macro-level (lower 
fidelity). In addition, this method will aid in identifying areas where it may be necessary to 
utilize higher fidelity engagement-level modeling as necessary to inform only the aspects 
of the aggregate model that are most influential on the desired measures of effectiveness. 
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By doing this, modelers can generate a model using available expertise and information 
rather than rely solely upon historical data that was poorly collected, does not exist for 
future systems, or may be unavailable due to classification levels.  
The author’s intent is to develop a system dynamics (SD) model depicting the AISR 
PED as part of the D3A (decide-detect-deliver-assess) [62] kinetic targeting cycle with 
long-range precision fires (LRPF) as a use case to demonstrate the overall method. The 
author desires to yield new observations, provide traceability and reproducibility while 
examining the consequences of proposed structural and technological changes suggested 
by the Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 2017-2042 to the existing system-of-
systems.  
The initial model will be based upon the current AISR architecture that has been 
rapidly expanded over the past 15 years in support of contingency operations. To maintain 
the model at the UNCLASSIFIED level, a hypothetical multi-intelligence UAS is used 
with estimated ranges of values. Future models can include the use of classified data. The 
model will be verified and validated based upon the output trends through direct structure 
tests (assessing each of the relationships individually) and structure-oriented behavior tests 
(running the simulation for the entire model). The simulation will then be used to explore 
sensitivities/primary influencers where small changes lead to large changes to mission 
effectiveness and substantial return on investment. Monte Carlo analysis will yield multiple 
combinations that will yield desirable effects which can be used to allocate resources and 
inform key decision makers. Surrogate models will be created to provide instantaneous 
results for rapid comparison of various combinations.  
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Next, the M&Sl, using the existing AISR PED architecture as a baseline, will 
explore the effects of introducing a structural change to the PED process, i.e. the 
introduction of the MDTF PED. This model could be used to inform MDTF requirements 
and structure which can be verified using future exercises (outside the scope of this 
research). The M&S can be used as the overarching model to play games. For areas 
determined most influential, smaller higher fidelity models can be used to create a better 
informed a blended model. (Future work beyond this thesis).  
The AISR architecture and sub-architectures are quite expansive and complex. A 
model that includes every detail would be both classified and take a dedicated team several 
months to develop. The intent of this academic effort is not to suggest a complete overhaul 
of the existing reach-back PED system, nor does it intend to demonstrate the complete 
system with all its complexities. Such an endeavor would be beyond the scope of a single 
thesis. There is no attempt to make an absolute judgement on any policy, strategy, or 
acquisition effort. Nor is it an attempt to redefine the entirety of JCIDS and DoD 
Architecture Format (DoDAF), but rather introduce a way to evaluate trades in a dynamic 
environment for a large system-of-systems against operational MOP/MOE to improve 
decision making.  
Lastly, the intent of this study is to propose a means to capture aggregate trends 
associated with difficult to quantify and difficult to model impacts (cyber, training, morale, 
etc.) that are difficult or impossible to model with high-fidelity simulations reliant upon 
pre-programmed behaviors. Ideally this simulation is possible with readily available 
modeling software that can be generated and manipulated more rapidly without the need 
for massive amounts of computing power required of most modern military agent-based 
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simulations. The author seeks to add an additional methodology to the repository of 
effective analysis techniques. 
An abbreviate summary of the research problems and questions is shown in Figure 
32 below for reference.  
 
Figure 32: Overall Research Problem Diagram 
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Systems Engineering Concepts  
This dissertation hopes to explore and demonstrate a solution to the problem of 
executable architecture through the application of “Systems Thinking,’ Modeling and 
Simulation (M&S), and surrogate modeling. Before addressing the identified problems and 
research questions, it is important to provide the reader with some basic understanding of 
terms and concepts that will be used in this document for reference. This subchapter will 
address basic Systems Engineering Concepts gleaned from an expansive literature review 
conducted by the author. 
3.1.1 Definitions 
3.1.1.1 System 
A system is a term that is often used and as a word itself, has been extensively discussed 
and analyzed. From the DOD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Glossary a system is:  
“A collection of components organized to accomplish a specific function or 
set of functions” [63]. 
From the DOD System Engineering Guide for Systems-of-systems a system is: 
"A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly 
interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a 
unified whole” [64]. 
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Lastly, from Dr. C.E. Dickerson and Dr. D.N. Mavris’s textbook, Architecture and 
Principles of Systems Engineering: 
“A system is a combination of interacting elements integrated to realize 
properties, behaviors, and capabilities that achieve one or more stated 
purpose(s)” [29]. 
From the above definitions, there are a few commonalities such as interacting 
components/elements with an intended purpose. With these definitions in mind, a 
summarized definition is proposed for use in this thesis: 
Definition: A system is a set of interacting components organized to achieve a stated 
purpose 
 
3.1.1.2 Terms That Describe a System 
It is also important to define terms used to describe a system in terms of modeling 
and simulation as opposed to those used in physical systems. Physical systems include 
elements and the interconnections between elements, both of which are self-explanatory. 
For system models, it is important to define additional terms which are summarized in the 
Table 5: System Modeling and Simulation Terms .[65] 
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Table 5: System Modeling and Simulation Terms 
System Term Definition 
Environment Anything outside of the designated system 
that may affect the system 
Boundary Separates the system from its environment 
Entity Object of interest in a system 
Attribute Property of an entity 
Activity Time period of a specified length 
State of a System Collection of variables necessary to 
describe the system at a given time 
Event An instantaneous occurrence that may 
change the state of the system 
Endogenous Activity and events that occur in the 
system 
Exogenous Activities and events in the environment 
that can affect the system 
Discrete State variables change at distinct points in 
time  
Continuous State variables change nonstop over time 
 
3.1.1.3 System-of-systems (SoS) 
The definition of a ‘system’ gives way to the often confused and debated term 
‘system-of-systems.’ The DOD System Engineering Guide for Systems-of-systems defines 
a system-of-systems as: 
“A system-of-systems is a set or arrangement of systems that results when 
independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that 
delivers unique capabilities ” [64]. 
The 2018 DOD Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System adds the following to the DOD definition: 
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“SoS may deliver capabilities by combining multiple collaboratives and 
independent-yet-interacting systems. The mix of systems may include 
existing, partially developed and yet-to-be designed independent systems” 
[27]. 
The preceding definitions represent the commonly accepted understanding of a 
system-of-systems, namely that the combination of independent systems into a larger 
system produces a capability that cannot be obtained by the independent systems 
independently. In 1998, Dr. Mark W. Maier, author of The Art of Systems Architecting, 
proposed a more thorough definition, taxonomy and set of principles to define a ‘system-
of-systems.’  
Taking the commonly accepted requirements of the time, geographical distribution, 
emergent behavior, and evolutionary development processes, he added two distinguishing 
principles that are required to apply the term ‘system-of-systems’: ‘operational 
independence of the components’ and ‘managerial independence of the components.’ 
Without these two principles Maier posits that a system cannot be a system-of-systems 
irrespective of emergent behavior, geographical distribution, or evolutionary development 
processes. Operational independence of the components implies that if the system of 
system was divided into its individual systems, each would be able to operate 
independently to fulfill its purpose on its own. Managerial independence of the components 
means that the can and do operate independently and component systems are separately 
acquired and integrated [66].   
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Definition: A system-of-systems is a set of interacting components organized to achieve 
a stated purpose that demonstrates operational and managerial independence of 
component systems as well as geographical distribution, emergent behavior, and 
evolutionary development processes.  
 
3.1.2 Systems Thinking 
Model-Based Systems Engineering is based on the principles of ‘Systems Thinking.’ To 
address the problem of creating executable architecture, it is important to first define what, 
exactly, “Systems Thinking” is. The term ‘Systems Thinking’ was coined by Dr. Barry 
Richmond, a former graduate student of Dr. Jay W. Forrester at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology and a professor of system dynamics at Northeastern University and 
Dartmouth in 1987. In his words: 
“As interdependency increases, we must learn to learn in a new way. It’s 
not good enough simply to get smarter and smarter about our particular 
‘piece of the rock.’ We must have a common language and framework for 
sharing our specialized knowledge, expertise and experience with ‘local 
experts’ from other parts of the web. We need a systems Esperanto. Only 
then will we be equipped to act responsibly. In short, interdependency 
demands Systems Thinking.” [67] 
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As expected, the use of term without a defined architecture, has led to a highly contested 
definition amongst Systems Engineering experts and no widely agreed upon definition. 
Figure 33 illustrates the three predominant interpretations of systems thinking.  
 
 
Figure 33: Systems Thinking Interpretations adapted from [68] 
 
The leftmost image is Forrester’s definition. From his perspective systems thinking 
is a minor subset of system dynamics (See Section 3.3.4). Forrester’s belief is that systems 
thinking is little more than a “general and superficial awareness of systems.”[69] Though 
it can be useful in providing the general public of the benefits and importance of systems 
and provide a “door opener” to system dynamics. As a former Electrical Engineer, he felt 
that systems thinking and its reliance on casual loops lack the discipline to the thinking that 
is imposed by level and rate diagrams used in system dynamics. He did, however, recognize 
causal diagrams as useful after modeling for presenting an “overall impression of [a] 
subject” to leadership and people who were less interested in the specifics of dynamic 
behavior as demonstrated by Dr. Peter Senge in his book The Fifth Discipline.[69, 70] In 
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his view, systems thinking is only 5% of the way towards a genuine understanding of 
system, the other 95% coming from rigorous system dynamics structured models and 
simulations.[71] 
The center image of Figure 33 represents Richmond’s view of systems thinking. In 
this view, systems dynamics is a subset of the larger systems thinking perspective, albeit 
the central and predominant aspect. Richmond recognized the need for a new way of 
thinking. While rigorous structuring and simulations are necessary, the models and 
simulations are not the sole end but rather a means. As a new paradigm, the purpose was 
to “think more productively about how to improve the way a system worked.” [71] The 
premise being that systems thinking should enable all people to generate insights rather 
than being limited to skilled systems dynamics practitioners.  
Ultimately, Richmond defined “systems thinking” as: 
“[T]he art and science of making reliable inferences about behavior by 
developing an increasingly deep understanding of underlying structure.” 
He summarized the pieces of this definition with the diagram shown in Figure 34.  
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Figure 34: Components of Systems Thinking (adapted from [71]) 
 
In terms of a paradigm, the vantage point determines how one positions oneself 
relative to the system to see both the “forest and the trees.” While thinking skill are those 
that one employs to determine what in the system to attend to versus ignore and what to 
make of it all. In short, systems thinkers see “both generic and specific” and “both the 
pattern and the event.” Richmond postulates that systems thinkers use three thinking 
skills: system-as-a-cause, closed-loop, and operational thinking. ‘System-as-a-cause 
thinking’ is the idea that the structure of a system, rather than outside factors, that causes 
problems. Closed-loop thinking is the idea of how the structure is arrayed in reciprocal 
relationships. Operational thinking, therefore, is using stocks and flows to define that of 
which the closed loops are composed [71]. 
The rightmost image in Figure 33 represents a more current paradigm of modern 
systems, led by Dr. Derek Cabrera at Cornell University. Cabrera’s supposition is that most 
people have adopted the idea that systems dynamics and system thinking are equivalent; 
analogous to one thinking that hammering nails is the equivalent of being a carpenter. One 
former is a learned ability to use a tool the latter being an expertise. He also emphasizes 
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that while systems dynamics is a valuable tool, like a carpenter, it is not the only tool in the 
toolbox. Furthermore, like a tool, while there are many uses for which SD, a powerful 
framework, is appropriate, there are many uses for which it is not. Knowing when and how 
to use a tool is the expertise (thinking skills) come into play.[68] Reflected in Figure 33, 
Cabrera’s view is the exact opposite of Forrester, in that System Dynamics is but a minor 
subset of a much larger body of holistic systems thinking.  
The three definitions of ‘systems thinking’ are not all inclusive, but rather 
demonstrate the extreme limits of the term and the intent of the originator of the term. 
Many definitions and key elements of systems thinking have been identified by leaders in 
the systems engineering field since Richmond first coined the term in 1987, supported by 
numerous studies. In 2014, researchers, Divya Vuhra Behl and Susan Ferreira from The 
University of Texas at Arlington, Systems Engineering Research Center compiled a 
summary of 21 key elements of individual systems thinking identified by 12 of the leaders 
in the field. They subsequently analyzed the various phraseologies for similarities and 
developed the relationships between the resulting 21 individual systems thinking elements 
[72]. All the elements are inextricably linked to the ostensive definition of systems 
thinking—the ability to think about a system as a whole. A sample mapping of the 
elemental relationships is shown in Figure 35. 
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Figure 35: Systems Thinking Element Relationships adapted from [72] 
In the level beneath holistic thinking, is are the remaining three elements that most 
systems scholars agree upon: the ability to understand interconnections; the ability to 
create, build and use models; and the ability to consider and use multiple perspectives. All 
other elements are linked through these three.  
Recognizing the increasing interdependence of complex systems in today’s world, 
and in order bring systems thinking out of the educational margins and into the mainstream 
lexicon to solve complex problems, researcher Ross D. Arnold and Dr. Jon P. Wade 
defined systems thinking using a systems approach. Under this approach, they developed 
a system test to examine eight definition of systems thinking by the 14 most predominant 
systems thinkers (Richmond, Senge, Sweeney, Sterman, Hopper, Stave, Kopainsky, 
Alessi, Davidsen, Squires, Wasde, Dominick, Gelosh, and Forrester) as a necessary, but 
not sufficient criteria of definition completeness. Each definition (like a systems) was 




Figure 36: Arnold and Wade Systems Test [67] 
Through their examination, they found that every published definition of systems 
thinking failed the systems test. By their estimate, all definitions focused on the elements 
of systems thinking but not what systems thinking is or does (the purpose and the 
interconnections). Arnold and Wade then composed a diagrammatic comparison of the 
definitions and their various aspects shown in Figure 37.  
 
Figure 37: Comparison of Systems Thinking Definitions from [67] 
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Like Behl and Ferreira, Arnold and Wade found that the most accepted elements of 
systems thinking were the considering “wholes rather than parts” and “interconnections 
and interrelationships?” However, unlike Bhel and Ferreirra, Arnold and Wade found 
equal concurrence on the elements of; ‘dynamic behavior’ and ‘feedback loops’ closely 
followed by the idea that system structure causes behavior, much like Richmond. They 
then crafted a definition of systems thinking that can satisfy the systems test: 
“Systems thinking is a set of synergistic analytic skills used to improve the 
capability of identifying and understanding systems, predicting their 
behaviors, and devising modifications to them in order to produce desired 
effects. These skills work together as a system.” [67]  
It is this definition of systems thinking that will be used in this thesis.  
The set of synergistic skills are as follows: 
• Recognizing interconnections 
• Identifying and understanding feedback. 
• Understanding system structure 
• Differentiating types of stocks, flows, and variables 
• Identifying and understanding non-linear relationships 
• Understanding dynamic behavior 
• Reducing complexity by modeling systems conceptually 
• Understanding systems at different scales.  
 80 
Arnold and Wade then interconnected the elements through the following systemigram in 
Figure 38. 
 
Figure 38: Systems Thinking Systemigram from [67] 
 
3.1.3 Event Oriented and Feedback Systems Thinking 
Event oriented thinking is a linear action-reaction method of thinking. A problem 
exists and a solution is presented as a fix; like pop-up targets or putting out fires. This type 
of thinking is pragmatic, compelling, and extremely common in the military. This line of 
thinking is ingrained in the Army and even reflects the Army Design Process. While simple 






Figure 39 Event Oriented Thinking (recreated from [1]) 
 
Figure 39 recreated from Dr. John D.W. Morecroft’s book Strategic Modeling and 
Business Dynamics: A Feedback Systems Approach, demonstrates the idea of that problems 
are often treated as events. When confronted with a discrepancy in each situation with 
desired goals, leaders decide upon a solution as a fix and see immediate action and results. 
This method, ideally, provides the desired effects. However, event-driven thinking 
typically entails short-term solutions and fails to take into consideration the second and 
third order long-term effects of those decisions.  
Event  Fix 
Increasing Demand → Deploy more AISR 
Intelligence Gaps → Add new sensors 
Too Much Data → Add More Analysts 
Too Many Deployed → Develop Reach-back 
Too Much Data → Federate PED 
Figure 40: Examples of Event-Driven UAS Decisions 
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As an example of event driven thinking, take the notional example of UAS decision 
in Figure 40 . Thought treated as independent problems and solutions, the items in the 
figure are inherently linked.  
The feedback systems approach to thinking, on the other hand, is what Dr. Peter 
Senge refers to as a “shift of mind” that requires “seeing interrelationships rather than linear 
cause-effect chains” and “seeing processes of change rather than snapshots.”[70] The 
fundamental premise behind feedback systems thinking is the realization of circular 
causality. Feedback systems thinking solutions that are arise in response to decisions made 
in or effects of their organizational and social environment. The fundamental premisis the 
idea that solutions are not implimented in a vacuum. Problems do not simply stem from 
events; the both problems and slutions are interdependent.[74] 
 
Figure 41: Feedback Systems Thinking Reproduced From[74] 
Figure 41 depicts and overview of the feedback systems thinking concepts. A 
problem exists (in the red circle) where there is a discrepency between the current situation 
and the desired goal. As a solution (green circle) a dicision is made, actions are taken, and 
there is a net result. This result impacts the current sitation but also affects other situations, 
which consequently, through the same cycle have actions and results that feedback and 
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affect the current situation for the problem of interest in a constant loop. This simlified 
figure shows only a single external loop that is affected by and, subsequently, affects the 
main problem. However, in reality there can be several, dozens, or hundreds if interlocking 
loops. Obviously, it can become overwhelming and is beyond human capacity to capture. 
Therefore, like water seaking the path of least resisitance, humans have a tendancy towards 
event-driven, linear thining for problem and solutions.  
A popular humorous cartoon by Arnie Levin once featured in The New Yorker 
Collection is often used in Systems Engineering as a demonstration of the necessity for 
feedback thinking and the dangers of event-driven thinking. The danger lies in the concept 
of hidden feedback. In the cartoon, the first panel depicts a man seated in the center of two 
large square blocks of stone, one on either side like giant dominoes. From his narrow 
perspective he has two choices: push over the block on his left or on his right to give himself 
more space. The second panel of the cartoon showed that his short-term decision was a 
success; knocking down the block to his immediate left provided him ample breathing 
room. Like large dominoes, the block he pushed began to topple blocks adjacent to it, 
confirming to the man that his immediate decisive action was correct. However, in the third 
and final panel, we see the entire picture and notice that the large blocks of stone are 
arranged in a giant circle. His decision to knock down the block to his immediate left 
caused a disastrous chain of events that, despite his best intentions, will ultimately result 
in the blocks crushing him; demonstrating the risk of not looking at problems 
holistically.[61]  
Too often complex problems, especially in the military, are approached with event-
oriented thinking where complex dependencies and non-linear relationships due to 
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feedback loops cannot be readily visualized. Simply increasing one element of the system 
to meet a particular demand signal (e.g. more unmanned full-motion video (FMV) assets) 
without realizing its effect on other elements of the complete system and the limitations 
and delays of those systems over time will fail to render the desired improvements or 
outcomes; much like optimization of individual parts often fails to optimize the whole.  
3.1.4 Tools to Aid System Thinking 
3.1.4.1 Sector Maps 
For complex systems-of-systems, there are no shortages of potential model 
activities, elements, and actors. According to Dr. Morecroft “[w]hat matters is not so much 
the raw number of components but the intricacy with which they are bound together.”[61] 
For the initial analysis of such systems, a "sector map" can be a valuable tool to reduce 
complexity and identify key actors in the systems, serving as a device for “easing the 
transition from a mind’s eye view” to a complex stock and flow rendering.[71] A sector 
map is a holistic rendering of a system at a much higher level than causal diagrams or 
stock-and-flow diagrams. The purpose of these sector maps is to develop simple visual 
model to spur group discussion of the system and the associated problems while providing 
a shared understanding of the major components. Once stakeholders are engaged with a 
concept model, then larger and more refined models and simulators with greater granularity 
can take shape and be used for analysis, as necessary [61].  
Modelers typically use bevel-cornered rectangles, ovals, or circles to represent 
sectors of the system. These sectors represent ‘key actors’ in the system rather than 
quantities or accumulations and normally include the operating policies though stock 
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accumulations within each sector can be added for more detail [71]. Sectors are connected 
by arrows representing non-dimensionally consistent bundles of flows between sectors. A 
basic sector diagram for a canonical predator-prey model is depicted below showing the 
two sectors of the basic system where predators consume prey. The top image in the figure 
depicts a basic sector map while the lower image depicts a sector map with imbedded stock-
flow diagrams that can be developed through stakeholder refinement.  
 
Figure 42: Sector Map Example 
3.1.4.2 Causal Loop Diagrams 
 To develop feedback loops, modelers use systems thinking to first create causal 
relationships using causal diagrams. These diagrams are comprised of variables as nouns 
which are positive measurable quantities connected by causal links, represented by arrows. 
Obviously, causality is required, not simply correlation.  
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Figure 43: Causal Diagram Examples 
The ‘+’ or ‘−’ indicate the link polarity. A positive polarity indicates that if one variable 
were to increase so to would the other variable, while negative polarity indicates that if one 
variable were to increase the other would decrease.  
Table 6: Causal Diagram Link Summary Adapted from [51] 
Polarity Definition Math 
 
Positive 
If X↑ then Y↑ 
 





X adds to Y 






If X↑ then Y↓ 
 





X subtracts from Y 





Causal diagrams are a tool to represent feedback that aid the model builder in 
developing mental models that can be converted into basic algebraic relationships, 
capturing hypothesis regarding dynamic causes, and communicate the central tenants of 
the model. Forrester recommends using causal loops as ‘soft’ techniques to explain 
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dynamic behavior to non-technical decision makers, while Sterman and Morecroft endorse 
using them in the early stages of modeling in parallel with sector maps to be later combined 
into stock and flow diagrams.[51, 61, 69] When feedback within a causal loop diagram 
leads to a change in condition that results in a balance effect, it is called a balancing loop 
and is indicated as a ‘B’ in a circular arrow. When feedback results in continued increasing 
or decreasing effect, it is called reinforcing loop and is indicated as an ‘R’ in a circular 
arrow. These structure of these feedback loops results in dynamic behavior depicted in  
 
Figure 44: Fundamental Modes of Dynamic Behavior adapted from [61] 
3.1.4.3 Integrated Product & Process Development (IPPD) 
Created in 1994 at Georgia Institute of Technology by Dr. D. Schrage and Dr. D. 
Mavris, the Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) (Figure 45) is a means to 
integrating Quality Engineering (QE) methods, System Engineering (SE) methods, 
computer-integrated environments in a top-down design and decision support process. 
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This methodology is a procedural approach to design but via “system synthesis 
through multidisciplinary optimization” also encompasses an analytical approach, and via 
the “robust design assessment and optimization” is also an experimental approach. This 
method simultaneously considers the product (e.g. performance, geometry) and process 
(e.g. manufacturing, economics, supportability) characteristics during design 
decomposition and re-composition. The overall approach incorporates the early integration 
and concurrent application of high-fidelity information from all disciplines that play a role 
in the system’s lifecycle into the design stages. 
 
Figure 45: Georgia Tech IPPD Approach Flowcharts from [75] 
By integrates product design tools with process design tools in a top down design decision 
support process this method creates a formal process completed through a computer-
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integrated environment by which early design decisions can be improved by integrating 
required knowledge at the onset.[75] 
The key take-away from this approach is the center column (outlined in red on the 
figure) which is the core of the IPPD and the essential steps of a top-down decision process. 
It is this top-down decision process that will be used as a core of this framework for rapid 
SoS analysis.  
3.2 Modeling and Simulation 
To approach complex problems, modeling and simulation are often used to aid human 
decision-making. This chapter will provide a background on basic modeling and simulation 
terms to ensure a common understanding of terminology between the author and the 
readers. To help inform the research questions in subsequent chapters, this section will also 
provide a brief review the most common types of modeling and simulation in use today 
and techniques used to create and validate them.  
3.2.1 Definitions 
3.2.1.1 Models 
Depending on the domain of interest, there are many definitions for the word 
“model.” From a review of DOD and Systems Engineering literature the following broad 
definitions are presented: 
From the DOD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Glossary:  
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“A physical, mathematical, or otherwise logical representation of a system, 
entity, phenomenon, or process.” [63] 
From Dr. Osman Balci’s 1994 article “Validation, Verification, and Testing Techniques 
throughout the Life Cycle of a Simulation Study” in the Annals of Operations Research: 
“A model is a representation and an abstraction of anything such as a 
system, concept, problem, or phenomena.” [76] 
From system dynamic’s expert, Gene Bellinger’s webpage “System Thinking”: 
“A model is a simplified representation of a system at some particular point 
in time or space intended to promote understanding of the real system.”[77] 
From Dr. C.E. Dickerson and Dr. D.N. Mavris’s textbook, Architecture and 
Principles of Systems Engineering: 
“A model is a relational structure for which the interpretation of a (logical) 
sentence in the predicate calculus becomes valid” [29] 
With these definitions in mind, a summarized definition is proposed for use in this thesis: 
Definition: A model is a static, abstract, simplified representation of a system intended 
for study to the appropriate level of complexity to answer questions and promote a shared 
understanding 
The key element of a model as that it is static. That is not to say that a model cannot be 
updated or changed, but that its practical purpose is to understand the structure of a system 
 91 
and the interdependencies and relationships rather than the effects of those relationships 
over time. Models are important when experimenting or prototyping is either physically 
infeasible or economically nonviable. The process of mapping a real-world problem to a 
model is called abstraction, which determines the fidelity required in the model.  
3.2.1.2 Simulations 
Often, the terms ‘model’ and ‘simulation’ are used interchangeably, though they 
are often used in conjunction with one another as a blanket term ‘modeling and simulation’ 
(M&S). However, it is important to differentiate the two terms. 
From the DOD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Glossary:  
“A method for implementing a model over time.” [42] 
From Dr. Osman Balci’s 1994 article “Validation, Verification, and Testing Techniques 
throughout the Life Cycle of a Simulation Study” in the Annals of Operations Research: 
“Simulation is the process of constructing a model of a system which 
contains a problem and conducting experiments with the model on a 
computer for a specific purpose of experimentation to solve the 
problem.”[76] 
From system dynamic’s expert, Gene Bellinger’s webpage “System Thinking.” 
“A simulation is the manipulation of a model in such a way that it operates 
on time or space to compress it, thus enabling one to perceive the 
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interactions that would not otherwise be apparent because of their 
separation in time or space.” [77] 
With these definitions in mind, a summarized definition is proposed for use in this thesis: 
Definition: A simulation is the implementation of model over time for the purpose of 
experimentation 
The difference between a model and a simulation is the element of dynamic behavior or 
the ability to change over time. While a simulation may reach a state of equilibrium it is 
not initially static unlike a model. Dr. Jerry Banks, in his textbook Discrete Event System 
Simulation, highlights eleven circumstances for which simulation is an appropriate tool 
and eight rules of when simulation is not appropriate (Table 7).[78]  
Table 7: When Simulation Is and Is Not Appropriate 
Simulation is Appropriate Simulation Not Appropriate 
To enable the study of and experimentation 
with complex system internal interactions 
If the problem can be solved using 
common sense. 
To simulate the effects of informational, 
organizational, and environmental changes 
on a model’s behavior. 
If the problem can be solved analytically 
When knowledge gained from the design 
of the simulation would identify and 
suggest ways to improve the system  
If it is easier to perform direct experiments. 
When changing inputs and observing 
outputs can provide valuable insight into 
the most important variables and variable 
interactions. 
If cost of simulation exceeds potential 
savings. 
When it can be used as an educational 
device. 
If no data or estimates are available to 
inform the model and simulation 
To prepare for future events by 
experimenting with new designs or 
policies prior to implementation. 
Not enough time or personnel to verify and 
validate the model. 
To verify analytical solutions. If managers expectations are too high or if 
abilities of simulation are overestimated. 
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Table 7 Continued: When Simulation Is and Is Not Appropriate 
To develop requirements by simulating 
different capabilities for consideration. 
If system behavior is too complex it can’t 
be simplified; i.e. human behavior. 
As a training device with reduced cost.  
For visualization of an operation  
When a modern system or system-of-
systems is so complex that interactions can 
only be evaluated through simulation. 
 
3.2.1.3 Characterizations of M&S 
M&S has many characterizations that will be used throughout this thesis. A 
classification chart of these terms is included in Figure 3.13. M&S may be qualitative or 
quantitative. In qualitative research, the primary goal is exploration into subjective, 
nonquantitative or difficult to enumerate characteristics such as opinions, motivations, and 
structures. By contrast, in quantitative M&S the intent is to generate numerical data or that 
can be transformed into usable statistics for analysis. These qualitative M&S can be 
deterministic which means they have no random components only known values or 
stochastic meaning it includes random components and must incorporate uncertainty 
(typically through probability distributions). F 
Furthermore, as discussed in the previous sections, M&S are either static or 
dynamic depending on if the passage of time is considered. If time is not considered, we 
use the term model to describe it and simulation if we want to evaluate the effects over 
time. That is not to say that models cannot be simulated per say. Monte Carlo simulations 
often only represent a system at a particular point of time but run thousands of cases 
(typically greater than 10,000) to evaluate the probability of different outcomes in an 
stochastic processes and account for uncertainty.[78]  
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Finally, simulations can be discrete or continuous, like stepwise or continuous 
mathematical functions, respectively. How the state variables change with respect to time 
dictate this characterization. Some problems incorporate both continuous and discrete state 
variables which must be addressed (typically through discretization of continuous 
variables). [36] 
 
Figure 46: M&S Characterizations 
 
3.2.2 Model Development Techniques 
3.2.2.1 Forrester’s Method 
To develop models, Dr. Jay Forrester [69]recommended the six-step process 
depicted in Figure 47 in the year 1994. As shown, the process developed for System 
Dynamics but could be easily applied to any M&S paradigm. Like any modeling process, 
Forrester’s is iterative. 
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The first step involves describing the system. This can be accomplished through a 
variety of means, to include case studies, soft operations research, and applying systems 
thinking. The intent of this step is to identify behavior of a system or SoS that is undesirable 
with the aim of improving it. The second step involves formulation of the M&S in terms 
of level and rate equations with more explicit information. The third step is the actual 
simulation of the model and check for unrealistic behavior, cycling back to Steps 1 and 2 
as necessary to check for common errors such as simultaneous equations, terms defined 
more than once, and inconsistent units. This cycle repeats until the behavior is adequately 
representative of the system under consideration. The fourth step involves testing policy 
alternatives to identify policies that indicate the most promise to reaching desirable 
behavior. Many of these policies are proposed by SMEs. The fifth step involves gaining 
consensus for the selected implementation of policies through exploration, gaming, and 
debate with key stakeholders. The final step involves the implementation of policies 
generated in the M&S from the previous steps. Like the preceding steps, the M&S is 
considered a ‘living’ environment that can continually be refined and adjusted as real-




Figure 47: Forrester's 6-Step SD Modeling Process recreated from [69] 
 
3.2.2.2 Sterman’s Method 
From his book Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex 
World, Sterman’s modeling process and its five steps are summarized briefly in Figure 48 
[51].  
 
Figure 48: Sterman's Iterative Modeling Process recreated from [51] 
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Sterman’s process that he published in 2000 varies slightly from that Forrester 
devised in 1994. Like Forrester’s methodology, it is an iterative process and not a linear 
sequence, though he emphasizes that defining the problem is the most important step in the 
process.  
Table 8: Steps of Sterman's Iterative Modeling Process adapted from [34] 
Step 1: Problem 
Articulation 
Define the problem dynamically and why it is a problem. Establish 
reference modes and time horizon. Reference modes are descriptive data 
and graphs showing the growth of the problem over time. Time horizon 
is how far back the problem arose.  
Step 2: Formulate a 
Dynamic Hypothesis 
Characterize problem in terms of feedback (causal loops) and stock and 
flow structure of the system. Additional tools include mapping 
techniques such as subsystem diagrams, policy structure diagrams, and 
model boundary diagram.  
Step 3: Formulate a 
Simulation Model 
Create computer simulation by transforming dynamic hypothesis int 
detailed diagram of feedback processes and associated algebraic 
equations.  
Step 4: Testing Begins as soon as first equation is written but more than simple 
replication of historical behavior. Conduct sensitivity analysis 
considering parametric and structural assumptions. Must test under 
extreme conditions.  
Step 5: Policy 
Design and 
Evaluation 
Design and evaluate policies for improvement; conduct “what if” 
analysis. Don’t simply change parameter values but change structure, 
decision rules, and delays.  
 
Sterman recommends and describes twelve procedures for evaluating the 
acceptability of a model: boundary adequacy assessment, structure assessment, 
dimensional consistency assessment, parameter assessment, extreme conditions tests, 
integration error tests, behavior reproduction testing, behavior anomaly tests, family 
member tests, surprise behavior tests, sensitivity analysis, and system improvement 
tests.[51]  
3.2.2.3 Verification and Validation (V&V): 
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The terms ‘verification’ and ‘validation’ (V&V) generally have commonly agreed 
upon definitions in engineering, acquisitions, and in modeling and simulation. However, 
even very experienced practitioners have a tendency to conflate or confuse the terms.[79]  
Model verification is the process of evaluating if a model is transformed from one 
form into another, correctly and completely during a given development phase to satisfy 
the conditions imposed at the start of that phase.[76, 80, 81] In other words, verification 
ensures that the model is behaving the way it was intended and answers the question “Did 
you build it right?” [64, 79]. 
Definition: Verification is the act of ensuring that a model is built and functioning 
correctly. Is it built right? 
In order for the verification process to be successful, the model must include all of the 
components specified during system definition and must run without errors or warnings 
[79].  
Validation, on the other hand, is the process of determining if a model or simulation 
accurately represent the real world system it meant to represent within its domain of 
applicability from the perspective of the intended study objectives of the model.[63, 76] In 
other words, to validate a model is to determine if the model behaves the same as the real 
system and answers the question, “Did you build the right thing?" [64, 79]. 
Definition: Validation is the act of ensuring that a model is correct for the system meant 
to be represented. Was the right model built? 
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V&V from a systems perspective is often visualized with the classic ‘Vee’ diagram shown 
in Figure 49. It starts from the left side of the ‘Vee’ beginning with user requirements and 
moves down through the decomposition and definition process until reaching fabrication 
and moving back up the right side of the ‘Vee.’ At each step there is verification that the 
elements are built correctly culminating in a validation that the system meets user 
requirements. While the model mentions ‘code’ at the base of the ‘Vee’, this method is 
mostly applicable to physical systems.  
 
Figure 49 ‘Vee’ Model recreated from [29] 
A method for verifying and validating the model and simulation for the proposed 
research will be discussed in greater detail within the experimental plan.  
3.2.2.4 Model Errors 
Like any experiment, model errors are a significant concern. A model that does not 
accurately represent the system under study then the results are not reliable. There are three 
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types of model error and these types of model error are analogous the errors found in 
inferential statistics. The premise of inferential statistics, like V&V, is not to prove the null 
hypothesis (H0), but to attempt to disprove it by finding an exception (H1); much like was 
discussed as the purpose of V&V in the previous section. By failing to prove the model 
wrong during V&V under the conditions and for the problem the model was built, the 
confidence in the model’s predictive abilities is increased. A commonly used graphic in 
statistics is shown in Figure 50 to demonstrate the first two types of errors associated with 
this idea. 
 






Type I Error 
“False Positive” 
(Probability = α) 
Correct Inference 
True Positive 




(Probability = 1 - α) 
Type II Error 
“False Negative” 
(Probability = β) 
Figure 50 Statistical Error Types 
In statistics, Type I Error is rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. Likewise, 
in modeling and simulation, this equates to rejecting model credibility when it is in fact 
sufficiently credible (H0=model is credible) and is referred to as “Model Builder’s Risk.” 
In statistics, Type II Error is accepting the null hypothesis when it is false. Likewise, in 
modeling and simulation, this equates to accepting the model as credible when it is, in fact, 
not sufficiently credible; this is known as “Model User’s Risk.” The last type of error of 
interest is Type III Error. In statistics, this is known as correctly rejecting the null 
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hypothesis, but for the wrong reason. In modeling and simulation, this equates to solving 
the wrong problem with the model that was created [76].  
3.2.2.5 Variability and Uncertainty 
In any model, uncertainty will be present through either data, the process, or 
assumptions made in the model. Two types of uncertainty are relevant: aleatory variability 
and epistemic uncertainty, also referred to as randomness and uncertainty respectively. 
Definition: Epistemic uncertainty is the uncertainty regarding the model due to limited 
data and knowledge. 
If variables are discrete and random, the epistemic uncertainty can be modeled by 
probability distributions. If the variables are random and continuous, probability density 
functions can be used to model epistemic uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty is often 
confused with aleatory variability.  
Definition: Aleatory variability is the natural randomness in a process. 
A method to distinguish between epistemic uncertainty and aleatory variability is to 
examine the parameter in question. If the parameter has different values and different times 
randomly, then it is aleatory variability. If the parameter has either one value or another 
value, but the modeler is uncertain as to which value it has then the parameter has epistemic 
uncertainty [82].  
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3.3 Modeling and Simulation Paradigms 
3.3.1 Petri Nets 
3.3.1.1 Description 
The original Petri Nets were presented by Carl Petri in his 1960’s PhD Thesis.[83] 
Commonly used for data flow, basic Petri Nets, or place/transition (PT) nets are a formal, 
graphical, executable technique for the specification and the analysis of concurrent, 
discrete-event dynamic systems. Because Petri Nets having multiple transition pathways 
between states, they are a non-deterministic modeling tool. This means that multiple 
executions of the same model are not guaranteed to have to same results [84].  
3.3.1.2 General Principles 
Petri Nets are directed bipartite graphs with two disjoint node types and are a type 
of simulation under the category of Discrete Event Dynamic Systems (DEDS). Petri nets 
consist of places (circles) and transitional nodes (rectangles or squares) joined by arcs. Arcs 
may have multiplicities. Places typically represent conditions and while transitional nodes 
represent events that may occur. An indistinguishable non-negative integer number of 
markers, known as tokens, are added to the place nodes and the distribution of tokens in 
the nodes (known as a marking) fully indicates the state of the system. Based on transition 
rules or conditions requiring every one of the input places to have at least as many tokens 
as the multiplicity of the arc connecting the place node to the transition to ‘fire’.[30] The 
marking will enable transitions that can then ‘fire’ and remove a number of tokens from 
place nodes (based upon output arc multiplicity) and create corresponding tokens in other 
place nodes (based upon input arc multiplicity). If tokens are on a place node then the place 
exists; meaning more amount or activity of a given entity it represents in the model exists.  
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Figure 51 Basic Petri Net and Example Transition  
Transition firings represent any discrete event of the system being modeled.[84] 
The corresponding moving of the tokens around based on the topology of the graph 
represent changes in state of the system. Of note, Basic Petri Nets are not suitable for 
representing systems typified by time-driven processes like those described by differential 
or difference equations as they did not account for the concept of time [30]. Rather, all 
enabled transitions would immediately fire. Later developments in Petri Nets allow for 
deterministic time delays called timed Petri Nets [84]. This lead to the creation of 
Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) where delays are assigned as random variables placed on the 
node based on given distributions to account for uncertainty [85]. Because of the non-
deterministic nature of the model, Monte Carlo Simulation can be performed to account 
for probabilistic outputs to account for these uncertainties.  
Another variation of the method is the colored Petri Net which uses colors to 
differentiate between tokens. The colors can be used to track specific tokens or be 
leveraged as a flag to account for token which have passed through a specific transition or 
have demonstrated a specific behavior. The colored Petri Nets also provide the benefit of 
reducing the size and number of states required to create the model. [57] 
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The final variation of note in the application of aging tokens. In this variation, the 
ages of tokens are tracked as they transition through the place and transition nodes in the 
system. Transition nodes can be assigned rules that only accept tokens within specified age 
requirements [86].  
3.3.1.3 Examples of Use 
Under the precursor to DoDAF, the C4ISR architecture, the default paradigm for 
an executable model was DEDS. Command and Control information systems that consist 
of primarily of computers and software are intrinsically discrete event systems in terms of 
data flow, making Petri Nets a logical and appropriate paradigm [30]. Dr. Levis, himself, 
demonstrated the ability to evaluate distributed C4ISR architecture utilizing colored Petri 
Nets in 1991 [87]. However, while this may be true for analyzing the flow of data, it fails 
to capture the other present and contributing elements of the system-of-systems, to include 
but not limited to, experience, training, enemy actions, and kinetic effects.  
In version 1.5 of the DoDAF, the use of Petri Nets for the refinement and dynamic 
analysis of Operational Viewpoints, namely the Operational Rules Model (OV-6a) 
Operational State Transition Description (OV-6b), and the Operational Event-Trace 
Description (OV-6C). It additionally identifies Colored Petri Nets as valuable tools for the 
dynamic simulation of the OV-5, Operational Activity Model. While the newest DOD 
Architecture Framework Version 2.02, Change 1 Architect's Guide .makes no mention of 
Petri Nets and provides no guidance on executable techniques, the method remains a valid 
approach to dynamically assessing discrete information flow systems [88, 89]. 
Petri Nets using aging tokens have been used to model systems that have 
components that may degrade with time like the tokens that represent them. Hence, Petri 
Nets with aging tokens have been widely used for reliability, maintenance, and safety 
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studies. This property also makes the useful for information systems that contain 
information that becomes irrelevant after a certain period. AISR PED architecture is one 
such example where intelligence products become less valuable over time. In military 
terms, this is when certain priority intelligence requirements pass the LTOIV (latest time 
information of value) cutoff. Petri Nets with aging tokens can be used as a valuable tool to 
identify choke points that stagnate information flow and cause it to expire before being of 
use [86]. 
3.3.2 Discrete Event Simulation (DES) 
3.3.2.1 Description 
Discrete Event Simulation (DES) traces its roots to the General-Purpose Simulation 
System (GPSS) created by Geoffrey Gordon of IBM in the early 1960s and is a type of 
global entity processing algorithm, where the elements may be stochastic or deterministic. 
In a system or a process where the state variables that define the system change only at 
discrete points in time, much like a step function in mathematics, DES may be appropriate. 
For simple systems over short periods of time such as a simple single-channel queue (such 
as a bank teller or market cashier), analysis can be computed analytically, typically by hand 
or with a spreadsheet.(Figure 52) However, DES is necessary when multiple dependent 
and interactive events occur, often on parallel timelines, simultaneously. However, unlike 
analytical models, DES is a numerical method to ‘run’ rather than to solve mathematical 
models [78]. The passage of time plays a crucial role in discrete-event simulations, and 
hence they are dynamic.  
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Figure 52: Simple Unit Entering System Flow Diagram recreated from [78] 
 
In DES systems are typically characterized by flow charts comprised of entities 
(passive objects such as parts, people, documents, etc.) and push these entities through 
blocks (sometimes referred to as servers [90] [91]. DES model a system as a network of 
activities and queues, where each entity is individually represented and can be tracked 
through the system. Each of these entities is assigned specific attributes to determine what 
happens to them through the duration of the simulation [92]. 
When modeling a DES, three primary paradigms exist: Activity Oriented, Event-
Oriented, and Process Oriented. Using the example of simple queue where customers arrive 
to a single teller/server where each service performed has a varying random duration. 
Subsequent customers must wait in the queue until the previous customer is served. In this 
system, time is continuous, both for the random service time variables and for the arrival 
times. The paradigms explain how this problem will be made discrete.  
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The activity-oriented paradigm is the original and most basic DES paradigm. In this 
method, activity time is segmented into in very small increments. At each time-step, the 
DES would check for the possible occurrence of specified events. Obviously if the 
discretization is too small relative to the activity duration, the simulation can be very slow 
to execute with little to no state change to the system at each step. Depending on the scale 
and complexity, these simulations can take days to run and be computational expensive. 
Therefore, “what-ifs” and trade space exploration even with a proper design of experiments 
can take a very long time and be computationally expensive with a lot of wasted processor 
time. However, if the discretized time steps are too large, events will be missed. 
To address these issues, the event-oriented paradigm for DES was developed. By 
skipping periods of inactivity and advancing directly to the time of the next event, updating 
all entity attributes accordingly, processing time is reduced dramatically. To accomplish 
this task, an ‘event set’ is created which stores all the pending events such as the next arrival 
in the queue usually in a linearly linked list called a future event list (FEL). This list 
contains all future scheduled events as event notices. Once the event is drawn, its duration 
is selected from a sample from a statistical distribution or is computed. To account for real-
world unscheduled random events, the events are “represented by the end of some activity” 
as a statistical distribution [78]. The FEL is ordered chronologically by event time(tn) and 
the clock time (t) where the clock time progresses to and executes each event on the FEL. 
 𝑡𝑡 < 𝑡𝑡1 ≤ 𝑡𝑡2 ≤ 𝑡𝑡3 … ≤ 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 (1) 
The contents and lengths of the FEL changes as the simulation progresses: proper 
list processing will increase the efficiency of the computer program. New events are added 
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to the list in chronological order based on their future event time (t*) by taking the current 
clock time and adding the activity time(a) for the new event (calculated or generated from 
probability distribution) and comparing t* to the tn times of the other events on the list. 
This method is called bootstrapping. This process continues until the predesignated run 
time TE. Such a method is only possible because of the discrete nature of the system and 
would not be possible to implement in a continuous simulation model. This paradigm is 
easy to implement, exhibits fast execution speed, and is flexible. 
 
 
Figure 53: DES Bootstrapping adapted from [78] 
 
The final DES paradigm is called process-oriented DES. As the name implies, 
activities are modeled as a process, with each process modeled as an independent thread 
(i.e. one thread for the customer arrivals and one thread simulating the teller, and a general 
thread to manage the global process). While legacy software made this type of DES 
difficult, the introduction of more user-friendly thread packages such as Unix, SimPy, and 
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Java, to name a few, has made this method of programming DES the most popular. The 
code is more modular and is easier to read and write than other DES paradigms [91]. 
3.3.2.2 General Principles of DES  
DES is one of the most popular M&S paradigms for good reason; many real-world 
processes in logistics and manufacturing can be modeled as a network of queues and 
activities. DES excels at providing insight on processes concerned with individual entities 
at a high level of fidelity and low aggregation (Figure 80) by allowing users to “explore 
progression through a system” [93]. It is ideal for exploring the impact of randomness 
analyzing system behavior at for operational/process view and has been used in 
conjunction with other operations research methods such as statistical analysis, data mining 
and multi criteria decision-making. Because of the aleatory variability of normal flow 
operations that can be difficult to analyze manually, DES is ideal for its incorporation of 
and emphasis on stochastics. However, DES is primarily concerned with process details 
and event focus and state changes, not emergent behavior and does not overtly seek to 
model feedback loops. DES is essentially a model of linear relationships and lacks 
feedback systems thinking. While this is adequate depending on the goals of a study of a 
system (creating statistical observations of system such as average delays, average items 
manufactured, variance, etc.) its aim is to analyze the outputs of a system and explore the 
impacts of randomness and system behavior and not system structure itself [74, 93, 94]. 
3.3.2.3 Examples of Use 
DES has been in use for so long, it would be impossible to list all its uses. It is best for 
dynamic process that are essentially a network of queues and activities with multiple 
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entities and stochastic state variables. Use Cases of Discrete Event Simulation, a collection 
of articles from modelers and experts from ten different countries demonstrates the vast 
applicability of DES across various domains. Examples include using DES to investigate 
the effectiveness of variance reduction techniques in manufacturing, call centers, and 
warehouse cross-docking distribution systems; DES of energy consumption in automotive 
industries; and planning earthwork processes using DES, to name a few [95].  
Military acquisitions and operations researchers are heavy users of discrete event 
simulation to gain insight into a myriad of issues that are wrought with uncertainty but vital 
to training, maintaining and sustaining a “viable military industrial complex” [36]. In 
recent military applications it has successfully been used simulate and study military 
deployment operations [96], assess military helicopter maintenance and the 
implementation of proposed maintenance free operations [97], military aircraft sustainment 
[98], and Marine Corps unmanned logistics systems (ULS) concepts of operation [99].  
3.3.3 Agent Based Modeling (ABM) 
3.3.3.1 Description 
Agent-based modeling (ABM) draws its roots from game theory, complex system 
theory, artificial intelligence, and other disciplines. Though conceived far earlier, ABM 
was not in widespread use until the early-mid 1990s due the lack of advanced computing 
ability and the advent of object-oriented programming and implementation [90, 100]. In 
the early 2000s the use of agent based modeling rose dramatically with widespread used in 
both civilian and military modeling efforts [35, 101].  
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Figure 54: ABM Generic Architecture adapted from[102]  
ABM is essentially bottom-up modeling, which Dr. Eric Bonabeau, founder of 
ICOSYSTEM, describes as a mindset rather than a technology; a mindset of “describing a 
system from the perspective of its constituent units” [101]. Rather than modeling a macro 
system with high aggregation, which requires an understanding of overarching structures, 
mathematical differential relationships, and predicted behaviors, ABM is constructed at 
micro-level, regardless of the overall level of use for the model. Entities within the 
simulations are represented by autonomous individual agents with programmed decision-
making behaviors based on a set of programmed rules. What distinguishes ABM from other 
M&S paradigms is that it is decentralized; the interactions of the agents is governed by the 
agents themselves and not by the system structure [36]. Because of this fact, the model can 
be constructed without a priori knowledge regarding global interdependencies. The 
repeated competing interactions and relationships between the agents and the environment 
generates the complex dynamics of the model over time; far beyond what is possible with 
purely mathematical methods [90, 101].  
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The complex behavior patterns are the result of aggregate behavior of the agents as 
a collective and provide valuable insight into the dynamics of the real-world system it is 
attempting to represent. The consequences of these interactions and the agents’ decisions 
have both spatial and temporal elements. In fact, the ability to incorporate spatial as well 
as probabilistic aspects of the system are two of the largest advantages of ABM over other 
flow chart based simulation paradigms [100, 103, 104]. These agent interactions are 
predominantly nonlinear, meaning the overall collective behavior can only be determined 
by the interactions of the isolated components, not by simply summing the behavior of 
them.[105] In other words, simply inspecting the laws satisfied by the components does 
not reveal regularities in the system behavior. This phenomenon is what is known as 
emergent behavior. The DOD Modeling and Simulation Glossary notes that: 
“If emergence happens over disparate size scales, then the reason is usually 
a causal relation across different scales. In other words, there is often a form 
of top-down feedback in systems with emergent properties. These are two 
of the major reasons why emergent behavior occurs: intricate causal 
relations across different scales and feedback.” 
This emergent behavior the driving benefit of ABM, though Bonabeau identifies 
two other benefits; AMB provides a natural description of the system and it is flexible 
[101]. Emergent behavior has the potential to be counterintuitive as simple changes to the 
rules that dictate individual agent behavior can have a large effect on the collective 
emergent behavior. This is a large benefit. By modifying the environmental parameters and 
the rules the agents follow, researchers can attempt to better understand what the outcomes 
will be as a result of the emergent behavior of the overall system [105]. This ability to 
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generate variation of simulated data directly from carefully specified set of rules rather than 
direct measurement of the real world can invaluable when experimentation or measurement 
is impossible, difficult, or expensive. The simulated data can then be analyzed inductively 
through observation and generalization [63]. The rules for the agents need not be fixed; 
more advanced individual behaviors such as learning and adaptations can be generated 
using neural nets, machine learning, and other modeling types incorporated within the 
ABM to make adaptive agents [100, 101]. Because ABM generates emergent behavior, it 
has the potential to change the scientific process from the quest to explain observed 
phenomenon/behavior to a quest to grow the desired behavior from the constituent entities 
[101].  
To define global interdependencies in terms of governing mathematical equations 
can be a difficult proposition in some cases. It is far easier to describe how individuals or 
entities within a system will conduct activities. This is what is meant by a natural 
description of a system—one that is far easier to explain and justify when developing and 
presenting the M&S to the decision makers or a non-technical audience to aid in building 
trust for not only the M&S but of its results and conclusion derived therein. 
In terms of flexibility, ABM can span levels of description and aggregation 
depending on the problem and the problems under study, as illustrated in Figure 80. ABM 
is especially useful in problems where the proper level of description or complexity is not 
known a priori. In such a case, agents can be added or removed as necessary given some 
experimentation with the model. In addition, the behavior of agents, rules of interaction, 
and ability of agents to think, learn, and evolve (degree of rationality) can all be modified 
with relative ease; allowing one to play games and ‘tune’ the model. However, the ability 
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to easily use and program ABM can lead to the misconception that the concepts are easy 
to master. Bonabeau [101] highlights five examples of when the use of ABM is appropriate, 
which are summarized and paraphrased below: 
1. When agent interactions are complex, nonlinear, discontinuous, or 
discrete and the behavior of agents can dramatically affect the behavior 
of others.  
2. When then environmental space is central to the problem definition, 
assumptions, or constraints (traffic, market, etc.) 
3. When the populations under study are heterogenous. 
4. When agent interactions between agents are complex and heterogenous; 
they cannot be summarized in a homogeneous global manner. 
5. When agents can learn and adapt rather than prescribe to fixed behavior.  
As is implied, ABM is not the quintessential M&S paradigm; the model must serve 
the tailored purpose for which it is prescribed; no general-use model is possible. Soft 
factors that are wrought with uncertainty such as irrational human agents and subjective 
choices can be difficult to verify and validate. When such factors are included in a model, 
it is imperative not to conflate qualitative outcomes as purely quantitative results. The 
largest challenge in ABM is scale. As previously mentioned, ABM can be used at nearly 
every level of aggregation. However, in practice, models can easily grow so large that they 
become computationally expensive and infeasible. Therefore large systems prove to be a 
challenge for ABM; with large computational time required, making numerous means and 
ways trades is time consuming, difficult, or impossible without an appropriate design of 
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experiment and meta-modeling, which can further obfuscate the validation of the model 
and the traceability of root causes and/or compound errors depending on model fit.[106] 
3.3.3.2 Examples of Use 
Bonabeau [101] also classified four primary classification areas for which ABM 
and its ability to demonstrate emergent phenomenon and global behaviors: flows (traffic, 
customer, etc.), markets (stocks, strategic simulation, etc.), organizations (operational 
risk), and diffusion (innovation and adoption dynamics) [101].  However, since he authored 
his seminal colloquium paper on the topic, the use of ABM has exploded. It is now used in 
biology, business, network theory, economic and social studies, and organizational studies. 
ABM has also seen heavy use in the military since the early 2000s and is now, along with 
DES the primary means of modeling beyond the engineering level. In fact, the DOD uses 
ABM to “model everything from maintenance processes on the flight-line or on-board a 
Naval vessel to examining personnel retention” [35]. ABM has also been used to research 
and examine historical battles to validate historical observations and assumptions with 
respect to causes of successes and failures, as well as to use historical battles to validate 
current models used to predict future battle/engagement results [107].  
3.3.4 System Dynamics (SD) 
3.3.4.1 Description 
System Dynamics (SD) is one of the oldest of the M&S pedagogies examined in 
this thesis. Jay W. Forrester of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology developed the 
approach in the mid-1950s and published the seminal book in the field, Industrial 
 116 
Dynamics [108] in 1961. Forrester conceived the fundamental idea for system dynamics 
while attempting to solve a business problem for General Electric. General Electric could 
not understand why they had an oscillatory unstable workforce requirement (having a few 
years of working triple shifts to satisfy demand followed by having to lay off half of the 
work force). From his modeling of the hiring and operational practices, Forrester 
discovered that “even if incoming orders remained constant, employment instability could 
still arise as a consequence of common decision-making policies.”[109] His findings 
became known as the “Forrester effect” or bullwhip effect wherein customer demand 
results in increase inventory swings with decreasing forecast accuracy as one moves further 
up a supply chain. Hence, system dynamics was born of business and management to assess 
trends associated with policy, decision-making and strategy. Modelers would study a 
corporation, develop a model, and provide consultant services and recommendations. Since 
its inception, however, SD use has significantly expanded and evolved. The System 
Dynamics Society’s modern definition of System Dynamics is as follows: 
“System Dynamics is a computer-aided approach to policy analysis and 
design. It applies to dynamic problems arising in complex social, 
managerial, economic, or ecological systems—literally any dynamic 
system characterized by interdependence, mutual interaction, information 
feedback, and circular causality.” [110] 
The key takeaways from the definition that reflect the core principles of system 
dynamics are as follows: complexity, interdependence, interactions, circular causality, and 
feedback. Unlike DES, the key to system dynamics is the idea that behaviors of the model 
result from nonlinear relationships and feedback. Central tenet of SD being that it is the 
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structure of a system that causes its behavior endogenously, whereas exogenous factors 
are, at most, triggers of system behavior but not the cause. As a method, system dynamics 
is 
“a perspective and set of conceptual tools that enable us to understand the 
structure and dynamics of complex systems. System Dynamics is also a 
rigorous modeling method that enables us to build formal computer 
simulations of complex systems and use them to design more effective 
policies and organizations.” [51]  
Since Forrester was originally an electrical engineer, SD modeling traces its roots to control 
theory extended from complex machines to complex systems and thus, draws many 
parallels. In a closed-loop control system, a portion of an output signal is fed back to the 
input whereby actual output can be compared to desired output and adjustments can be 
made to account for perturbations or to reduce error (Figure 55) [111]. 
 
Figure 55: Canonical Closed-Loop Control System adapted from [111] 
Hence, concepts such as positive and negative feedback, sensitivity to initial conditions, 
and state space as well as oscillations, asymptotic behavior, exponential growth, S-shaped 
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growth, goal seeking behavior, overshoots and collapse are as relevant in SD as they are 
control theory [51, 61]. Developing an SD model requires that one describe processes of 
accumulation and feedback. These models are then used to systematically test proposed 
policies for achieving desired outcomes [94].  
 In SD, real-world systems and processes are represented in terms of stocks, flows, 
delays, and the information and relationships that determine the values of the flows (Figure 
56). A stock is an accumulation that characterizes the state of the system under study. Thus, 
in modeling terms, stocks are the state variables and in mathematical terms represent the 
integral value or levels. Flows represent the time rate of change in the amount of stock 
flowing into or out of the system; hence flows are the rates or derivative functions. 
Additional detail can be added to the logic of stock and flow diagram via converters (or 
auxiliaries) that affect the flow rates due to causal relationships. The numerical 
relationships between the variables is called a connector. [51, 61] 
 
 
Figure 56: SD Canonical Stock and Flow Diagram 
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In mathematical terms, the premise of stock and flow is analogous to Reynolds 
Transport Theorem (RTT) for a control volume; the Eulerian approach used in thermal-
fluid systems as mass flows in and out of a system. RTT theorem states that for an extensive 
property (B) which depends on the mass or size of a system, that the rate of change of (B) 
in the system is equal to the rate of change of (B) into the control volume plus the net 
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𝝆𝝆 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅;𝒃𝒃: 𝒊𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅,𝑽𝑽: 𝒗𝒗𝒑𝒑𝒗𝒗𝒗𝒗𝒗𝒗𝒅𝒅, 
 𝜌𝜌: 𝒗𝒗𝒅𝒅𝒗𝒗𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅 𝒗𝒗𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊,𝑑𝑑: 𝒊𝒊𝒗𝒗𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒊𝒅𝒅 𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔 𝒗𝒗𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊 
 
This equation has many uses in the development of conservation principles, but in basic 
terms it is analogous to the filling of a bucket, where the quantity in the bucket is a function 




Figure 57: Control Volume Analogy 
 
In SD terms this is simplified to the following mathematical relationships [51]: 
Integral Equation: 
 







= 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) −𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) (4) 
 
Mathematically, a complete SD model is a system of nonlinear differential equations. 
However, to reduce mathematical complexity and additional converters and connectors 
may be utilized to build and express relationships between elements as interlocking sets of 
simpler algebraic equations and ensuring dimensional consistency among the units of 
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measure.[48, 61] By writing these equations in simple form in plain language, the causal 
structure posited is more clearly shown and provides greater overall model transparency. 
To develop these equations, modelers must use both theory, experimental data, and 
measured data (Figure 58). Therefore, SD requires both qualitative and quantitative inputs.  
 
 
Figure 58: Classic SD -Prey (Lotka-Volterra) Example  
 
SD models are likely to include more variables whose importance and inclusion are 
based on either logic or expert opinion, many of which may not have solid statistical 
estimates available [48]. It is therefore important to include the party ‘customer’ in the 
creation of the model from Step 1 to establish a level of confidence in the model to be able 
to accept the model as “an adequate depiction of the system it represents” [69]. Forrest 
posits that most SD models will only compete with mental models that decision-makers 
use to develop policy and make decisions in the absence of M&S. From his experience, he 
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claims that customers will accept SD models as ‘valid’ due to the increased clarity an 
insight than what they previously had available to them.  
The original SD software was DYNAMO, a programming language created by 
Alexander Pugh. Since that time, more advanced and user-friendly SD software has been 
developed such as STELLA (iThink) and Vensim which have contributed to the rise in 
interest in SD modeling [109, 113]. The later software makes the first three steps of the 
Forrester’s modeling process relatively easy by enabling computerized stock and flow 
diagrams, the ability to embed equations while building the model, and the ability to rapidly 
execute simulations with little computational power required—even large models can 
easily run on personal computers.  
There are some important things to note about SD modeling that differentiates it 
from other modeling methods. Due to the mathematical relationships used and underlying 
integrals and differential equations, SD model variables are typically continuous and not 
discrete. The models work with aggregates and therefore the items in each stock are 
indistinguishable; they do not have individuality Though methods exist in modern software 
to treat some variables as discrete by implementing delayed pulse steps. As models of 
aggregate behavior, SD models will have broader model boundaries than other types. 
Therefore, modelers must think in terms of global structural dependencies and provide 
accurate quantitative data for those dependencies [90]. SD is likely “to include more 
variables based on the recognition by logic or expert opinion that they are important but 
for which solid statistical estimates may not be available” [48]. If data cannot be found or 
is unavailable “best guesses must be substituted until measurements are taken” [114]. 
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In his 1991 chapter “System Dynamics and the Lessons of 35 Years” in the book 
The Systematic Basis of Policy Making in the 1990s [115], Forrester notes that 
“[e]ffectiveness of a model depends on how it uses the wide range of information arising 
from the system being represented.” Forrester also notes that SD gathers its data differently 
than other social sciences in that it focuses on policies and structure as the basic building 
blocks for the model. As such, there are three primary sources of information used to build 
an SD model: mental data, written data, and numerical data. He argues that while data is 
often used to signify only quantifiable numerical information, the dictionary definition is 
broader in that it includes the phrase “material serving as a basis for discussion, inference, 
or determination of policy” [10, 115]. He posits that most human affairs are conducted 
mostly from a mental database then written knowledge and then numerical data. 
The power of SD it the ability to generate, evaluate and assess trends; it cannot 
predict the future, nor can any model. Accurate trends are more important than exact data 
for past events—as no data can ever be found for future events. Alternative approaches 
involve using other M&S pedagogies to generate data that can then be aggregated and used 
in the SD model as mathematical data.  
The SD paradigm is one of bounded rationality [116]. Bounded rationality for 
decision makers and modelers is defined by three overarching and unavoidable constraints. 
First, the information that is available regarding alternatives and consequences, is limited 
and often unreliable. Second, the human mind (and the model) is limited in capacity to 
evaluate and process the available information. Third, there is a limited amount of time to 
decide [20]. Ultimately this means that SD does not attempt to nor does it require all the 
variables in a complex problem. Rather, SD focuses on the variables that are essential to 
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the problem and its context (the environment) defined by the modeler and the customer. 
Because it SD is a paradigm of bounded rationality, it does not attempt to seek a global 
optimum and instead must satisfice (accept an available option as satisfactory) by means 
of rules of thumb rather than explore every possible contingency [116].  
3.3.4.2 Examples of Use 
Since Forrester, first conceived SD, its use has expanded far beyond that for which 
it was originally envisioned. However, until Systems Engineering and Systems Thinking 
became popular coupled with user-friendly software developments in 1994, SD modeling 
was limited to a specialized group of experts [71]. Now, SD is used by Systems Engineers, 
the business community, in supply chain management, public policy, international and 
intra-national conflict, cellular receptor dynamics, [61, 116, 117]. Recently, the use of SD 
as a methodology for creating “simulation-based learning environments” has become more 
common and widely accepted amongst the SD community, grounded in the idea that the 
models can be used to improve decision-maker understanding of system structure and the 
essential features of system dynamics methodology and systems thinking.[118] 
SD has seen some limited use in military applications, though typically only in 
academia. SD problems for the military include supply system analysis, workforce 
manning requirement assessments, operational impacts combat actions in insurgencies, 
combat models, project management, wargaming, and national stability to inform policy 
and analyze effects of operations [48, 73, 119-121]. Most notably, it has been used to study 
technology integration for Army PED by researchers at Charles River Analytics [122, 123]. 
However, SD does not play a significant role in the primary M&S used by operations and 
acquisition personnel nor for the creation of executable architecture. 
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CHAPTER 4. PROBLEM 1: OVERALL FRAMEWORK 
From the stakeholder crosswalk and the literature review in 2.7, an overall 
framework was developed. This framework takes into consideration the systems concepts 
and important systems thinking considerations from Section 3.1 examined systems 
thinking, and IPPD (Figure 45).  
Various modeling methodologies were reviewed, namely those of Arnold and Wade 
(Figure 38: Systems Thinking Systemigram from [67]), Sterman (Figure 48: Sterman's 
Iterative Modeling Process), Forrester (Figure 47: Forrester's 6-Step SD Modeling Process 
recreated from [69]) and Ford). In addition to verification/validation principles from 
Mavris (Figure 49 ‘Vee’ Model recreated from [29]) With all of this in mind, the concepts 
are reflected in the framework presented in the Figure 59 on the following page. 
Leveraging the AISR PED use case, the steps of this combined approach will be 
demonstrated. Figure 60 shows a mapping of the supporting research questions to the 
analytical framework. This mapping will serve as a guide for the remainder of the 
dissertation for the reader’s reference and orientation. It is the authors position that the 
answering of these questions and demonstration of the framework via the use case is 
sufficient to provide an equivalency to the larger real-world problem. This method (and the 
M&S created) can be refined with data to provide a reasonable prediction of real-world 






















































4.1 Problem 1 Summary 
Problem 1 as associated to the overall problem along with its subsequent research 
questions and hypothesis is depicted in the figure below for the reader’s convenience. For 
detailed development of the sub-problem and questions see Section 2.5. 
 
Figure 61: Problem 1 Summary 
4.2 Identify the Real-World Problem/Scenario 
As is true in every method, the first step is to identify and define the real-world 
problem. If the problem is static traditional modeling and numerical optimization methods 
may be the best course of action. However, if the problem is variant with time and exhibits 
dynamic behavior, then a simulation is required. For the purpose of this research a real-
word problem was as a an need to dynamically model AISR-PED to allow the multiple 
stakeholders in the system-of-systems the ability to efficiently and holistically analyze the 
effects of modernization efforts and structural changes to the AISR enterprise architecture 
via a common operating picture with shared understanding to streamline communications 
and decisions.  
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4.2.1 Define the Environment/Scenario 
For the given SoS, the modeler must define the environment and scenario in which 
the SoS will be operating. Defining the scenario is an important step to assess capabilities 
and test it against real objectives and forces (actual or simulated). Without an appropriate 
operating environment and scenario, one cannot assert the benefits or necessity of a 
capability [16]. Without defining the scenario and operating environment, one cannot 
identify the primary MOP and MOE. The method selected to generate the executable 
architecture should be flexible and adaptable enough to be able to alter the scenario and 
operating environment without drastic change or recreation of the EA framework.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the use case for the executable architecture will 
focus on unmanned aerial intelligence and surveillance operations in support of long-range 
precision fires against near-pear threats in a multi-domain environment. Specifically, the 
future scenario focuses on Phase II, Seize the Initiative operations, (see Figure 177) during 
the first 48 hours of such a conflict during which forces must penetrate and disintegrate 
enemy A2AD systems and exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to accomplish 
strategic goals (see Appendix A).  
4.2.2 Aerial Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AISR) Use Case  
A system-of-systems is a set of interacting components organized to achieve a 
stated purpose that demonstrates operational and managerial independence of component 
systems as well as geographical distribution, emergent behavior, and evolutionary 
development processes [27, 64, 66]. Army Aerial Intelligence Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (AISR) and the associated Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination 
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(PED) of the information collected embodies this definition of a system-of-systems. The 
military phrase “sensor to shooter” implies a misleading simplification to the true 
complexity of AISR and PED which are both part of a complex system-of-systems 
spanning the globe. The massive addition of assets, sensor payloads, and architecture have 
been built up over the past decade as an attempt to not only provide more intelligence, but 
to make time sensitive intelligence accessible across organizations. 
The complete system-of-systems operating in a continuous cycle (Figure 62). This 
system-of-systems includes forward-deployed systems and systems in sanctuary via 
reachback. Each of these systems and their associated personnel are independent 
organizations working in concert with one another under different operational and 
managerial controls, across vast geographical separation, and undergo independent system 
development. The complete system-of-systems, from a holistic sense, includes the aerial 
collection platforms with various collection of sensor payloads; the space assets that 
connect remote operation and transmit data back to sanctuary; the cyber distributed 
information systems network to provide access to raw data and intelligence products; the 
processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems and analysists that convert raw data to 
intelligence; and finally the “shooters” or kinetic assets that engage enemy forces.  
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Figure 62: Aerial ISR System-of-Systems 
 
After three years of exercises, war games, experiments, studies and field force 
observations the Army Campaign of Learning has identified the Army’s number one 
capability gap (challenge) is the lack of adequate Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR), specifically at echelons above brigade (EAB) in its ability to 
effectively support of large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against near-peer threats 
(NPT). The Army is addressing these challenges along three primary lines of effort from 
within the DOTmLPF-P spectrum: organization, materiel, and training as potential 
opportunities for improvement, thus making it a perfect candidate as a test case for this 
approach [124].  
In typical modern wargames and simulations, AISR performance is simply included 
as a detection probability of enemy position to inform future wargaming or simulation 
agents’ decisions. The AISR process itself, however, is typically not simulated in large 
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scenario models nor is it wargamed. That is not to say AISR is not modeled at all. Many 
models and simulations exist to simulate UAS against advance enemy air defenses to 
determine detection probability, survivability, fleet mixing, and swarming tactics in an 
anti-access/area denial (A2AD) environment.[125] These modelers may focus on the 
number of assets, flight performance characteristics of different aircraft types, and 
sensor/payload capabilities in engagement or mission-level simulations to define future 
requirements or to analyze alternatives. These simulations typically focus on attrition rates 
of enemy and friendly forces and all rely upon the assumption that information is passed 
seamlessly between intelligence and kinetic assets, either assuming complete autonomy or 
simply neglecting the complex reach-back chain required. 
Figure 63 from the Department of Defense (DoD) Unmanned Systems Integrated 
Roadmap FY2013-2038 depicts the complex architecture associated with the collection of 
ISR information from a data transport perspective. From a broad overview, the AISR 
network consists of three layers: Space, Aerial, and Terrestrial Communications. The space 
layer, consisting of both protected military (MILSATCOM) and commercial 
(COMSATCOM) satellite communications relays, is critical for both the transport of raw 
data from manned and unmanned assets to the terrestrial satellite dishes that provide the 
gateway into the enterprise for further processing, exploiting, and disseminating (PED) of 
the data in the form of intelligence products. The MILSATCOM also provide critical 
beyond-line-of-site (BLOS) control of the UAS from either a forward deployed control 
shelter or via reach-back to a control shelter stateside. 
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Figure 63: High-Level Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) 
Operational Overview (OV-1) of ISR System-of-Systems [126] 
While the fully autonomous, ‘drone,’ concept is imagined for future operations, it 
is an unlikely scenario in the near- to mid-term. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the military 
or the civilian leadership would ever accept kinetic actions without a human-in-the-loop 
element to confirm identifications and authorize weapons release [11, 127]. This means 
that this reach back architecture will remain relevant even if the UAS are fully autonomous. 
This complex loop requires extensive modeling and the application of systems thinking to 
analyze its complexity and improve its operation concurrently with the increasing and 
improving AISR assets.  
To complicate matters, the Army’s current AISR reach back architecture was not a 
product of complete preplanned development through detailed creation and analysis of 
DoDAF products from the onset. Rather the fielding of the capabilities was evolved hastily 
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to satisfy a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) during the War on Terror. 
New technologies and architecture were introduced and tested against real-world 
operations. To satisfy the ever-increasing demand for ISR, the DoD and the Army used a 
combination of existing programs of record, rapid modifications to existing platforms, and 
the rapid acquisition of commercial and contractor solutions. Unfortunately, while 
necessary, this enterprise grew in absence of unified plan under the DoD Architecture 
Framework. Aerial ISR and the PED architecture that supports it are constantly evolving.  
As an experimental first step to make the ISR PED more agile for future near-peer 
conflicts, the Army has developed a conceptual unit deemed the Multi-Domain Task Force 
(MDTF) that is currently undergoing testing and evaluation in the exercises in the Pacific 
theater of operations, manual wargames, and simulations [42]. This pilot organization built 
around the 17th Field Artillery Brigade is equipped with high-mobility artillery rocket 
systems (HIMARS) and includes a plus sized battalion consisting of intelligence, 
information, cyber, electronic warfare and space elements (I2CEWS). The organization 
will have capabilities in each domain to help it penetrate enemies’ anti-access aerial denial 
defenses and will be equipped with future technological capabilities, some of which are 
still in the conceptual phases [128, 129]. This proposed structural change has yet to be 
modeled into the existing framework analytically.  
The current systems within the AISR-PED distributed architecture are each 
managed under different stakeholders, particularly Program Executive Offices (PEO), 
Program Managers (PM) within those PEOs and TRADOC Capability Managers, and three 
Futures Command CFTs each trying to develop, integrate and sustain their respective 
elements of the system. This distribution of responsibility requires an incredible amount of 
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coordination and synchronization. Without an overall model of the governing system and 
idea of how it will be integrated and employed, modifications are developed by end user 
identified capability gaps developed through CBA and JCIDS. Improvements have been 
and will be based on observed or predicted gaps from SMEs against current or past 
operations without the ability to trace major influential factors, points of diminishing 
returns or vulnerabilities. This method results in “best guesses” for how to quantify 
questions such as how much technology may be needed to process data, how many people 
it can replace, how effective it is.  
Systems thinking was likely applied by the Army throughout the AISR 
modernization process. However, given the fact that were so many entities involved over 
an extended period, and, it is reasonable to state that it was not examined holistically and 
simply grew too large with complex dependencies and non-linear relationships due to 
feedback loops cannot be readily visualized using traditional static MBSE. Before 
proceeding with additional modification and improvements, it is imperative the system be 
modeled holistically and examined to determine which factors are the most influential and 
a priority for future investment.  
A system-of-systems this complex, however, is also difficult to model the entirety 
with popular methods used in military simulations such as discrete event simulations or 
agent-based models. Would an agent be needed for every aircraft, satellite, bit of data 
transmitted, intelligence analyst, kinetic fires system (ground and air), and every enemy on 
the battlefield? The computational time an effort would be unquantifiable and running 
thousands of cases with varying probabilities to account for stochasticity and uncertainty 
would be computationally expensive. Furthermore, validating and calibrating a model of 
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this type so that end users would trust in the results is a challenge for a system in which 
data has been poorly recorded or is classified for a system that was developed in pieces 
rapidly over the past decade. A “soft” modeling approach may be more appropriate to 
provide qualitative understanding and support quantitative trend results to inform decision, 
policy, and investments. 
4.3 Selecting Appropriate DoDAF for Executable Architecture  
4.3.1 Research Question 1.1 
The reader is reminded of the research question this section hopes to address:  
Research Question 1.1 
What means are available to aid understand the system structure as the first step of 
conceptualizing the EA?? 
Hypothesis 1.1: Existing DoDAF models can be used initially. SMEs and data can be 
used to modify and adjust. 
Previous sections discussed the three primary sources of information recommended 
by Forrester [108] [115] for creating M&S for an executable architecture: the mental 
database, the written database, and the numeric database; with existing SME input, and 
DoDAF models to satisfy the first two requirements. He emphasized the mental database 
as the most important for determining know how and where information flows the roles of 
players in the system., and where decisions occur. The initial M&S can be generated and 
supplemented with numerical data as available.  
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Based on 17 years of experience in the field, the author suggests that AISR PED 
operations are no different, especially in the constantly evolving architecture compounded 
by the dynamic and uncertain operations of combat. However, this heavier reliance on 
mental and written data leads to the inclusion of many parameters which may be of 
assumed importance or have estimated or difficult to quantify values. Forrester [115] and 
Sterman [51] make an effort to note that excluding a variable from a model simply because 
accurate numerical data does not exist or cannot be found is more detrimental than 
estimating a value in a model for which behavior analysis is the primary goal. This is 
because removing the variable implicitly assumes that it has a value of zero and is not an 
influencer on the system, when through the application of systems thinking it was 
determined, at least initially, that the variable was important, or at least relevant.  
4.3.2 Approach-Mapping the DoDAF 
4.3.2.1 Initial Viewpoint/Model Selection 
With these concepts in mind, the next step is to map static DoDAF viewpoint 
models to the dynamic simulation model. Unfortunately, DODAF 2.02 does not have 
product tailoring guides. Some DoD policy documents may specify specific DoDAF 
products for specific projects, which may at least provide a minimum set of diagrams, 
tables, etc. However, the decision of which DoDAFs to use is typically at the discretion of 




DoDAF version 1.0 required a minimum core set of products required for every 
project:  
• AV-1: Overview and Summary Information 
• AV-2: Integrated Dictionary 
• OV-1: High Level Operational Concept Graphic 
• OV-5: Operational Activity Model 
• OV-2: Operational Node Connectivity Description 
• OV-3: Operational Informational Exchange Matrix 
• SV-1: System Interface Description 
• TV-1: Technical Standards Profile 
While DODAF policy changed in later version, as not all the views were suitable 
for every problem, this list, while obsolete, at least creates a starting point on where to 
begin. Furthermore, DODAF 1.5 [88] provided a chart with applicable architecture 
products for various recommended uses and problem types. Bear in mind, however, that 
the some of the names and uses of these products have been modified or changed in 
DODAF 2.0 [89]. Nevertheless, Figure 64: DoDAF 1.5 Recommended Product Selection, 
provides a good starting point, despite its discontinued use. Even though the AISR TC-
PED problem for study falls under C4ISR, we are assessing the system of system under an 




Figure 64: DoDAF 1.5 Recommended Product Selection from [88] 
 
 Comparing a typical SD model to DoDAF, the holistic similarities between the 
operational viewpoints (OV) and SD modeling are readily apparent. Given that the 
overarching architecture for this research will be an SD model, a mapping of SD to DoDAF 
Operational Views is appropriate and feasible. In 2014, researchers at the Industrial 
University of Santander, Bueno et. al. [130] proposed an integrated executable architecture 
and mapped DoDAF operational views to SD stock and flow diagrams. The researchers 
proposed using only operational viewpoints to map static DoDAF products to a typical SD 
stock and flow diagram as depicted in Figure 65. 
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Figure 65: Mapping of OV Products to SD Model adapted from [130] 
They suggested that a standard SD stock and flow diagram can be constructed from 
the information gleaned from just five different operational viewpoints: OV-1, OV-3, OV-
5, OV-6a, and OV-6b. The ability to develop SD M&S using just these products is 
extremely valuable, given that operational viewpoints are some of the most often developed 
DoDAF products on Army projects, being produced for 86%, 71%, 86%, 57%, and 29% 
systems respectively [131]. 
However, in their conclusions, these computer scientists stated two findings. First, 
DoDAF models provide important and relevant information to the development of an 
interactive simulation. Second, DoDAF does not lend itself to automatically generated, 
direct mapping SD simulations, thus the modeler and SMEs must use them to glean 
relevant information [130]. This lack of automatic mapping, while an area of continued 
research, is not the emphasis of this thesis, quite the contrary. Recall the intent is to 
 141 
demonstrate the ability to rapidly and holistically develop a simulation that through its 
creation and through interactive experiments with the final product allow decisionmakers 
and SMEs to play games and produce results that inform decisions with some scientific 
backing and reasoning as opposed to a data-in-data-out black box.  
4.3.2.2 High-Level Operational Graphic (OV-1) 
In his doctoral thesis, Architecture-Based Selection of Modeling Type For System-
of-systems Analysis, Dr. Burak Bagdatli [132] proposed a methodology for the SoS 
modeler to select a correct modeling technique by mapping various modeling paradigms 
to DoDAF via the viewpoint details and the modeling elements in a process he named 
Selection Of Logical Simulation Types for Systems-of-systems (SOLSTySS).  
 
Figure 66: OV-1 for AISR PED in MDO With LRPF Example  
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In this work, Bagdatli found that the OV-1: High Level Operational Concept 
Graphic, is helpful in identifying stocks, flows and, potentially, variables while Bueno et. 
al found that OV-1 are useful for overall understanding of the system and for identification 
of stocks only. The author concurs with positions Bueno et al. and Bagdatli while also 
adding of posits that the OV-1 also provides information on the identification of the 
subsystems with the SoS framework, albeit at a superficial level. Using the OV-1 in Figure 
66, the initial subsystems can be identified: enemy ground forces, friendly ground forces, 
friendly MDSS UAS, friendly PED (See Table 9).  
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4.3.2.3 Operational Resource Flow (OV-2) 
Like Bueno, Bagdatli found limited use of the OV-2: Operational Resource Flow 
Description, due to lack of details in the OV-2 to inform the SD model. However, the 
DODAF website states that the: 
“OV-2 can be used to show flows of funding, personnel and materiel in 
addition to information. A specific application of the OV-2 is to describe a 
logical pattern of resource (information, funding, personnel, or materiel) 
flows.”[31]  
The OV-2 is specifically intended for supply chain analysis and the allocation of 
activities to resources, the former being a common usage of SD and the latter being one of 
the objectives of this research. The author posits that, the OV-2 aids in the identification of 
critical flows (personnel, materiel, etc.) that are necessary for the conduct of real 
operations. Too often such flows are neglected due to the difficulty of capturing such things 
in models and simulations. However, it is precisely these considerations that should be 
included to provide policy makers a better perspective of all that affects the operational 
effectiveness of the system; not simply the performance of the system in an isolated 
environment that treats these intangibles as unnecessary for the model or outside the scope 
of assessment. Of course, it depends on what problem the M&S is posing to address and 
what parts of the environment need to be included to answer that question while still 
reducing complexity. Hence, rather than dismiss the OV-2 outright, it should be considered 
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to provide perspective to other stocks and flows in the problem that may need to be included 
as implied in Figure 64: DoDAF 1.5 Recommended Product Selection.  
 
Figure 67: OV-2 (AISR-PED Example) 
 
4.3.2.4 Organizations, Activities and Resources (OV-3)  
Both Bueno and Bagdatli found that OV-3, which is inextricably linked to OV-2 
could be used to inform flows and feedback, though Bagdatli notes that, like the OV-2, the 
implantation details in the OV-3 are lacking. It is true that neither given an indication of 
how much flow is required or the time rate of change of said flow but does aid in the 
identification of those flows that could affect stocks of interest.  
Both sources and this author find that the OV-4, Organizational Relationships 
chart is of little to no value for the creation of an SD model.[130, 132] While 
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organizational hierarchical relationships are important in understanding the roles in an 
operation, they provide no additional information to develop the SD model.  
 
 
Figure 68: OV-3 Resource Flow Matrix (AISR-PED Example) 
 
4.3.2.5 Operational Activity Decomposition Tree and Model (OV-5a, OV-5b)  
The OV-5a is an Operational Activity Decomposition Tree and the OV-5b is an 
Operational Activity Model. Both Bueno and Bagdatli dismiss outright the usefulness of 
the OV-5a in the creation of an SD model but found the OV-5b as useful in identifying 
stocks, flows and feedback [130, 132]. However, according to the DoDAF 2.02 Architect 
Guide [89], these two documents combined are used to “describe the operations that are 
normally conducted in the course of achieving a mission or a business goal” and describe 
“operational activities (or tasks); input/output flows between activities, and to/from 
activities that are outside the scope of the Architectural Description” [31].  
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More importantly, the OV-5a and OV-5b are used to “uncover unnecessary 
operational activity redundancy” and “make decisions about streamlining, combining, or 
omitting activities.”[31] Part of creating an SD model is reducing complexity of the 
model, how this task will be accomplished with the M&S will be discussed in a 
subsequent section, however, the OV-5a which provides an “overall pictures of the 
activities involved” may prove useful as an additional manual check of redundancies as a 
“quick reference for navigating the OV-5b” [133]. 
 
Figure 69: Example OV-5a Activity Decomposition Tree  
The OV-5b depicts Activities connected by Resource Flows. As such, the OV-5b 
supports development of an OV-3. Together, the Resource Flows and Operational 
Activities contained in the OV-5b are linked to the Resource Flows identified in both the 
OV-2 and the OV-3 [133].  
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Figure 70: OV-5b Operational Activity Model (D3A Example) 
 
4.3.2.6 Operational Activity Sequence and Timing Descriptions (OV-6a/b/c)  
The OV-6, Operational Activity Sequence and Timing Descriptions are important 
to modeling dynamic behavior. Previous operational view artifacts were important to 
developing the model, but dynamic behavior over time (simulation) the modeler must 
have information as to the timing and sequencing of operational activities to inform 
parameters of the SD model. It is important to note that the OV-6a Operational Rules 
Model, OV-6b Operational State Transition Description, and OV-6c Operational Event-
Trace Description are three different ways to represent timing and sequencing, hence, not 
all three need to be completed. Furthermore, these do not represent the only way to 
demonstrate sequencing and timing information[28]. The OV-6a “identifies and describes 
the rules and conditions that constrain activities within a described architecture [89]” that 
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cannot be represented generally with a graphical MBSE depiction (see Figure 71). Bueno 
et al. [130] claim that OV-6a is important in identifying the governing parameters of the 
business model, which includes restrictions and rules on processes or activities.  
A common use of SD is to evaluate the effect of system structure and policies on 
dynamic behavior over time. It would make sense, then, that an OV-6a be used to 
describe rules and policies in place that could be altered to change the dynamic behavior 
of the system to something more desirable. As such the author posits that the OV-6a is 
valuable for the creation of converters/variables and connectors and for the creation of 
the differential equations for the underlying relationships.  
 
Figure 71: OV-6a Operational Rules Model (AISR PED D3A Example) 
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2 MC Node Minimize loss of friendly assets UAS and HIMARS Constraint
3 MC Node
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1 Conduct 24-7 Operations for first 48-72 Hours Activity
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Bagdatli notes that for a SoS, the OV-6b Operational State Transition Description 
is a good method to depict dynamics and maps well to SD since it shows how the system-
of-systems works on a macro scale by use of a state transition diagram that graphically 
depicts how a node transitions its state as it responds to events.[132] Bueno et al. [130] 
note that the OV-6b is useful in identifying the key subsystems necessary to perform the 
essential function within which the stock and flow diagrams operate. However, Dam 
notes that the OV-6b does not provide clear linkage between function and data and 
cannot deal with complex interactions[28]. Dam also notes that all of the OV-6 diagrams 
“have a poor linkage between operational activities and information portrayed in the OV-
5 [28].”  
 
Figure 72: OV-6b State Transition Description (AISR PED D3A Example) 
The OV-6c Operational Activity Sequences “identifies and describes a sequence 
of activities within a described an architecture [89].” Interestingly, neither Bagdatli nor 
Bueno et. al. recommends the use of the OV-6c. This view is used to capture time 
ordered information exchanges between operational nodes and provides a depiction of the 
sequencing of events in each scenario.  
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Figure 73: OV-6c: Operational Activities Sequence (AISR PED D3A Example) 
 
4.3.2.7 System Interface Means (SV-2)  
In addition to OV diagrams, Bagdatli recommends the use of System Views (SV) 
as well if available. In particular, he found SV-2 System Interface Means which is a 
representation of the primary physical connections between the systems of interest to be 
of particular value[133]. More specifically, the SV-2 depicts the “means by which 
resources flow between systems occur [89].” As such, the systems can be imagined as 
stocks and the connections as flow of the resources with ports as the variables that adjust 
flow rates with “perfect one-to one mapping.” [132] In addition to the mapping of the 
SV-2 to SD modeling provided by Bagdatli, the author finds that the SV-2 is also 
 151 
valuable in defining connectors that may not necessarily indicate a flow but as an 
information pathway that influences a flow particularly between subsystems.  
 
 
Figure 74: SV-2 System Interface Means (AISR-PED D3A Example) 
 
4.3.2.8 Systems and Services Resource Flow Matrix (SV-6)  
Bagdatli also notes the value of the SV-6, Systems and Services Resource Flow 
Matrix. This system viewpoint details the characteristics of the flow of resources between 
systems, the activities performed, and the rules and measures associated with these 
exchanges [31, 89]. While these attributes make for an ideal candidate for mapping to an 
SD M&S environment, the SV-6 really the “physical equivalent to the logical OV-3 
table” [134] and provides very little useful information for the creation of an SD model 
 152 
over what is already contained in the OV-3 and the SV-2. Furthermore, the SV-6 is far 
less likely than the OV-3 to be generated in Army systems development (71% vs 29%). 
Therefore, the SV-6 can be used in the same manner as the OV-3 to identify stocks and 
flows but is redundant.  
4.3.2.9 Systems Measures Matrix (SV-7)  
The SV-7, Systems Measures Matrix (Figure 75) can be of great value in the 
creation of any M&S environment as it lists both the qualitative and quantitative metrics 
that are selected by the stakeholders/end-users and all of the measures that will be used in 
the model [31]. These measures contained in the SV-7 are those considered most crucial 
for mission success and are the performance parameters will must be met This document 
can include end-user defined MOEs and MOPs as measures that can be captured and 
presented in the SV-7 as performance parameters and requirements that can be developed 
and as specification that can be defined. This makes the SV-7 an important document in 
the CBA process during the creation of the ICD. However, it is not uncommon to 
continue to develop a complete set of performance parameters throughout the 
Architectural Description, as the performance parameters may not be fully known during 
early stages of architecture development. Hence the SV-7 is a ‘living’ document that “is 
updated throughout the specification, design, development, testing, and possibly even its 
deployment and operations lifecycle phases [89].” Surprisingly, this document is 
underutilized in the Army with surveys showing that it is developed for 0% of the 
systems in the study. In fact, it is the least developed product across the services, included 
in only 5% of systems developed [131].  
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Figure 75: SV-7 System Measures Matrix (AISR-PED D3A Example) 
 
In summary, through extensive literature review and study of the DOD 
Architecture Framework, the author recommends that if available, the OV 
1/3/5b/6a/6b/6c in addition to OV-2, SV-2, SV-6 and SV-7 to build the preliminary 
model. After which, SME input and parametric values will be leveraged to refine the 
model based on the problem(s) to be addressed 
 
Figure 76: Final Proposed DoDAF Mapping 
 
System Action Metric Value
UAS Report Enemy Asset Locations (PIR) Obserables/Hour/UAS ~1-5
PED Process, Exploit, Disseminate Reports/Hour ~20-30







4.4 Understand the System/Apply Systems Thinking 
As Forrester suggested, understanding the system requires data from three sources: 
mental, written, and numeric. As an initial starting point, SME input alongside available 
DoDAF artifacts/models are used to develop and understanding of the elements, functions, 
and interconnection within the system-of-system architecture. Numeric data will be used 
to modify and improve the model as available, otherwise, assumed values and parametric 
ranges will be used initially to ascertain behavior of the system under study.  
4.4.1 Identify Key Sectors of the SoS 
As an initial step, a general sector map is generated to depict the major sectors of 
the system-of-systems as shown in the Figure 77: 
 
Figure 77: AISR TC-PED Sector Map 
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4.4.2 Apply Systems Test 
The systems test shown in Figure 36: Arnold and Wade Systems Test is applied to 
gain understanding of the system or system-of-systems under study by forcing the modeler 
to identify elements, their functions, and the interconnections between them. For the given 
AISR PED SoS use case, is depicted in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Use Case Elements Functions and Interconnections 
 
4.4.3 Develop Causal Relationships 
From this architecture diagram and SME input, initial causal relationships can be 
developed. A sample of causal relationships are depicted in the figure below. Additional 
causal relations will be shown in the final model development in the next chapter. 
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Figure 78: Sample Causal Relationships for Case Study 
 
4.4.4 Establish Boundaries and Variables of Interest 
The modeler must then, using the previously generated products, determine what 
variables are of interest and what factors will be included in the model using a model 
boundary chart like the one depicted in Figure 79 which has been generate for the use case 
in this dissertation. Recalling the definitions of endogenous, exogenous, and excluded from 
Table 5: System Modeling and Simulation Terms. The model boundary chart delineates 
the primary endogenous, exogenous, and excluded element and activities and elements in 
the system structure to be modeled.  
This step is critical to identify model boundaries and aid in the identification of 
what does and does not need to be in the model. While this step does rely on SME and 
modeler subjective input, it is the first step in both utilizing systems thinking to reduce the 
complexity of the model and simulation. The endogenous elements that occur in the use 
case are identified in the innermost green circle. 
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Figure 79: Model Boundary Chart 
 
The orange middle circle encapsulates activities and elements that can affect the 
system of interest. Finally, the elements in red are excluded; while they may impact the 
system of interest indirectly, they are too far removed to be of interest for the study at hand. 
The identification of the key elements and activities will aid in the determination of the 
necessary simulation paradigm. Considering the variable of interest and their 
characteristics, as well as the model boundary and the role of the environment, the M&S 
type. 
Using the Table 10: Use Case Elements Functions and Interconnections, the above 
sector map in Figure 77, and the section outlined in red in the OV-1 from Figure 175 an 












































4.4.5 Define MOP and MOE for the System 
For the SoS under study, the key operational MOP and MOE of interest to the 
operational customer must be defined to ensure that the right M&S is built and that the 
M&S is right; else the executable architecture will be a waste of effort, fail to gain 
acceptance of stakeholders, and ultimately be excluded. Determining the MOP and MOE 
are critical for simulation paradigm selection; it is of no value to select a method that is 
incapable generating the desired observations and outputs.  
 Up until this point, the author has used the terms MOP and MOE in the technical 
sense of the terms. However, there is ambiguity in the definitions of these terms between 
the technical/acquisitions branch of the military, and the operational branch of the military. 
It is important to both define MOP and MOE as well as differentiate technical and 
operational MOP/MOE for clarity for the remainder of this dissertation.  
 The collaborate publication “Technical Measurement (INCOSE-TP-2003-020-01)” 
[21] coauthored by members of the U.S. Army, PSM (Practical Software and Systems 
Measurement), INCOSE (International Council of Systems Engineering), and Lockheed 
Martin, defines technical MOP as : 
Definition: Technical Measure of Performance: “The measures that characterize 
physical or functional attributes relating to the system operation, measured or estimated 
under specified testing and/or operational environment conditions [21].”  
  
 160 
When dealing with the development of technical systems these technical MOP 
translate to system performance targets or goals, e.g. data transmission rate, max range, 
endurance, etc. They compare how well, from a supplier’s viewpoint, the delivered system 
performs against system level requirements. But while targetable performance metrics are 
sufficient for development, the crux of the issue and the ultimate question is how these 
measurables translate to the desired real-world mission success. This concept leads to the 
MOE which [21] defines as: 
Definition: Technical Measure of Effectiveness: “The “operational” measures of 
success that are closely related to the achievement of the mission or operational objective 
being evaluated, in the intended operational environment under a specified set of 
conditions; i.e., how well the solution achieves the intended purpose.[21].”  
 
Operational MOE from a technical definition perspective can have a wide range 
depending on the problem definition. These MOE are stated from the customer’s standpoint 
and represent the most important indicators of affordability, suitability, and performance 
needed to achieve mission success across the life cycle of the system. These MOE are 
typically normalized to aid comparison of alternatives and evaluate achievement of key 
operational performance, e.g. maintenance-free operating period, systems/dollar/year [21]. 
These “operational” measures of success are typically predicated off metric that presume 
an operational advantage or benefit in a conflict or scenario.  
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However, the operation branch of the military defines MOP and MOE differently. 
The Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations defines the MOP as: 
Definition: Operational Measure of Performance: “A criterion used to assess 
friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment [135].” 
 
In an operational environment these operational MOP amount to measurable 
activities such as number of hours flown, number of reports processed, number of sorties 
flown, etc. These operational MOP are easy to track and brief to higher commands as 
indicators of success.  
However, while these metrics indicate how well a unit or a system performs, they 
give no indication of the value the asset/system/unit provides relative to the success of the 
commander’s ultimate objectives. In other words, MOP may sound good, but if they had 
no bearing on the desired end state that it is nothing more than a number. For example, if 
1000 intelligence reports were processed, but none contain any information of value that 
led to the destruction of enemy targets, then the intelligence collection was not effective.  
Definition: Operational Measure of Effectiveness: “A criterion used to assess 
changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to 
measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an 
effect [135].” 
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When deriving MOP and MOE perspective is vital (supplier versus customer; 
technical versus operational). From the preceding definitions and discussion, operational 
MOP can be conflated with technical MOP with the operational MOE being estimated or 
assumed. It is important that distinctions are made. When assessing a SoS architecture and 
changes therein, operational stakeholders (customers) need to be able evaluate a SoS for 
how changed across the DOTmLPF-P spectrum affect not only operational MOP, but more 
importantly operational MOE.  
Like the environment and scenario selection, modelers should seek guiding 
documents such as doctrine, Army Vision, Army Priorities, scenario objectives, and 
subjective SME guidance. For the AISR PED use case, the intention of ISR and 
improvement to the SoS is to increase the collection of intelligence that leads to the 
elimination of enemy targets while sustaining friendly assets while reducing chronic 
fatigue on limited capabilities (intelligence personnel, aircrews, HIMARS, and UAS) and 
intelligence losses due to expired information (LTIOV). From the resources and 
discussions with AISR PED SMEs following MOP and MOE are identified: 
Table 11: AISR-PED Measures of Performance 
Friendly UAS Losses Over Time 
Friendly HIMARS Losses Over Time 
Friendly Satellite Losses Over Time 
Enemy Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Losses Over Time 
Enemy Artillery Losses Over Time 
Intelligence Processing Rates 
Intelligence Overflow Over Time 
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Table 12: AISR PED Measures of Effectiveness 
Enemy to Friendly Artillery Loss Ratio Over Time 
Enemy AAA to Friendly UAS Ratio Over Time 
Total Loss Ratio Over Time 
Friendly Loss Percentages Over Time 
Intelligence Overflow Ratios 
Average Intelligence Capacity Utilization 
Intelligence Personnel Overwork 
 
4.5 Problem 1.2 Executable Modeling and Simulation Approaches 
The reader is reminded of the research question this section hopes to address:  
Research Question 1.2 
Which simulation methods are suitable to create an executable architecture of a complex 
system-of-systems? 
Hypothesis 1.2: System Dynamics can provide an overarching M&S architecture that 
can capture key aspects of the system and enable understanding of technology benefits 
and limitations, policy impacts, and the likely outcome of future investment strategies. 
 
As discussed previously, the selection of an appropriate paradigm should focus on 
seeking the correct level of aggregation, though the end result may be a blend of paradigms. 
Initially, however, the modeler must select an overarching simulation paradigm to create 
the broader architecture at the strategic level. Recall that the intent of this framework is to 
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identify general trends that can be further informed by smaller, higher fidelity models only 
for elements of the system that are the most influential as a means to reduce complexity 
and increase efficiency of M&S creation and experimentation so as it is not excluded from 
the CBA process or the developing Futures Command methodology.  
This subsection addresses Research Question 1.2 shown in the Figure 61. this 
specific section seeks to demonstrate a method to compare and evaluate different major 
modeling and simulation paradigms in greater detail. First each paradigm will be described 
in more detail, with a description, general principles, and examples of use. The different 
paradigms will then be compared against criteria developed from both Army modeling and 
simulation guidance and developed from observations regarding desirable traits of 
executable architectures and stakeholder requirements.  
4.5.1 Determine Necessity for Simulation 
Prior to selection of a simulation paradigm, one must first determine if simulation 
is even necessary, recalling the challenges of DoDAF and the limitations of static MBSE 
architecture, especially when dealing with complex systems-of-systems. Table 7  discussed 
Dr. Jerry Banks’ circumstances for when simulation is or is not an appropriate tool [78]. 
As a matter of example, the AISR-PED use case will be used against these criteria. This 
will not only support the need for simulation, but the answers aid in the selection of 
modeling paradigm.  
In Table 13, the premise of an executable architecture for AISR-PED is evaluated 
against circumstance for which simulation is an appropriate tool. For circumstances that 
apply, the associated row in the center column is annotated with the word ‘yes’ and the cell 
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is color-coded green; for those in conflict, the associated row is annotated ‘no’ and color-
coded red. Because we are looking at circumstance which are appropriate for simulation, 
green and yes are desirable. Additional remarks are included with corresponding 
hyperlinks to areas in this document that expound upon the concepts further. It can be seen 
from this comparison, that the problem overwhelmingly supports simulation as opposed to 
analytical solutions or static models. The cells with ‘no’ do not preclude the use of 
simulation but should be briefly addressed.  
First, when constructing an executable architecture, it is unlikely that an analytical 
solution exists to be verified. This does not preclude the model from being simulated but 
can pose challenges in validation of the model. Additionally, while the EA is intended to 
provide some of the same benefits of wargaming as a learning tool, its primary intent is to 
analyze the SoS not simulate warfighting.  
The premise of an executable architecture for AISR-PED is evaluated against 
circumstance for which simulation is not an appropriate tool. For circumstances that 
comply, the associated row in the center column is annotated with the word ‘yes’ and the 
cell is color-coded green; for those in conflict, the associated row is annotated ‘no’ and 
color-coded red. Because we are looking at circumstance which are not appropriate for 
simulation, red and ‘no ‘are desirable. As previous, remarks are included to provide insight 
as to the applicability. 
Of note, are three circumstances which have the potential to indicate that simulation 
is not appropriate; these ideas should be addressed and help formulate additional criteria 
for the selection of a simulation paradigm, or combination thereof. First, the cost of the 
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simulation must not exceed the potential savings. As noted previously, the simulation for 
the EA should not be computationally or monetarily expensive, lest it is likely to put 
additional strain on the budget and the timeline. This premise directly applies to the concept 
of time and personnel to verify and validate the model. 
Table 13: Evaluating if Simulation is Appropriate for Use Case 
Simulation is Appropriate Y/N Remarks 
To study and experiment with complex 
system internal interactions Yes 
AISR-PED is highly complex. Internal 
interactions between systems must be 
analyzed.  
To simulate the effects of 
organizational changes on a model’s 
behavior. 
Yes 
Determining effects of organizational changes 
must be evaluated against operational 
MOP/MOE  
When knowledge gained from the 
design of the simulation would identify 
and suggest ways to improve the 
system 
Yes 
One of the goals for the EA is to improve 
understanding of the system-of-systems 
through the development of the simulation. 
When changing inputs and observing 
outputs can provide insight into the 
most important variables interactions. 
Yes 
The EA should be interactive to allow 
univariate and multivariate changes to observe 
operational MOP/MOE impacts  
When it can be used as an educational 
device. Yes 
EA should facilitate tabletop discussions and 
similar benefits to wargaming  
To prepare for future events by 
experimenting with new designs or 
policies prior to implementation. Yes 
The EA should be able to evaluate changes in 
policy and structure to be able to test them 
prior to costly implementation or live 
experimentation.  
To verify analytical solutions. No It is unlikely that analytical solutions exist for complex SoS in an operational environment.  
To develop requirements by simulating 
different capabilities for consideration. Yes 
The granularity of the EA will determine the 
fidelity necessary for the capability being 
evaluated.  
As a training device with reduced cost. No EA is not intended to be used as a training device.  
For visualization of an operation 
Yes 
The EA should provide visualization of system 
interactions and effects on operational 
MOP/MOE  
When a modern system or SoS is so 
complex that interactions can only be 
evaluated through simulation. 
Yes 
Complex SoS may have second and third order 
reactions and feedbacks that cannot easily be 
evaluated without simulation. 
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If the effort is too great for the EA, it is likely to be excluded Lastly, poorly recorded 
or classified data may add difficulty in creating and validating the M&S. This framework 
demonstrates that, like Forrester noted, there are three types of data: mental, written, and 
numeric; with existing SME input, and DoDAF models to satisfy the first two 
requirements. The M&S can be supplemented with numerical data as available. 
Table 14: Evaluating if Simulation is Not Appropriate for Use Case 
Simulation is Appropriate Applies Remarks 
If the problem can be solved 
using common sense. No 
Complex SoS interaction and feedback 
loops are difficult to infer. Static DoDAF 
models are useful for detail tracking but 
not for visualizing effects  
If the problem can be solved 
analytically No 
No equations can be used to solve 
complex dynamic stochastic architecture, 
If it is easier to perform direct 
experiments. No 
Direct experiments of complex systems 
are time-consuming and expensive and 
require huge monetary expense up front  
If cost of simulation exceeds 
potential savings. Yes No 
Dependent on type of simulation used. 
Goal is to create an inexpensive simulation 
relative to the cost of acquisitions.  
If no data or estimates are 
available to inform the model 
and simulation 
Yes No 
Data or estimates can be challenging to 
obtain especially for systems that have yet 
to be created/implemented or are 
classified. However, simulation should be 
capable of providing insights with the 
three primary data sources and refined 
with additional data.  
Not enough time or personnel 
to verify and validate the 
model. Yes No 
Some simulations can be extremely 
difficult to verify or validate. Simulation 
should provide reasonable behavior, not 
predict exact behavior for non-physics-
based models.  
If managers expectations are 
too high or if abilities of 
simulation are overestimated. 
No 
EA serves to provide technical orientation 
and management orientation; it does not 
predict the future. 
If system behavior is too 
complex it can’t be simplified, 
i.e. human behavior. No 
For a strategic level EA average values or 
perceived trends can be used. For areas 
most influential, additional simulation 
types may be used to provide greater 
fidelity. 
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With the recommendation for simulation for the problem set being confirmed, subsequent 
sections will provide an overview of the four major modeling paradigms researched for 
this study.  
4.5.2 Select Modelling and Simulation Type/Combination 
After careful contemplation of the problem, examination of available data, and an 
initial attempt to understand the system and reduce complexity using systems thinking, a 
M&S type or combination thereof must be selected. An M&S paradigm must be selected 
to fit the problem, along with the appropriate scenario to assess the capabilities and 
behaviors under examination.  
Table 15: Questions to Evaluate Analytical Approaches from [37] 
Question/Criteria 
1. Can the approach evaluate the doctrinal approaches you have collected? 
2. Can the approach estimate the measures of effectiveness you are using? 
3. Can the approach represent the scenarios, tasks, and functions identified in the 
study definition? 
4. Does the approach represent the correct warfighting scope? 
5. How large a team does the analytical approach require to execute? 
6. How much analytical overhead (i.e., estimation of outcomes not relevant to the 
CBA) must be absorbed in the approach? 
7. How long will the approach take to execute? 
8. Does the approach require construction of a set of special-purpose models? If so, 
how long will it take, and will it be difficult to win acceptance of these models? 
9. Is the approach agile enough? Can it quickly assess many alternatives (US and 
enemy CONOPS, scenarios, and capabilities)? 
10.What is the backup plan if the approach does not work? 
 
As implied in Figure 46: M&S Characterizations, models and their variables can be 
dynamic or static, deterministic or stochastic, discrete or continuous, and the M&S method 
should be capable of simulating said characteristics. When considering large scale systems-
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of-systems for strategic-level insight, the question of necessary aggregation is an important 
one. Additionally, the DoD Capabilities-Based Assessment Users Guide lists a specific set 
of questions to evaluate analytical approaches that must be considered summarized in 
Table 16. Each of these questions should be considered when developing the model and 
simulation. Determining the proper complexity of a model is often a challenge. If a model 
is too detailed (high-fidelity) it becomes too large and complex to effectively be used as a 
communication tool to promote shared understanding; too simplified (low fidelity) and it 
ceases to be able to answer detailed questions. 
 The quote commonly attributed to Albert Einstein, “Everything should be made as 
simple as possible, but not simpler” demonstrates the ideals standard for models and 
simulations. While there are many modeling and simulation types, this thesis will examine 
four types in detail: Petri Nets (PN), Discrete Event Simulations (DES), Agent Based 
Modeling, and System Dynamics. Figure 81 provides an overview of these modeling types 
and their typical levels of abstraction, variable types, and general characteristics. 
Developers of M&S seek foresight and insight, seeking qualitative predictions and 
quantitative predictions of the problems they seek to investigate.[103] This pursuit requires 
the appropriate level of aggregation and modeling paradigm for the problem being 
investigated, each with their own unique assumptions, methodology, and different criteria 
to evaluate the results. All too often, practitioners of M&S resort to the M&S paradigm 
with which they are most familiar.[93] But the type of problem will dictate the level of 
aggregation required based on the desired insights and the characteristics of the problem 
being modeled, which requires the correct M&S paradigm. Dr. Sterman makes it a point to 
stress to the model builder that the creating a model of a system is not the singular purpose; 
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solving a problem is and the model must be simplified to the appropriate level of 
complexity to accurately replicate a specific problem. 
 
 
Figure 81: M&S Paradigms adapted from [90] 
 
A modeler may but does not necessarily have to choose between “modeling the 
forest or modeling the trees,” i.e. macro or micro. While such a distinction is possible and 
sometimes necessary, one may model both the model and the trees by combining modeling 
methods for various aspects of the problem depending on the aggregation required or in 
the absence of data to provide emergent behavior of micro elements to inform the macro 
model. Rather than make the distinction of petri nets, discrete-event simulation, agent-
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based modeling, or system dynamics the correct answer may be a combination of two or 
more of the methods.  
For quick reference, a brief summarized comparative chart of the paradigms explored 
in the previous section is depicted below in Table 16: M&S Paradigm .  
Table 16: M&S Paradigm Comparative Summary 
 Petri Nets DES ABM SD 
Approach Process view Process view Bottom-up Top-Down 
Detail Level Meso Meso Micro-Macro Macro 
Level Individual (hetero) 
Individual 
(hetero) Individual (hetero) Aggregates (homo) 
Time Discrete Discrete Discrete Continuous 
Stochastic or 
Deterministic Stochastic Stochastic Stochastic Deterministic 
Mathematics Graph Theory 
Event 






Activities Agents and Logic 
Equations, stocks, 
flows, feedback 




Events Events and delays Events 


















Application Problem Solving 
Problem 
Solving Exploring Problem Solving 
Graphic 
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As noted by Dr. John Sterman Dr. Hazhir Rahmandad, forcing oneself to simply 
choose between the paradigm can be “a false choice rooted in confusion.” The answer is 
the seek the right level of aggregation [136]. However, the modeler will have to compare 
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and contrast the benefits and limitations of the aforementioned paradigms against the 
objectives of the study, the available data, and the time constraints, amongst any other 
criteria the modeler deems important for the given problem. 
Despite the generalized usages implied in Figure 81 hybrid approaches are not 
limited to using system dynamics as the macro and agent-based as the micro. Multiple 
studies have demonstrated that some paradigms can replicate the performance of others or 
can be imbedded in each other, some using system dynamics within an agent-based model 
or discrete event simulation and some with agent-based models or discrete event 
simulations within the larger system dynamics model  [93, 100, 104, 137, 138]. 
For the case study, the selection of a paradigm or blend of paradigms will be 
selected in the subsequent chapter as well, leveraging the systems thinking tools already 
developed and displayed in this chapter. The subsequent chapter will also detail the 
methods to construct the model using available data and validation and varication (V&V).  
4.5.2.1 Initial Comparison 
Beyond just characteristics of the variables, goals, and treatment of time for 
simulation paradigms shown in Table 16, the reader is reminded of the ten questions posed 
by the DOD Capabilities-Based Assessment Users Guide depicted in Table 15: Questions 
to Evaluate Analytical Approaches from [37]. As an initial attempt at determining the 
appropriate M&S for the executable architecture, the paradigm are assessed against an 
abbreviated form of those questions in Table 17. 
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Table 17: Initial Assessment of M&S Types for Study 
Question/Criteria 
CPN DES ABM SD 
Ability to evaluate the doctrinal approaches Y Y Y Y 
Ability to estimate the desired measures of 
effectiveness N N N Y 
Able to represent the scenarios, tasks, and functions 
identified in the study definition N N N Y 
Able to represent the correct warfighting scope N Y Y Y 
Size of team required to execute analytical approach M L L S 
Time to execute approach M L L S 
Requires construction of special-purpose models? Y Y Y Y 
If so, how long will it take M M M S 
Will it be difficult to win acceptance of the model? U U U U  
Agility; able to assess many alternatives N N N Y 
 
Each of the methods can evaluate the doctrinal approaches, though it depends on the 
scale and the metrics being observed. For the AISR PED use case, CPN and DES are good 
for tracking the flow of intelligence along with sources of delays but are not good at 
depicting feedback from second and third order effects. ABM can assess engagements and 
individual actors to determine battle damage for actual assets and kinetic engagements but 
for the scope of the problem would require far too many agents to be created. Even if 
aggregated, things like data flow would be difficult to model and assess. SD on the other 
hand, is capable of modeling both the asset interactions, engagements, and data flow, but 
again, at a higher aggregation. Techniques could be used to discretize elements that need 
more specific granular data points like UAS and HIMARS assets.  
The ability to estimate MOE would depend on exactly what the desired MOE are. If 
the MOE are based solely on improved data flow or intelligence reports DES and CPN 
would be suitable, if not ideal. If kinetic effects are the key MOE, ABM would provide 
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engagement-level interactions to inform global effects. However, if the impact of 
intelligence and the effects on friendly forces and enemy forces are desired, SD would 
provide a holistic sinew to join the two. Data flow would be aggregate, which is acceptable 
for strategic-level observations. However, it cannot simulate battle engagements beyond 
statistical elements or stochastic effects. Those areas could be refined by integrating an 
ABM. This assessment is also true for represent the scenarios, tasks, and functions 
identified in the study definition. Given the MOP and MOE for the AISR PED use case  
and the description of SD characteristics, SD appears to be the only paradigm that is able 
to capable of satisfy in the requirements.  
The size of team required to execute analytical approach is also a functin of the 
fidelity required and the scope of the operation under study. For example, for a campaign-
level or mission analysis (Figure 8: DOD Modeling Hierarchy from [35]) with high levels 
of aggregation, small to medium team would be necessary, whereas if the scope was large 
and the fidelity was high with many entities, attributes, and activities, the effort could be 
massive. For a typical SD problem, small teams are recommended to meet with SMEs, 
review policies, and develop architectural frameworks because SD focuses on global 
relationships at the strategic level of macro aggregation. If areas needed additional blended 
modeling types, additional members may be required.  
Because the CBA ICD development timeline is short, the intent is to develop an EA 
using a rapidly developed and executed method to obtain reasonable behavior models of 
the system. CPN, DES, ABM can all be developed in a moderately reasonable amount of 
time with the right expertise and available simulation platforms such as AFSIM. However, 
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SD is marketed as being able to be rapidly developed and has low computational 
requirements, meaning many alternatives can be assessed quickly.  
Agent-based models are the easiest to understand because they deal with the actions 
and rules of individual agents. However, agents are not suitable for all aspects of the given 
AISR PED use case, namely data transport. CPN and DES can be confusing and serve, 
essentially, as black boxes to decision-makers. Because SD is a graphical interface that is 
easy to view and understand and utilizes easy to understand algebraic and differential 
equation written in plain English with instantaneous visualization of outputs and effects, 
the author believes it will be easier to gain acceptance of the model. This belief is 
strengthened by the fact that it emphasizes behavioral trends and influence on those trends 
rather than numerical results. 
From this initial selection method, the author deduces that SD would provide the best 
method to create a strategic-level holistic executable architecture of the SoS. However, to 
provide numerical objectivity to the selection of the M&S paradigm, a classic Pugh matric 
with absolute weighting is used.  
4.5.2.2 Pugh Matrix 
A type of matrix diagram, a Pugh Matrix (PM) is an easy to use decision support tool 
for multi-attribute decision making. This method is intended to help reduce subjectivity 
when comparing several alternatives. The method allows for the pair-wise comparison of 
the alternatives against a baseline rather than against each other for many decision criteria 
to help reduce subjectivity [139].  
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The first, and arguably most important step of crafting the PM is the selection of 
evaluation criteria. An incorrect, inadequate, or incomplete selection criteria can reduce 
the quality of the assessment and lead to an incorrect decision [139]. For the selection of 
an appropriate M&S paradigm for the creation of an EA capable of informing strategic-
level acquisition, policy, and allocation decisions four primary selection criteria were 
identified: ability to provide technical orientation, ability to provide managerial orientation, 
flexibility/adaptability, and cost. These four primary selection criteria were further divided 
into18 secondary selection criteria depicted in Figure 82. These criteria were generated 
using the simulation criteria found in Table 13 and Table 14; from desirable EA 
characteristic generated from gap analysis and through discussions with SMEs.  
The second step was to select a baseline to compare the other paradigms against. As 
discussed in Section 3.3.1.3 CPN and TPN have been used in the past to create executable 
architecture by Levis, et. Al. [30, 87] and in Executable Architecture Methodology for 
Analysis (EAMA) by Pawloski et al [140]. Additionally, PN in general were originally 
mentioned specifically for the creation and testing of OV-6 series DoDAF models. For 
these reasons, CPN were selected as the baseline paradigm. 
For the third step, each alternative paradigm was then compared against the baseline 
criterion by criterion. For each criterion, the baseline was assigned a numeric value of ‘3’. 
A pair-wise score with ‘3’ means the alternative is the same as the baseline, ‘4’ means it is 
better, and ‘2’ means it is worse. To add extra levels of discrimination, ‘5’ means the 
alternative is much better and ‘1’ means it is much worse. 
 177 
 
Figure 82: Pugh Selection of M&S Paradigm 
 
The numeric values are tallied at the bottom. From the initial computation, SD is the 
clear winner based on the criteria, just as the hasty subjective analysis in the previous sub-
section. CPN and ABM had equal scores and slightly edged out DES. This is an interesting 
result given that the two M&S paradigms are used to simulate very different things. 
However, this result provides great insight into the best methods to use to refine certain 
aspects of the global EA for areas deemed the most influential and for which smaller 
models can be used to confirm global assumptions in the absence of data. If desired, hybrids 
could be created, and the Pugh Matrix could be reevaluated; this is a form of qualitative 
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optimization [139]. Because the intent of this study is to demonstrate a framework for 
creating an overarching, rapid, EA to evaluate operational MOP/MOE at the strategic-
decisionmaker level, the use of hybrid models is beyond the scope of this thesis but will be 
explored in future work.  
To improve differentiation, the criteria can be weighted. While there are several types 
of scaling approaches (absolute, sales-driven, analytic hierarchy process, etc.) the absolute 
scale from 1-5 was used for this study. Each numeric value represents the relative 
importance of the criterion to the stakeholders. The value of with ‘1’ represents the criteria 
being of minor importance, ‘2’ being of moderate importance ‘3’ being important to the 
stakeholder, ‘4’ being very important, and ‘5, being of extreme importance. The weights 
were individually assessed for each criterion and applied. The weight value is multiplied 
by the pair-wise comparison value for each criteria and alternative paradigm before being 
summed at the bottom to calculate the weighted score.  
Coincidently, not only did the weighted score ranking of the alternatives match that 
of the non-weighted score, but CPN and ABM again have matching scores. Furthermore, 
the ratio of the scores is identical as well. Ironically, this is not a miscalculation nor was it 
done intentionally: simply changing one of the weights changes the values and ratios. For 
example, if the first criterion “Identify Emergent Behavior” was changed from a weight of 
‘3’ to ‘4’ the scores change to 210, 193, 212, and 291, respectively.  
4.5.3 Selection of System Dynamics 
For purposes of this study, SD was selected as the appropriate type of M&S to 
analyze and conduct experiments on the AISR PED architecture problem. Given the 
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previously generated products from the use of Systems Thinking, stock and flow diagrams 
can be created and then combined with causal loops to create the SD model. A sample of 
stock and flows for this problem for the primary variables of interest are show in the figure 
below. 
 
Figure 83: Use Case Stocks and Flows for Variables of Interest 
 
The stock and flow diagrams will be combined with all causal feedback loops using 
commercial software. For this research, Vensim will be used due to its ability to quickly 
build SD models with the built in sensitivity analysis toolkits, built in Monte Carlo 
capability, and limited DES and ABM capability that can be included if necessary or if 
required for future development of the architecture. 
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An advantage of SD paradigm is that it operates at a global level, excluding 
extraneous details. By developing causal diagram, we can investigate the factors that 
contribute endogenously to the behavior of the system with respect to the desired 
MOP/MOE over time due to the structure of the system-of-systems. However, many 
parameters in an SD model may be difficult to obtain, while others may even be difficult 
to quantify and be subjective [141]. 
Using the three types of data sources, mathematical relationships between variables 
must be developed. For aspects for which data is unknown or too difficult to model, proxy 
variable will be used. Careful examination and SME input will help inform which ‘knobs’ 
(variables) that the decision-makers will be able to manipulate. This selection must be 
grounded in that which is technically feasible and will be initially aligned with Roadmap 
2017-2042 initiatives.  
The next section within this chapter will discuss the creation of the model using 
available information; namely using the products developed previously using systems the 
mapping of DoDAF Operational Viewpoint models to create the M&S environment. 
4.6 Apparatus/Simulation Design 
Rather than depict AISR in a specific operational theater with a specific environment, 
the intent is to model the entire AISR PED enterprise from sensor to shooter, starting with 
theOV-1 (Figure 66) Enemy effects will be assumed. MDSS UAS assets are assumed to be 
operated remotely via MILSATCOM from sanctuary. The AISR PED enterprise will also 
include the newly proposed MDTF PED discussed in Section 0. Relationships not 
delineated in the DoDAF viewpoints will be constructed using published policy, SME 
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expertise, and any available numerical data. Other values with be assumed as parametric 
analysis will be performed. In this study, we are primarily concerned with the enemy 
destroyed over time for which more is better; the ratio of enemy destroyed versus the 
friendly which a higher ratio is better, and intelligence backlog for which a lower value is 
preferred.  
4.6.1 Modeling Friendly UAS and HIMARS  
Using the information derived from the OV-1 and the Table 18 initial stock and 
flow diagrams with variable and connectors can be developed (see Figure 84). The initial 
stocks of interest are the UAS overhead, the satellites overhead and the pool of UAS 
available, as these are items that will decrease with time over the course of the operation 
and are directly related to the MOP/MOE. The flows can be deduced logically from the 
OV-1. The UAS overhead are depleted by enemy anti-aircraft fire and by the loss of UAS 
capacity; this can be caused by the loss of satellites needed to operate them, the return of 
UAS to base after a set period of time, and through the reduction of ground control stations 
or crews. These variables become converters that influence the flow rates or limit the value 
of the stocks. These relationships will continue to be refined with other DoDAF products 
and SME input via model testing. 
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`  
Figure 84: Initial Stock and Flow Diagram for UAS 
 
Lastly, we know that the UAS in theater are a limited resource and, thus, must come 
from some reserve base. This available pool will be limited by the total UAS in theater, the 
operational readiness (OR) rate, and the number of aircraft required overhead. However, 
these UAS cannot be replaced immediately and will require additional delays to be added 
to account for average launch and transit times. While the OV-1 does not provide details 
as to the numeric values or mathematical relationships, the causalities are easily inferred. 
For example, if the OR increases then the available UAS in the UAS pool increases; such 
logic can be applied initially to all connections. From there, basic equations can be 
implemented. As discussed, SD equations are simple differential relationships. If more 
complicated relationships are required, it is customary to add additional variables in 
between two variables to keep relationships simple. This aids not only in the construct of 
the model, but also in the ability for stakeholders to easily see and understand relationships 
as they are simple to communicate with variable names in plain language [73]. The stock 
 183 
equation for the ‘UAS Overhead’ is depicted below in both differential and integral form. 
For a complete list of all equations used in the model see Appendix B. 
 𝑑𝑑(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑)
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)
− 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)




= � [𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑)
𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡0
− 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑)
− 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑)]𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (𝑡𝑡0)  
 
(6) 
The ‘UAS Overhead’ has an initial value dictated by ‘UAS Limit.’ The number of 
aircraft that can be place overhead are limited by GCS, crews, and the frequency limit. The 
frequency limit is dictated by the variables associated with the satellites, including not only 
SME defined converters/variable associated with the satellites but also with the number of 
satellites as well. The number of satellites, in turn, is affected by enemy actions (cyber, 
shootdown, etc.). This trail of causes is depicted in the causal tree for the variable ‘UAS 
Limit’ shown in Figure 87. From just the simple OV-1 we can see complex relationships 
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form; with changes in one affecting a key variable or changing a constraint/limitation. To 
account for this limitation on the ‘UAS Overhead,’ and outflow must be added as a function 
of these constraints that may change with respect to time.  
 
 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 <
= 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑,𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁,𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃)
∗ (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)/𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃, 0 ) 
(7) 
 
The UAS Capacity Loss equation accomplishes two ends when determining ‘UAS 
Capacity Loss’ rate with respect to time. First the if/then/else statement calculates, at each 
time step, the difference between the ‘UAS Limit’ and the current ‘UAS Overhead’. If the 
‘UAS Overhead’ are greater than the organizations ability to support (due to loss of 
satellites, crews, etc.) then there is a corresponding drop in the number of ‘UAS Overhead.’ 
Dividing this difference by the time step serves two purposes. First, it puts the rate in the 
correct units of UAS per unit time. Second it applies the entire reduction instantaneously 
at the time step as pulse. The instantaneous pulse function is also known as the Dirac delta 
function 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡), where 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡), is the limit of a rectangular pulse starting at time ‘T’, with a 
width ‘W’ and a height of 1/W as the duration of the pulse goes to zero [51]. In 







0 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑇
1
𝑊𝑊
𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂 𝑇𝑇 < 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑇 + 𝑊𝑊
0 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂 𝑡𝑡 > 𝑇𝑇 + 𝑊𝑊
 (8) 
 
Figure 85 shows a standard rectangular pulse function over for rate of four UAS per hour 
starting at time T=10 hours for a duration of W=2.5 hours (shown in blue). The green line 
indicates the accumulation of UAS equal to 10 UAS.  
 
Figure 85: Standard Pulse Function Example 
 
Note that the accumulation of UAS in this example is continuous, meaning at select 
times between 10- and 12.5-hours fractional values of UAS are included. By dividing the 
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rate of UAS for the pulse by the time step (in this example 0.25 hours), and reducing the 
width of the pulse ‘W’ to the time step the increase of UAS is instantaneous at T=10 and 
the net accumulation is equal to the previous example of 10 UAS. The increase of the rate 
fourfold in this example is simply a byproduct of the technique to ensure the accumulation 
quantity is accurate without increasing the total UAS. In both examples, the accumulated 
UAS is10 UAS, but in Figure 86, the increase occurs from 10 to 10.25 hours. Decreasing 
the time step can cause this limit to approach 10, but with little added benefit to the model.  
 
 
Figure 86: Dirac Delta Function Example 
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This is a method to add discretization to the continuous system for a more physical 
representation and better understanding for stakeholder [142]. As an example, there cannot 
physically be 9.73 UAS. While this is simply a function of the integration time step if a 
simple continuous rate is applied and can be explained as such, or could be justified as a 
degraded capability, it is more physically accurate to have the reduction of integer values 
of physical entities. However, for the purpose of this model for this dissertation, the Dirac 
delta function was utilized.  
 
Figure 87: Initial UAS Limit Causal Tree 
 
A similar equation is applied to the UAS replacement rate, that serves as both the 
rate of outflow from the ‘UAS Pool’ stock in reserve and the inflow to the ‘UAS Overhead.’ 
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 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸( 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑
< 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∶ 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴: 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼
> 0 ,𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼
/𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃) , 0) 
 
(9) 
Like (8), (9) places qualifiers on the flowrate, giving it discrete behavior within a 
continuous model. The model is built under the assumption that for the initial ‘penetrate’ 
commanders require the maximum number of UAS Overhead as possible, limited only by 
the number of UAS available in theater and the capacity to operate them, dictated by UAS 
Limit. Hence, the if-then-else-and statement controls the outflow from the UAS Pool. If 
the UAS Overhead is less than the UAS Limit meaning there is additional capability 
bandwidth and there are still UAS available in reserve, then either a fixed integer value of 
UAS equal the value shot down by Enemy Anti-Aircraft Fire (see Figure 84) or the number 
of UAS remaining in the UAS Pool, whichever is less.  
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Figure 88: UAS Replacement Rate Causal Tree 
 
 Like previous outflows discussed, the UAS Replacement Rate value is divided by 
the time step to apply the effect immediately via the Dirac delta function rather than 
throughout the model’s user-defined time scale (hours) to provide discrete additions. What 
differs the UAS Replacement Rate from other flows like UAS capacity loss or Enemy Anti-
Aircraft Fire, is the inclusion of a time delay. Time delays are essential elements of SD and 
often the root cause of dynamic behavior in a system [51]. 
In SD modeling, a delay can be modeled in several ways, the simplest is through a 
series of intermediate stocks between uneven inflow and outflow rates where the outflow 
lags the inflow by some average time ‘D’. this is known as a fixed-delay or pipeline delay 
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and is commonly used for items or material in transit. A pipeline delay can be expressed 
as follows:  
 
 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡)






𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼(𝑑𝑑) = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 (𝑑𝑑 − 𝐴𝐴) 
 
(10) 
n Vensim, this simple delay can be added using a basic “DELAY FIXED” function 
rather than having to add an intermediary stock and flow diagram, as is applied in the ‘UAS 
Replacement Delay’ function. The average delay duration is adjustable via the ‘Average 
Launch and Transit Time’ variable. It is important to note that the assumption in this basic 
delay type is that there is no mixing in order of the material in the process; items exit the 
accumulation in the same order they enter without consideration for individual items (recall 
SD works as aggregates). In a practical sense, this means the model does not account for 
specific UAS reaching its designated target area prior to another. All UAS are treated the 
same with an average launch and transit time to the target area. If specific aircraft to target 
area data is required to that granularity, rather than aggregate trends, then a different 
modeling type may be required. However, for top-level holistic analysis, average transit 
times can be used and made variable to gain valuable insights such as how increasing cruise 
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speed (and decreasing average transit time), reducing launch times, or positioning UAS 
reserve assets closer to the target area (tactical considerations notwithstanding) could affect 
the successful completion of overall operational MOP/MOE. This can be done simply by 
providing a parametric range to ‘Average Launch and Transit Time’ for the ability to 
conduct univariate or multivariate sensitivity testing which will be discussed later. If this 
average transit time is found to be of considerable influence, then higher fidelity modeling 
may be required.  
 
 
Figure 89 Initial HIMARS Subsystem Stock and Flow Model 
 
Referring to the OV-1, it can be observed that the number of HIMARS is also 
considered an important variable interest during combat operations, hence it a stock. The 
outflows are the rate at which HIMARS destroyed by enemy counter-battery fire and flow 
in is due to replacements. Like with UAS, other converters and connectors can be inferred, 
specifically those influencing the replacement rate (inflow). Like the UAS, there is a delay 
prior to replacement of the HIMARS due to transit time. Additionally, the addition of the 
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variable “HIMARS per Replacement” allows the user to adjust the number of HIMARS 
that are replaced with each Dirac delta function pulse. What differs between the ‘UAS 
Replacement Rate’ and ‘HIMARS Replacement Rate’ is a matter of modeling assumption 
based on interviews with SMEs and doctrine. While UAS are tasked individual to NAIs, 
HIMARS are deployed in organizational unit structures (battalions, batteries, etc.) and 
would be employed as such. It is assumed in the model that the entirety of the MDTF 
Brigade’s HIMARS battalion would be employed from the onset of hostilities. Only after 
a certain friendly loss threshold (‘Combat Ineffective Threshold’) would reserve units be 
called in if available. If no reserve units are available or are excluded for the analysis, either 
the ‘Combat Ineffective Threshold’ or ‘HIMARS Replacement Rate’ can be set to zero, 
effectively shutting off the inflow valve (see below).  
 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁(𝑡𝑡)
= 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸(𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝜌𝜌𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑
< 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑
∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝜌𝜌𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆,𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶
/𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃, 0) 
(11) 
Like the UAS, enemy attacks that affect the outflow rate of the HIMARS are a 
challenging but extremely critical unknown. For the initial assessments, as is typical in SD, 
an assumed average rate can be assumed and given a parametric range. By providing a 
simple assumption initially, it allows for easier comparison of effects. However, because 
SD is continuous the rate will be integrated over the simulation’s time step interval. This 
means that the number of HIMARS or UAS will decrease continuously as well, which can 
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be confusing to the user as at intermediate time periods, as there will be fractional numbers 
of HIMARS or UAS as discussed previously. Therefore, a discrete Dirac delta function is 
again applied for the outflows of UAS Overhead, Number of HIMARS, and Satellites 
Overhead. However, the frequencies and magnitude of the enemy fire has to be taken into 
account as a repeated event.  
Regardless of how many DoDAF diagrams are used, none can account for enemy 
action and the enemy effects remain a virtual unknown. If modeling a historic engagement, 
post battle data can be used to generate a simulation, but the simulation will only be correct 
for the past engagement. In short, the actions and effects of the enemy anti-aircraft artillery 
and counterbattery artillery will always be an unknown and for all intents and purposes, be 
random. A smaller refined engagement model that incorporates terrain (such as an agent 
based model) can be used for the engagement information and after thousands of runs, 
surrogate models can be created and inserted into the larger holistic SD model as has been 
done for other systems [100, 105]. However, that hybrid model integration is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Additionally, such a method is time consuming, while this effort is 
meant to be applied rapidly during CBA generation of the ICD. Therefore, the 
implementation of a stochastic function can be applied to generate random effects of enemy 
action for initial analysis.  
The VensimTM software utilized in this study contains several random number 
functions. Because we desire a discrete integer value for the outflow representing the 
destruction of these friendly assets, we require a discrete probability random number 
function of which two are available in VensimTM. The first, a binomial distribution seems 
plausible because an enemy attack is either a hit or a miss. However, in Vensim this random 
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probability is assessed at every time step. Therefore, if a simulation is conducted to 
replicate 24-hours with a step time of 0.125 hours, it will assess strikes as successful hits 
or misses 192 times in the 24-hour period. If even half are assessed as hits, our HIMARS 
and UAS would be eliminated in the first few hours of the engagement. Such a result has 
the potential to be useful in a force on force warfighting simulation but is of little to no 
value when conducting analysis of technology or allocation alternatives.  
The alternative random number function that utilizes a discrete probability 
distribution available in Vensim is the ‘Random Poisson’ function which utilizes the 
Poisson distribution defined as follows:  
 
𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑃𝑃(𝜕𝜕 = 𝑥𝑥) =
𝑁𝑁−𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥!
 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂 𝑥𝑥 = 1,2,3, … 
Where 
𝜇𝜇 = 𝐸𝐸(𝜕𝜕) =  𝜆𝜆 and 𝜎𝜎2 = 𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂(𝜕𝜕) =  𝜆𝜆 and 𝜎𝜎 = 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴(𝜕𝜕) = √𝜆𝜆 
(12) 
The Poisson distribution expresses the probability, given a known constant mean rate, that 
a discrete number of events will occur in a fixed interval of time or space. Each event is 
independent of previous events. 
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Figure 90: Example Poisson Probability Distribution λ=0.7 
 
This function is appropriate for the targeting of friendly UAS and HIMARS that 
are assumed to not be stationary and hence firing solutions for each engagement are 
independent. In the SD model, the Vensim function RANDOM POISSON(m,x,M,h,r,s) 
creates a Poisson distribution with a minimum value of ‘m’, the maximum value of ‘x’, a 
mean value ‘M’, a shift parameter ‘h’, a stretch parameter ‘r’, and a stream ID ‘s’. The 
stream ID identifies an independent random number stream to use that is reproducible so 
that each run generates the same results [142]. The stream ID can be varied by introducing 
a ‘NOISE SEED’ variable that allows the user to change the stream ID to observe different 
random number strings and evaluate the effects of changing enemy actions (outflows) on 
the dynamics of the system against desired MOP/MOE.  
Such a characteristic is an important when evaluating different alternatives for 
technological, structural, and policy implementation; just because a solution shows 
effective against a stream of outcomes, does not mean that is suitable against others. It can 
be assumed that rate at which enemy actions that destroy friendly assets will have a 
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considerable effect on the performance of the system-potentially more so than anything 
else. Therefore, solutions and combinations of user-controlled variable for the system-of-
systems must be robust. How to address this robustness against noise using surrogate 
models is addressed in the subsequent chapter. However, since enemy actions and effects 
are so uncertain, given the same periodicity for enemy effects, initial holistic evaluation 
can still provide effective comparison or which policies perform better given the same 
noise seed and exact same likelihood of occurrence, afterward solutions can be evaluated 
against different noise streams.  
The application of the Dirac delta function on asset outflow due to enemy action 
with the RANDOM POISSON function can be seen in the following two figures. Each has 
a mean of 0.7 so that there is a higher probability of discrete asset outflow assessed with 
P(X=0)=0.496; P(X=1)=0.347; P(X=2)=0.12; P(X=3)=0.028; with the P(X>3)=.006. The 
first, Figure 91, uses noise seed=0, while the second, Figure 92 uses noise seed=5. 
Note that Dirac delta function combined with the Random Poisson provides corresponding 
discrete reductions in the number of HIMARS (recall that the reduction value is divided by 
the time step, in this case 0.25 hours so the rate is four times the magnitude of the physical 
reduction). Note that with a noise seed of 0, the frequency and amplitudes of the outflows 
are different than those with a noise seed of 5. As a result, while the exponential decline 




Figure 91: Example Enemy Strikes on HIMARS Noise Seed 0 
 
 
Figure 92: Example Enemy Strikes on HIMARS Noise Seed 5 
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Additional realism can be added through logic rather than force-on-force simulation 
by means of additional variables/converters to account for disparity of forces, though not 
for the effects of maneuver or terrain. It is logical to assume that as the number of enemy 
counter battery artillery and AAA assets decrease due to HIMARS kinetic strikes, that there 
will, in turn, be fewer strikes against the friendly HIMARS and UAS. Additionally, it can 
be assumed that as friendly HIMARS are killed and the numbers are reduced, the likelihood 
of hitting the remaining assets decreases as fewer targets remain. Therefore, by introducing 
additional converters, these variables can be multiplied by a constant to create a variable 
mean value (λ) for the Poisson distribution that decreases as enemy and friendly assets are 
reduced.  
 
Figure 93: Updated HIMARS Stock and Flow with Variable Mean Outflow 
 
An updated version of the HIMARS and stock and flow diagram that incorporates these 
variables is shown in Figure 93 with its corresponding conditional Enemy Counter Battery 
Fire outflow equation shown below. 
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 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁(𝑡𝑡)
= 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 (𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶 >
= 1:𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴: 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝜌𝜌𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑
>  0,𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁( 0,𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝜌𝜌𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑, 0.007
∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝜌𝜌𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑
∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 , 0 , 1 , 0)/𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 ,0) 
(13) 
This equation sets conditions that are easily defined and necessary to prevent negative flow; 
there must be at least one Enemy Artillery and one friendly HIMARS for outflow to 
continue. Note that the equation also incorporates IFTHENELSE qualifiers so that if the 
enemy or friendly assets are eliminated the outflow goes to zero and prevents negative 
stock (you cannot have negative assets. There are many methods to do this, often done with 
average rates multiplied by the stock. MAX MIN and IF THEN ELSE are also acceptable 
methods, but, like many modelling efforts, the best method is a matter of model preference, 
situationally dependent, and a subject of debate in the field. 
 Likewise, the UAS Overhead model can be improved to account for Enemy Anti-
Aircraft effects. Also, additional converters can be added to expand on the original 
converters in Figure 84. These converters represent physical entities or policy 
considerations that stakeholder and decision makers can affect.  
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Figure 94: Updated UAS Overhead Stock and Flow Diagram 
 
Like the Number of HIMARS, the UAS Overhead behavior is also influenced by enemy 
actions, and like the Number of HIMARS, the UAS Overhead leverages a Dirac delta 
function with a RANDOM Poisson with a shifting mean as UAS Overhead and Enemy 
AAA decrease. With the added converters, a more complex causality tree is formed (Figure 
95) with an added layer over the initial causality tree for the UAS Limit( Figure 87).  
From the stock and flow diagram and the causal tree, the dependencies become 
apparent. Unlike the Number of HIMARS, the UAS is dependent not only on the available 
stock in reserve, but also on the number of satellites overhead as an additional stock that 
affects the outflow. Before combining this subsystem of the model with others, it is 
important to test behavioral relationships and assess behavioral trends. Model testing and 
validation will be conducted first for subsystems connections then for the entire system as 
recommended by Ford [143]. This process is iterative. Model testing and validation types 
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and results should be documented thoroughly along with any constraints and assumption 
made in the process. 
 
Figure 95 Updated UAS Overhead Causality Tree 
  
4.6.1.1 Validate and Verify the Model 
According to Dr. Christopher Chung, associate professor in the Department of 
Industrial Engineering at the University of Houston there are two major types of validation 
for models and simulation. The first being face validity and the second being statistical 
validity. Face validity is straightforward and literally means that, on its face value, the 
model represents reality which is typically done with the assistance of SMEs 
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knowledgeable on the system under study. This approach instills a sense of ownership and 
helps avoid last-minute inquiries into model elements. However, this also depends on the 
perspective and interpretation of the SME; a model may be valid to one person but not to 
another. For face validation, it is necessary for the modeler to ensure there is enough 
animation of the process with enough visual fidelity of the actual process to assuage the 
SMEs and key stakeholders.  
Statistical validity requires an objective quantitative comparison between the 
outputs of the actual system and the model. The smaller the statistical difference between 
the real-world and model/simulation data sets, the more valid the model.[79] However, this 
requires data to be available in the first place. In the real world, there may nothing by which 
to compare the model, such as in instances of proposed real-world systems. Furthermore, 
while a model or simulation may be statistically valid for a model or simulation at the 
onset, this does not guarantee validity when the model is changed to explore alternative 
methods or layouts of a system.[81] 
Dr. Stewart Robinson, of the Operations Research and Systems Group at the 
University of Warwick, posits that there are six types of validation for models: conceptual 
model validation, data validation, white-box validation, black-box validation, 
experimentation validation, and solution validation. Conceptual model validation, like face 
validation, in ensuring that the conceptual model contains the necessary scope and level of 
details necessary to meet the objective of the study.  
Data validation involves determine what data is necessary for model construction 
and validation, and that this data is sufficiently accurate. White-box validation is assessing 
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if the constituent parts of the computer model accurately represent the real-world elements 
they are intended to. Black-box validation is the macro check of the model’s operation. 
White-box and Black-box validation are frequently collated under the term ‘operational 
validity.’ Experimental validation is the act of ascertaining the accuracy of the 
experimental procedures that will be conducted with the M&S. Lastly, solution validation, 
like statistical validation assess the accuracy of the outputs of the model. This process is 
iterative over the life-cycle of the simulation study.[81]  
The aim of V&V is to confirm that a model is sufficiently accurate for the purpose 
for which it had been built and for which it will be used. A common misconception of 
V&V is that it proves a model is correct. In reality, the intent of V&V is to attempt to prove 
the model is incorrect and by failing to do so build the user and the modeler’s confidence 
in the model and its results.[81] Even “painstaking constructed models may not actually 
represent reality.”[79] As famed statistician, George E.P. Box once stated that “all models 
are approximations. Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful. However, the 
approximate nature of the model must always be borne in mind.”[144] 
It is imperative to know the limitations, assumptions, and constraints of the models 
being used; there are simply too many variables and uncertainties in military operations, 
let alone in war. The Code of Best Practice: Experimentation notes that while models and 
simulation can be used to test limits of experiments, but are “neither valid nor robust 
enough to explore the range of conditions relevant to military operations.”[145] That being 
said, a program still has to go through the verification and validation processes before 
experimentation can begin; this process is iterative. 
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4.6.1.2 Model Testing 
Model testing is the means of conducting verification and validation and is 
therefore often abbreviated as VV&T. This is often done be subjecting the model to test 
cases or data to ensure it is functioning properly by demonstrating inaccuracies or revealing 
errors.[76] During formal model testing there are two types of structured tests, ‘direct 
structure tests’ and ‘structure-oriented behavior tests’.[146] Direct structure tests involve 
assessing each of the relationships individually in the model to the real system 
(mathematically or logically). These direct structure tests can be conducted empirically or 
theoretically. However, just because individual relationships are correct it does not ensure 
that the holistic model is correct. Structure-oriented behavior tests involve running the 
simulation for the entire model to uncover potential structural flaws. Several such tests 
exists such as extreme-condition/stress (indirect) tests, behavioral sensitivity tests, and 
phase-relationship tests.[146]  
The model and simulation developer should be wary of customers who seek 
validation of their predetermined notions about the system behavior, as they will likely not 
accept results that are contrary to them. Like Forrester, Sterman posits that validation and 
verification are impossible, though as discussed falsification of the model is possible. If 
one cannot prove the model false, then it is acceptable for the given problem.  
For actual DoD M&S to be used, DoD Policy requires that it be verified validated 
and accredited. Per DoDI 5000.61, DoD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Verification, 
Validation and Accreditation (VV&A), “Models and simulations used to support major 
DoD decision-making organizations and processes …shall be accredited for that specific 
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purpose by the DoD Component M&S Application Sponsor.”[26] VV&A should be 
completed during the development efforts of the M&S to reduce associated costs. DoD 
policy requires the cost of implementing VV&A be commensurate with the risk associated 
with the criticality of the decision being informed by the M&S. M&S decisions that could 
result in the loss of life obviously warrant more thorough V&V while some M&S simply 
require, at minimum, sensitivity analysis be performed to identify the elements that are 
most influential and require more through focus to prevent a misleading result.[26]  
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is not to develop a fully verified, validated, and 
accredited model of the AISR-PED architecture, rather to demonstrate a methodology by 
which to model and answer the questions of interest that could be more thoroughly undergo 
DoD VV&A.  
Table 18 lists model testing methods recommended by Sterman [51]. Those that were 
able to be conducted for the creation of Validation will align with the position of both 
Sterman and Robinson. Namely, the model cannot be validated by historical data or 
otherwise. Rather, an attempts were made to invalidate the model through model testing; 
inability to invalidate the model along with having constructed it with the SME customer 
builds confidence that the model is a reasonable depiction of future behavior based on 




Table 18: Model Testing Methods 
Test Purpose Procedure Y/N 
Boundary 
Adequacy 
Check if important concepts to 
address problem are endogenous. 
Use generated products 





Check appropriate aggregation 
and description of system of 
interest 
Use policy diagrams 
(DODAF) and SMEs Y 
Dimensional 
Consistency 
Ensure equations dimensionally 
consistent 
Dimensional analysis 
software in Vensim Y 
Parameter 
Assessment 
Check if parameters have real 
world counterparts 
Statistical methods, 
modal tests, SMEs Y 
Extreme 
Conditions 








Check sensitivity to time step 
choice 




Check if generate modes reflect 
historical real behavior 
Statistical measures of 
correspondence with 





How does variation of 
assumptions change behavior? Replace Assumptions Y 
Family 
Member Calibrate model 
Compare against other 
models of same system N 
Surprise 
Behavior 
Check for previously unobserved 







Check numeric, behavioral and 
policy sensitivity 
Initially through built-
in sensitivity tools Y 
System 
Improvement Check if model improved system 
Compare to baseline or 
control Y 
Because a subsystem for enemy actions and friendly effects on enemy numbers has 
yet to be developed for the holistic system, an enemy reduction rate can be assumed to test 
the subsystem model. For testing of this subsystem, Initial Enemy AAA is assumed to be 
75 and are reduced by 1 every hour for a 48-hour run. The top graph in Figure 97 Subsystem 
Test UAS Overhead Causal Graphs, shows the behavior of the UAS Overhead through the 
first 48 hours. The number of UAS Overhead is initially capped at 20 due to the UAS 
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capacity limit in Figure 98 despite a desired initial value of 30 UAS overhead. Initially, 
crew limit, GCS limit, and frequency limit are all set at 20 to test if the frequency limit 
reductions dictate UAS limit. The frequency limit is reduced in correlation to the loss of 
friendly satellites due to enemy action (Figure 99). Returning to the UAS Overhead, 
dynamic oscillations are observed for the first 12 hours due to a balancing loop with delay 
(see Figure 44) between Enemy Anti-Aircraft Fire, UAS Replacement Rate and UAS 
Replacement Delay. (See Figure 96). This behavior is followed by exponential decline (if 
smoothed) due to the exhaustion of UAS Pool reserves. There are two additional 
observations of note germane to the testing of the model construct. First, as intended, as 
UAS Overhead decreased and Enemy AAA decreased, the mean of the RANDOM 
POISSON function shifted toward zero, decreasing the likelihood of Enemy Anti-Aircraft 
Fire demonstrated by the reduced frequency of the discrete outflow (Figure 97).  
  
Figure 96: UAS Overhead Loop Mapping 
Second, the UAS Capacity Loss is 0 over the duration (see Figure 97 third graph 
from top) despite continued decrease of the UAS Limit due to decreased Frequency Limit 
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(see Figure 98 first and third graphs) due to loss of Satellites Overhead caused by Enemy 
Satellite attacks (Figure 99). This is not a flaw in the M&S, on the contrary. The UAS 
Capacity Loss remains at zero because the rate at which UAS Overhead are decreasing due 
to Enemy AAA is greater and, hence, the reduction in Satellites Overhead does not 
influence the number of UAS. This assertion can be further tested by adjusting the outflow 
from the UAS Overhead due to Enemy Anti-Aircraft fire while keeping all other variable 
setting the same. Figure 101 compares the runs with and without Enemy Anti-Aircraft and 
demonstrates the desired effects of UAS Capability Loss. Note that despite the loss of UAS 
Overhead, no replacement UAS are sent from the UAS Pool due to lack of capacity to 
control them which is the correct behavior that is desired (Figure 101).  
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Figure 99: Subsystem Test Satellites Overhead Causal Graphs 
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Figure 100: Subsystem Test UAS Pool Causal Graphs 
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Figure 101: Subsystem Test UAS Overhead without Anti-Aircraft Comparison 
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These basic sensitivity tests as well as dimensional analysis were repeated for every 
subsystem by univariate testing to ensure no abnormal behavior, particularly at extreme 
value ranges. Additionally, testing was conducted using manipulation of two or more 
influential values at extremes to ensure reasonable behavior for the range of values applied, 
using SME feedback to refine relationships and assess initial behavior nodes. By following 
Fords method, this tests that the subsystem models cannot be invalidated and hence are 
valid moving forward in absence of historical data. This could be improved if additional 
data is available, but for combat scenarios, such data is unlikely. In the interest of brevity 
these subsystem graphs will not be repeated. However, as Ford [143] notes, testing the 
subsystems individually does not guarantee the combined system-of-systems model will 
accurately depict behavior. Hence, it will be necessary to again test the combined system 
in this manner as will be addressed in the subsequent chapter.  
 
4.6.2 Modeling Enemy Assets  
The next subsystem of interest is the enemy assets (Anti-Aircraft Artillery and 
Enemy Artillery). These changing stock values are important metrics for the operational as 
defined in Table 11: AISR-PED Measures of Performance and Table 12: AISR PED 
Measures of Effectiveness. Obviously, there are no DoDAF models for enemy assets 
beyond the OV-1 that depicts enemy assets of interest. Therefore, the initial enemy stock 
and flow diagrams are relatively simple; both Enemy Anti-Aircraft and Enemy Artillery 
are each a stock with the rate of replacement as an inflow and a destruction rate as the 
outflow. As a bookkeeping measure, the outflow of each of the enemy stock times becomes 
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an inflow for a stock representing the total cumulative enemy destroyed. It is in the outflow 
or destruction rate that represents a modeling challenge. From the DoDAF, SME 
knowledge, and the application of a bit of logic using causal diagrams, the initial converters 
and connectors can be generated by asking the simple question: what can influence the 
destruction rate? More importantly, what variables can stakeholders/decisionmakers 
control that have an influence on the effects on target? Logically, there are a limited number 
of HIMARS and those HIMARS can only target one thing at a time, how those fires are 
directed will influence the destruction rates; the more HIMARS and their focus of fires will 
increase the destruction rates accordingly. Furthermore, to target the enemy, they must first 
be detected. The detection rate and subsequently the targeting rates and hence the 
destruction rates reasonably increase as the number of UAS Overhead increase. From these 
simple relationships, we can construct the initial stock and flow diagram in Figure 102. 
 
Figure 102: Initial Enemy AAA and Artillery Stock and Flow Diagrams 
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 This stock and flow diagram can be refined further for additional detail. Like the 
friendly HIMARS, the Enemy Anti-Aircraft and Enemy Artillery should have some 
variables that influence the rate of replacement to aid in gaming with the ability to set a 
value for the comparison of technology and policy alternatives. The rate of replacement 
can be assumed to be directly proportional to the rate of destruction; there is no need to 
replace assets unless they are destroyed. To provide a means to adjust this rate, and “Ability 
to Replace” converter is added from 0-100% to either shut off the flow of replacements or 
have them match the losses 1:1. Additionally, a delay is added for the user to adjust the 
reaction time to replace. As mentioned previously, these delays can have a significant 
impact on dynamic behavior and use similar equations for the previous delays. 
  
 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁
= 0 ∶ 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴: 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 = 0 ∶ 𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅: 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 
>  𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 ,𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁( 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 ,𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 , 1 ,
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 ) ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅("% 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂"
∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑)/𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 , 0 ) 
 
(14) 
The larger and more complex additions come via the expansion of the targeting 
process (Figure 103). A stock of post-processing targets is generated from UAS ISR 
operations via the PED, MDTF, and Fusion Cells as identified in the DoDAF operational 
and system viewpoints. Some percentage of those targets will be beyond the LTIOV due 
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to target backlog and will outflow from the target stock as a Target Overflow Rate. This 
outflow will become an inflow into Target Overflow that exists a bookkeeping stock to 
track and measure the aggregated quantity of lost targets. The Target Overflow Rate is a 
function of Targets, the Targeting Rates, the Max Engagements rate, and a user-defined 




































Because, SD works in aggregates, which targets are lost is not specified, so an 
average rate must be assumed. This expiration rate can be assumed to be due to a variety 
of factors: target no longer in the area, redundant targets, or late reporting. A throttling 
variable (Average Products per Target) is added to the Target stock to account for the 
deluge of fused intelligence products since targets typically require multiple products 
(fused or directly from the MDTF). This average value is assumed and can be adjusted by 
the user based on historical data, intuition, or to observe impacts on MOP/MOE.  
 
 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁(𝑡𝑡) = 
𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸( 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 > 0:𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴:𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑
≥ 1 ,𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁((𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿 (0,𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁( 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 ,𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 ), 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶,𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁( 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 ,𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 ), 0,
"% 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈" , 0 )
/𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃), "% 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈"
∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑/𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃) , 0 ) 
 
(15) 
It is in this enemy stock and flow diagram, that the connection of subsystems begins 
to take shape. The rates at which Targets are prosecuted are functions of target selection, 
Fire Accuracy, and the Max Engagements Rate. The Hit Probability and Kill Probability 
are user selectable values that can be adjusted to desired values. These values can remain 
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fixed for analysis or be varied as targetable metrics to focus more specific efforts. The Max 
Engagements are tied directly to the Number of HIMARS stock and the Max Rate of Fire 
for a given weapon system. Again, this can remain fixed or varied for analysis. 
 
Figure 104 Enemy Destroyed Causal Tree 
 
Lastly, it is via the fire focus (‘% of Fires Focused on Enemy Artillery’ and ‘% Of 
Fires Focused on Enemy AAA’) that the decisionmakers and stakeholders can play games 
and assess policy or the effects on tactics. As mentioned previously, the HIMARS must 
decide how to focus fires on enemy targets: should 100% of fires be focused on the 
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elimination of Enemy Anti-Aircraft to reduce UAS losses that are vital to targeting, should 
they focus 100% of fires on the elimination of Enemy Artillery to reduce HIMARS losses, 
or is it some combination thereof? The equation for the AAA Targeting Rate outflow that 
ties directly into the AAA Destruction rate is shown in (15). The causal tree in Figure 104 
Enemy Destroyed Causal Tree shows the variables the influence this metric. 
 
4.6.3 PED 
The critical subsystem that ties all of the other subsystems together is the PED and 
subsequent fusion of information into intelligence products and, subsequently, targets that 
can be processed completing the dynamic SoS circle. Using the DoDAF products from 
Section 4.3.2 and the basic UNCLASSIFIED doctrine [147, 148] and initial PED Stock 
and Flow Diagram is generated. Each step of the PED Process is a stock representing a 
delay from the initial inflow (Sensing) to the final outflow/inflow (Dissemination) of the 
final ‘Products’ stock (See Figure 105). As was discussed in Section 4.6.1 for the modeling 
friendly UAS and HIMARS, the PED backlogs represent a pipeline. The rate at which 
observables collected by ISR platforms is transported between stocks is a function of some 
average processing rate per person times the number of personnel per stage.  
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Figure 105 Initial PED Stock and Flow Diagrams. 
 
 While this type of PED model could be considered sufficient for an initial holistic 
assessment of the overall SoS it leaves little in the ways of option for incorporating 
improvements, specifically in terms of policy, manpower allocation, and technological. 
Fortunately, some research has been conducted in the area of designing and improving 
PED, conducted by researchers at Charles River Analytics [122, 123] at the behest of the 
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. These researchers conducted a detailed study 
of PED processes, conducted numerous site visits, and surveyed SME, key decisionmakers, 
and stakeholders. From this research, they developed and proposed various SD models to 
simulate and evaluate PED processes and technology integration. While several models 




Figure 106: General TPED Systems Model Recreated From [123] 
 
 For the purposes of this study, this generalize TPED model provides the right 
fidelity to inform a holistic, strategic-level analysis for CBA while providing suitable 
variables that correlate with the initiatives shown in Figure 30: UAS Integration Roadmap 
Schematic from [11]. In its current construct it provides an ideal starting point to add the 
MDTF for Research Question 3 and explore structural changes in the executable 
architecture (see CHAPTER 6). For the sake of brevity, a complete discussion as to how 
each element of this model was generated, more detailed descriptions can be found in the 
references [122, 123]. However, key modeling elements will be briefly addressed, as the 
methods can also be used, as necessary, to refine the larger executable architecture.  
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 In their study, the Charles River Analytics researchers found that while PED is 
typically delineated as three separate elements, in reality, the initial exploitation is 
conduction in conjunction with processing, while further exploitation is conducted by 
senior-level analysts as a final step prior to dissemination. Hence, they consolidated the 
process into processing-exploitation (PE) and exploitation-dissemination (ED) as the two 
backlog stocks. The remaining stocks exist to calculate MOPs and MOEs. The rates at 
which processing occurs (flows) are the important characteristics that can be modified to 
improve the system and reduce the backlog and subsequent overflows (lost observables 
due to LTIOV).  
   
 
Figure 107: Capacity Utilization Graph recreated from [123] 
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The PE and ED rates are restricted by PE and ED limits which are dictated by the 
expertise, personnel, and technology factors. The ratio of the respective backlog to the 
associated limit determines the capacity utilization for each sector. This utilization is 
determined by use of an input graph (Capacity Utilization Graph) which is assumed to be 
the same for both PE and ED. This capacity graph will also be assumed for the MDTF PED 
once incorporated. 
After calculating the observables ratio, the value is entered into the graph on the 
abscissa and outputs the value on the ordinate. The value on the abscissa represents the 
observable ratio of the stage. Each Stage must perform work on the observables flow with 
a limit to the number of observables it can work on per hour. The value on the ordinate 
represents the percent capacity utilization of stage (PE or ED). It is assumed that a 1:1 ratio 
of observables to the respective limit constitutes the analysis working at 90%, keeping a 
10% capacity in reserve for flexibility and to reduce chronic fatigue. A ratio of 2:1 is the 
maximum rate that the analysts can process observables for a brief period before reaching 
burnout; anything over a ratio of 2:1 causes an increase in the respective backlog [123]. 
The respective capacity limit multiplied by the respective limit will dictate the flow rates 
(see Figure 106).  
The other graph of interest that also influences the backlog stock by controlling an 
overflow rate. These overflow rates account for observables ratios that are too great for 
each stage to accommodate, creating overflow. This release valve of sorts accounts for 
LTIOV. In this graph function (Figure 108). Like the Capacity Utilization Graph, the value 
on the abscissa represents the observable ratio of the stage. However, in this case the 
ordinate is limitless, meaning that if there is insufficient analyst capacity to work on them, 
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all the observables can overflow[123]. As with previous subsystems, the observables are 
aggregated, without differentiation as to which target, sensor type, or specific UAS. There 
is not means within this system to differentiate priorities of intelligence as would be 
indicated in the real world, which is a complicated subproblem and beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
 
Figure 108: Observables Overflow Graph recreated from [123] 
 
To account for such differentiation, the introduction of the MDTF for prioritized 
targets is introduced. This alternate system structure is created by generating an additional 
PED stock and flow diagram with associated connectors (Figure 109). Borrowing from the 
“General TPED Model”, the same Capacity Utilization and Overflow Graphs are used, as 
are the concepts of observable ratios, overwork, and PE limits. Like the federated PED, the 
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MDTF PED/Fusion (PEF) has a limit that is dictated by user-adjusted parametric values 
for expertise, personnel, and technology factor.  
Two additional variables are added to connect this stock and flow diagram to the 
original “General TPED Systems Model”. First is the variable “% Obs Direct to MDTF.” 
This variable allocates a percentage of the inbound observables from the UAS directly to 
the MDTF PED rather than through the primary federated PED. This variable accounts for 
the allocation of priority targets either by some filtering mechanism, or more realistically, 
by a percentage of direct-support UAS that report only to the MDTF to locate immediate 
priority targets in the D3A cycle by some designated area. Even without the ability to 
delineate the aggregated information or to interact with the environment, this will provide 
some measure to account for these real-world considerations for rapid holistic analysis. 
The end-user can dictate the percentage of observables allocated or it can be made 
parametric.  
Finally, in a no-growth army with limited human resources, particularly in low 
density military occupational specialties, personnel will have to be conserved. Namely, to 
build the PED elements of MDTF, it is assumed personnel will have to be reallocated from 
the PE Personnel. Hence, the variable “PED Personnel Total” was created along with a 




























4.6.4 Completion of the Overall AISR PED D3A M&S 
With the completion of the PED subsystem model, the final model can be created 
through the integration of some additional stock and flow diagrams and connecters on both 
sides of the PED. From doctrine, the following the processing and exploitation, the 
intelligence products are disseminated to the end users via the DISN[147, 149].  
 
Figure 110: Fusion Stock and Flow Model 
 
At echelons above brigade, the information is fused from various sources at the 
theater Analysis and Control Element (ACE) prior to being sent to targeting for the purpose 
of allocating fire support. To replicate this additional delay for the information generated 
from the federated PED, an additional stock and flow diagram representing the ACE Fusion 
Figure 110is built in the exact same manner as the PED that connects the PED to the 
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previously created targeting process (Figure 103). Because the MDTF is meant to bypass 
the traditional fusion for high priority targets, the flow from MDTF PEF feeds directly into 
the ‘Targets’ stock for immediate execution. 
The remaining connection is that of the UAS Overhead to the inflow of PED 
(Figure 111). This is another potential area where the inclusion of an ABM could provide 
some benefit, albeit at an added complexity, time, and expense. In lieu of that model, logic 
is applied. A ‘Target Saturation Ratio’ of targets to UAS is generated to differentiate-rich 
versus target-sparse environment. For first-order analysis, one could logically infer that a 
target-rich environment increases the likelihood of detecting enemy assets and convers for 
target-sparse.  
 
Figure 111: Connectors for Total Observables Rate into PED 
 
 The ‘Target Saturation Ratio’ is input to the ‘Observable Output’ Graph (Figure 
112) to determine a ‘Detection Rate.’ The ‘Observable Output Graph’ operates on the 
assumption that the maximum targets a single UAS can track is five per hour regardless of 
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target saturation in target rich environment due to the targeting cycle delay and transit time 
from one target to another. This graph is easily modified and subject to change based on 
real data. However, the five targets per hour per UAS is the assumption used in the 
development of this model and the subsequent experiments.  
I  
Figure 112: Observable Output Graphical Input 
 
With all the elements combined, the final SD model and simulation environment 
(Figure 113 and Figure 109) is nearly complete and ready for experiments and analysis. 
First, however, following Ford [143] and Sterman’s [51] model testing and validation 
methods, the complete model behavior must be tested to ensure the combined SoS is 
operating in a reasonable manner. This will be demonstrated in the subsequent chapters to 
baseline the models prior to the conduct of experiments and findings in support of the 
research questions for the use case to demonstrate the efficacy of the method for developing 

























4.7 Problem 1 Results and Findings 
Problem 1 served as the framework development and apparatus design. Using 
sample DoDAF models/products, SD was selected and used to develop an executable 
architecture.  This executable architecture was validated using reasonable performance 
evaluations for each subsection using Sterman’s model testing procedures. The resultant 
M&S environment is determined sufficient to be used to conduct equivalency experiments 
to demonstrate the potential and efficacy of the executable architecture as a modeling 
strategic level decision making tool. 
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CHAPTER 5. PROBLEM 2: POLICY AND STRUCTURE 
5.1 Problem 2 Summary 
With a complete executable architecture, it can now be used to economically 
investigate questions and proposed policy, allocation, and technical solutions associated 
with complex SoS architecture to provide some scientific backing to claims of 
improvements or needs thereof in the CBA ICD process. The Overall Problem, Hypothesis 
and summary of Problem 2 are summarized in the figure below for the reader’s 
convenience. The use case will be used to approach and answer both questions 2.1 and 2.2 
simultaneously. 
 
Figure 114: Problem 2 Summary 
5.2 Experiment Design 
To demonstrate the ability to use the Executable Architecture simulation to foster 
decisions and play games, the ASIR-PED in a D3A environment. For initial exploration 
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and for demonstrative purposes of rapid comparison with fewer user defined/controlled 
variables, the PED subsystem-of-systems will be utilized for clarity and brevity. 
Additionally, since the structural changes in question pertain only to the PED, it is logical 
to make preliminary estimates based on modification affects to that subsystem only using 
basic methods before integrating and analysing the large system-of-systems and comparing 
the effects on operational MOP and MOE. Given that the subsystem is isolated, the 
MOP/MOE will be those relevant to the improvement of the PED subsystem. The overall 
MOP/MOE were developed in Section 4.2 and summarized in Table 11 and Table 12. The 
MOP/MOE germane to PED improvements  
Table 19: PED MOP and MOE Recapitulation 
PED Centric Measures of Performance 
Intelligence Processing Rates 
Intelligence Overflow Over Time 
PED Centric Measures of Effectiveness 
Intelligence Overflow Ratios 
Average Intelligence Capacity Utilization 
Intelligence Personnel Overwork 
 
5.2.1 Establishing a Baseline 
To evaluate the effects of a change in structure, a baseline must be established by 
which comparisons can be made. For the PED subsystem of the model, outputs from the 
validate model sans MDTF exists from the research [122, 123]. To test the behavior of 
their ‘General TPED Systems Model’, the researchers used an assumed standardized 
observables input profile to observe the effects of delays on the PED process. The assumed 
observables profile depicts a 24-hour period during which the first two hours and the last 
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two hours have zero observables, from hours two through twenty-two, the observables 
increase linearly to a peak of 50 observables per hour at the 12-hour mark and decline at 
the negative of the slope until the 22-hour mark (Figure 115). Using standardized input 
functions is a useful way of observing and comparing behavior caused by the system 
structure with less noise that could mask the sources of behavior [51, 142].  
 
Figure 115: Standardized PED Test Input recreated from [123] 
Using PED model depicted in Figure 109 the initial values were set to mimic the 
behaviors demonstrated by the Charles River model Table 20.  
Table 20: Initial Baseline Settings for PED Subsystem Model.  
 
For the baseline run there is no MDTF, so the global parameters associated with the MDTF 
are set to zero, shutting off the flow and personnel to that structure. This action also renders 
 237 
any other settings for the MDTF irrelevant, but for completeness, they are also set to zero. 
To confirm, the variables were altered to ensure correct correlations and no change in 
behavior of the model. In the PED Subsystem Model, it is assumed that the number of PED 
personnel is a fixed number. This is a very relevant constraint for two reasons. First, as 
mentioned previously in the creation of the model, in a no-growth Army for low density, 
specialized personnel, a newly formed structure/organization must be built at the expense 
of another. Second, it eliminates the trivial solution of simply increasing manpower to 
increase output. Such a solution is limited not only by available manpower, but by 
workstations, budgets, etc. Because the ‘PE Personnel’ and ‘MDTF Personnel’ are 
functions of ‘PED Personnel Total’ and ‘MDTF Allocation’ they are greyed out to indicate 
they are not user-adjustable but are include in the table for completeness. 
For the baseline, the technology factors are all set to a value of one. It is assumed 
that for the initial assessment, no advance technology exists to improve the rate at which 
personnel can process, exploit, or disseminate the observables or to act as a force multiplier 
against the fixed number of personnel. The bulk of the personnel reside at the first stage of 
PE. However, the experience level is lower at this stage and limits the amount of observable 
feeds that the personnel can process per hour per person. The ED stage is assumed to be 
comprise of more seasoned and skilled personnel that can refine and complete the products 
produced from the raw observables at the processing stage. Because this final stage can 
exploit and disseminating at a higher rate and contains more senior personnel, it has a fewer 
number of personnel than the PE stage.  
The graphs in Figure 116 depict the throughput for each stage of the PED process 
through the federated PED given the inputs annotated in Table 20. The center graph shows 
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the input observables per hour as was depicted in Figure 115. The blue line indicates the 
processing rate of the PE flow. As expected, it is shifted in time due to the delay with its 
slope running generally parallel if only slightly more shallow to the input flow, indicating 
it the PE stage is capable of processing the information at the rate it is received.  
 
Figure 116: PED Baseline Processing Rates and Overflow 
 At approximately the 9-hour mark, the PE flow rate begins to flatten out below the 
rate of incoming observables indicating that the PE is reaching its PE Limit and operating 
above its threshold. The PE capacity utilization will ultimately influence the PE flow rate 
and the ‘Observables Backlog’ (see Figure 117), capping the throughput , increasing the 
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overflow. These behaviors are reflected in the flattening of the curve in the center graph 
along with the increased overflow response in the bottom graph representing unprocessed 
information. The top graph indicates the increasing overflow ratio representing the 
percentage of information that goes unprocessed. Note that this ratio increases as the PE 
attempts to process the backlog after the peak of the input flow eventually leveling off at a 
ratio of around 0.08. The peak mission overflow response (bottom graph Figure 116) is 
delayed approximately two hours from the peak input and the primary bottleneck.  
 
Figure 117: PE Capacity Utilization Uses Tree 
The PE Overflow is a direct reflection of exceeding capacity of 100%. In addition, 
however, a general heuristic is that 85% capacity utilization is the ideal maximum for 
sustained operations to prevent fatigue and provide flexibility (this value can be changed 
by the user but is kept at 85% for the entirety of this thesis). The graphs in Figure 118 
depict the Capacity Utilization for both PE and ED in the top and middle graphs. The 
middle graph ‘Average Capacity Utilization’ simply applies a smoothing factor to account 
for variability noise. Since the input is already a smooth function, the graph is identical to 
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the ‘Capacity Utilization’ graph above it. Depending on the severity of noise, this 
smoothing factor can be adjusted to provide clearer insight into the workload on the PED 
force unadulterated by random spikes. For the baseline, this factor is set to a value of one. 
The bottom graph in Figure 118 more accurately captures the ‘Overwork’ above the ideal 
‘Overwork Threshold’ of 85%.  
 
Figure 118: PED Baseline Capacity Utilization and Overwork 
 
Finally, to establish the baseline, it is imperative to discuss the standard expected 
behavior of the ED indicated by the red lines on all the graphs in Figure 116 and Figure 
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118. First, due to the delay associated with the PE process, the ED functions are further 
shifted later in time, initially by about 10 minutes as production is able to keep up with 
input, until the delay is exacerbated by the PE working at full capacity, at which point the 
ED is also working above the “Overwork Threshold.’ This delay is indicated in bottom 
graph of Figure 118 with approximately a two hour shift in peak overwork at (approx. 17.5 
hours) correlating to the peak processing rates and overflow. Note that the ‘ED Overflow’ 
is less than the ‘PE Overflow’ despite having fewer personnel (Figure 116 bottom). This is 
due to two factors: first, despite having fewer personnel and the same technology factor, 
the ED stage has higher expertise; secondly, the ED has a lower amount of observable 
products to analyze due to the PE Overflow at its peak at 14 hours (Figure 116 bottom). As 
with previous graphs, the peak ED Overflow is shifted by two hours (at approx.16 hours) 
due to the delays from the input through the PE. Note that the overflow peak proceeds the 
overwork peak as the ED stage attempts to “catch up” until the backlog stock is worked 
off.  
5.2.2 Adding and Testing Structural Changes  
5.2.2.1  Setup 
Having established the baseline behavior for the MOP/MOE of interest, the 
additional structure can be test and behaviors observed for predictable variations. By 
varying the ‘% Obs Direct to MDTF’ and ‘MDTF Allocation’ (see Table 21). 
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Table 21: PED Subsystem Model MDTF Test 1: Equal Allocations. 
 
By maintaining the same level of technology and expertise at the MDTF as the PE, while 
allocating equivalent amounts of observable flow and personnel, we expect to see some 
predictable results that ensure proper function and confirm insight on how such an 
allocation affects the system as a whole. The associated graphs from this variation are 
shown in the figure below.  
 
Figure 119: MDTF Equal Allocation Test Responses 
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5.2.2.2 Observations of Structural Change on Flow Rates 
From the graphs some obvious additions are observed: namely the addition of the 
MDTF (green) on all the graphs which are easily observed in the first column of graphs. In 
the second column of graphs, the MDTF (green line) is obscured by the PE (red line) as 
their technology, experience, and observables to personnel ratios are identical. With a quick 
glance, it can also be noted that when compared to Figure 116 and Figure 118 that while 
the PE Capacity Utilization (blue line) as remained unchanged (due to the same observables 
to personnel ratio) the ED Capacity Utilization (red line) has dropped below the 85% 
Overwork Threshold in the second column graphs in Figure 119. This is further evidenced 
by the absence of ED Overwork in the bottom graph. For the convenience of the reader, 
subsequent individual graphs will be used to explore more faceted changes to the outputs 
that should be noted.  
 
Figure 120: Observable and Processing Rates Baseline to Equal Distribution MDTF 
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The graph in Figure 120 overlays the Observables and Processing Rates from the 
PED Baseline run and the MDTF Equal Allocations run. The black triangle represents the 
total observable flow (see Figure 115) into the PED System with the smaller grey triangle 
representing the 20% allocation of those observables directly to the MDTF. The turquoise 
line represents the baseline PE Observable Rate discussed previously. The purple line 
directly below it represents the PE Observables Rate for the federated PED which has been 
reduced by 20% as expected due to the reallocation of personnel and observables to the 
MDTF. As a result, the MDTF PEF Rate increases from zero in the baseline (blue) to a 
peak of approximately 7 observables/hour at the 14-hour mark as the baseline did. 
Table 22: Processing Rates Baseline to Equal Distribution MDTF Tabulated Data 
 
Comparing MDTF PEF rate to the MDTF Priority Observable triangular input 
shows the same offset depicted in the baseline. For the second run the sum of the MDTF 
 245 
PEF rate and the PE processing rate match the PE rate for the baseline run. This is readily 
apparent by inspection of Figure 120, but can be confirmed empirically via the tabulated 
date shown in Table 22.  
 
Figure 121: Overflow Rates Baseline to Equal Distribution MDTF 
As with the processing rates, the addition of the MDTF with equal load and 
personnel percentages allocated from the federated PED results in an associated decrease 
in the PE Overflow (grey) and an increase in MDTF Overflow (red), the sum of which is 
equal to the MDTF Overflow rate in the baseline (Figure 121 and Table 23).  
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Table 23: Overflow Rates Baseline to Equal Distribution MDTF Tabulated Data 
 
At first glance, the results of Figure 120 and Figure 121 appear trivial. However, 
they provide valuable insight into the accuracy of the model and to the effects of the 
additional structure. First, the graphs and their associated values indicated that the 
structural changes in the model are made correctly and behaving as expected for an equal 
allocation of personnel and manpower. Second, the change in structure has seemingly no 
change in the processing flow rates and the overflow rates. Superficially, this observation 
would indicate the same amount of information was processed and/or lost, leading one to 
believe that the addition of the MDTF stage and change in structure provides no discernible 
benefit to ability to accomplish the MOP/MOE. The assertions are partly correct if focusing 
only on the processing and exploitation stages. However, the benefits of adding the MDTF, 
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(even if only reallocated from the federated PED PE stage and redirecting a proportional 
rate of observable flow) are demonstrated in the second order effects on ED.  
The additional routing structure through the MDTF reduces the amount of 
observable flow into the PE Backlog stock and, as a result, reduces the delay of processed 
observables to the ED Backlog. Without altering the number, technology, or experience 
variables of the ED stage, the reduced backlog results in reduced ED Overflow (Figure 
122), ED Capacity Utilization, and the elimination of ED Overwork (see Figure 126). 
 
Figure 122: ED Overflow Rate Baseline to Equal Distribution MDTF 
From Figure 122 it can be observed that the ED Overflow rate is reduced by over a 
50% through the duration. Because the flow is a rate, the integration of that flow overtime, 
represented by the ED Overflow Total stock (Figure 123). From this graph we can see that 
over the 24-hour duration the addition of the MDTF resulted in a reduction of 
approximately 11 total observables lost due to backlog and exceeding LTIOV through 
inspection of the baseline (red) to the MDTF run (blue).  
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Figure 123: ED Overflow Total Baseline to Equal Distribution MDTF 
Because of the decrease in lost observables there must logically be an increase in 
the total amount of observables disseminated in the final stage. However, looking at the 
ED Observables alone, it would appear as if there are fewer products being disseminated 
to targeting (see Figure 124), though this is not actually the case.  
 
Figure 124: ED Observables Total Baseline to Equal Distribution MDTF 
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When analyzing a change in structure, it is imperative to account for the alternate 
sources of information flow. In this case, the MDTF PEF flow directly feeds into the 
‘Priority Targets’ stock (see Figure 109). The ED Observables stock, on the other hand will 
also feed into the ‘Targets’ stock after Fusion at the Fusion Rate (see Figure 113). The total 
processed observables, therefore, is the sum of the MDTF PEF and ED Flows (see Figure 
125) 
 
Figure 125: Processed Observables Total Baseline to Equal Distribution MDTF 
From the baseline run, the processed observables for targeting only came from the 
ED Observables stock (red line). With the inclusion of the MDTF, the processed 
observables come from both the ED (blue) and MDTF (green). The sum of the ED and the 
MDTF for the new structure totals 453 versus the ED alone prior to the inclusion of the 
MDTF which totaled only 442 over the course of the 24-hour period. This difference 
accounts for the additional 11 observables backlog the ED was able to process due to 
reduce workload. The final number values, however, serve only as estimates based on the 
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assumed inputs and rates. What matters most, is the overall behavioral trends observed, 
which is an increase in productivity from the alternate routing through the MDTF—even 
though the total personnel, skill and technology factors remained constant. 
Additionally, the alternate routing through the MDTF, and subsequent reduced flow 
through the ED Capacity Utilization below the 85% threshold for the duration of the 
operation and eliminated Overwork (see Figure 126) The benefit of this is the ability to 
sustain long-term operations without fatigue of critical ED personnel.  
 
Figure 126 Capacity Utilization and Overwork Baseline to Equal Distribution 
MDTF 
5.2.2.3 Summary 
In summary, the previous analysis has demonstrated how additional structure was 
added to the system and how it was tested for accuracy given the baseline and assumed 
input flow to the overall system. Additionally, just this simple alteration of the structure 
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through the MDTF generated a net effect that not only reduced stress on the workforce, but 
an increased number of targetable information distributed to targeting sooner due to 
reduced ED overflow and reduced number of delays.  
5.3 Determining Sensitivity/Most Influential Factors.  
5.3.1 Manual Analysis  
The simple experiment in the previous section demonstrates a marginal benefit of 
the MDTF structure to the overall behavior of the subsystem with respect to the PED-
specific MOP/MOE, it still leaves many questions unanswered. Having introduced a 
standardized input and understanding baseline behaviors, experiments can be conducted to 
test proposals against desirable behavior. Further experimentation can be conducted with 
the model via a function of Vensim called SyntheSim [142] (for synthesis of simulations) 
where model structure and simulation behavior can be synthesized and instantly updated 
and superimposed on graphs as the model constants and lookups are varied (see Figure 
127). This function will provide decisionmakers a general understanding of the effects of 
structure and policy variations.  
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Figure 127 PED Subsystem Model in SyntheSim Model 
Simple variation can be made on the previous model to determine policy and 
allocation decisions. Suppose given the small size but vital importance of the MDTF PED 
and Fusion to the D3A cycle, decisionmakers deem it necessary to maintain the allocation 
of personnel and observables but increase the average expertise-level and processing 
technology at the MDTF.  
Table 24: PED Subsystem Model Ex. 2: Improved MDTF Expertise and Technology 
 
PE Expertise 1.5 ED Expertise 3 MDTF Expertise 2 % Obs Direct to MDTF 0.2
PE Personnel 20 ED Personnel 12 MDTF Personnel 5 PED Personnel Total 25
PE Technology 1 ED Technology 1 MDTF Technology 1.5 MDTF Allocation 0.2
PE ED MDTF Global Parameters
Increase of MDTF Expertise and Technology Improvements
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This would provide the predictable results of increased PEF processing rates (Figure 128) 
and priority targets from the MDTF (Figure 129) with reduced delays with corresponding 
decreases in MDTF overflow (Figure 130) and capacity utilization (Figure 6.18). However, 
while providing improvement to targeting and minor reduction to the total overflow ratio 
and does nothing to reduce the strain on the PE of the federated PED since 80% of 
observables are still routed through the traditional PED.  
 
Figure 128: MDTF PEF Rate Comparison with Improved Experience and Tech 
 




Figure 130: Total Overflow w/Increase Experience/Tech 
 
 
Figure 131: MDTF Capacity Utilization Comparison w/Increase Experience/Tech 
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How then should the manning be allocated? How much of the input observables 
should be routed through the MDTF? If the MDTF is increased in size to eliminate backlog 
and fatigue, how much technology improvement is required in the larger federated PED to 
prevent data loss? The possibilities are seemingly endless. In fact, for the PED subsystem 
model, not considering the value ranges and increments, just the combinations of which of 
the 10 “knobs’ or sliders to alter is 1024.  
5.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis Methods  
A holistic model with parametric values is commonly used in System Dynamics to 
ascertain how sensitive a model is to parameter values and structural changes to the model. 
It is used to eliminate or set constant variables that have little or no impact on the behavior 
of the system over time. Often this is used in SD in the iterative model creation and 
validation steps as one of the twelve model testing methods detailed by Sterman. Sterman 
states that there are three types of sensitivity analysis on an SD model: numerical 
sensitivity, behavioral sensitivity, and policy sensitivity.[51] There are several ways to 
conduct sensitivity analysis, the most common for SD being univariate and multivariate, 
i.e. changing one value at a time or changing multiple values at a time. This type of 
sensitivity analysis is useful when constructing and validating the models constituent parts 
which are relatively simple before being combined in a more complex fashion like Ford 
[143] recommends in his modeling process shown along with testing the effects of extreme 
values on model behavior.  
Sensitivity analysis in the model construct, testing, and validation steps can be used 
to determine which elements are most influential on the numerical sensitivity, behavioral 
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sensitivity, and policy sensitivity and as such can inform the model creator which variable 
can use estimates (little impact on model output) or need more refined data (more 
impact).[141] This can also be useful when defining requirement ranges and values for 
future systems, even if in generic terms.  
Univariate and multivariate sensitivity analysis is suitable for simple models or 
when using the model to visually explore policy with decision makers as was previously 
demonstrated. However, it is slow and tedious. The more complex the model and the more 
variables that can be changed, leads to the curse of dimensionality, where every 
combination cannot be explored. Experiments must be repeatable and simply randomly 
changing variable for only a handful of cases limits the ability to investigate all possible 
combinations of potential ranges of variables.  
5.3.3 Selecting Variables of Interest 
Vensim has built in sensitivity analysis. For this example, it is assumed that the ED 
experience and manpower are required at the traditional federated PED for their final 
analysis and dissemination. Additionally, no advance technology factor exists to improve 
the ED. Hence, it is assumed that manpower must be reallocated from a fixed number of 
PE personnel to man the MDTF as was assumed in previous examples. Additionally, it is 
assumed that the traditional federated PED is required, hence, not all the manpower nor all 
the observables can be routed through the MDTF. The percentage of observables can be 
assumed to directly correlate to specific targets or via a means to prioritize inbound feeds. 
It is also assumed that the best possible technology can only improve productivity per 
analyst by a maximum factor of two. Lastly, as senior experience is required at the ED 
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stage, it is assumed that the maximum average experience level at the MDTF and PE is 
two. Given these assumptions, the following ranges of values will be simulated. 
Table 25: PED Subsystem Sensitivity Testing Value Ranges 
 
With the primary variables of interest identified and ranges of values established, 
the output variables of interest related to the MOP/MOE must be determined. The ultimate 
objective of the PED, both traditional and MDTF, is to process as many observables as 
possible in each period. This goal implies the minimization of the Total Overflow Ratio 
which is the sum of the overflow ratios for the MDTF, PED and ED. This goal of 
maximized output also implies the maximization of processing rates and the reduction of 
associated backlog delays (shifting of the processing rate curves left to attempt to match 
the peak of the inputs as demonstrated in Figure 120 and Figure 128). Finally, for PED 
decisionmakers, there is a secondary priority of reducing capacity utilization and overwork 
for the MDTF, PE, and ED. These will be the primary output variables of interest.  
5.3.4 Monte Carlo Testing and DOE Types 
Subsections 5.2.2.2 and 5.3.1 demonstrated manual methods by which assumptions 
about constant values can be changed and examined to assess impacts on overall model 
behavior. As discussed, the process is valuable for exploration by and education for 
decision makers but is tedious and involves altering too many variables, especially for 
larger problems, the curse of dimensionality. Monte Carlo simulation was previously 
PE Expertise 1-2 ED Expertise 3 MDTF Expertise 1-2 % Obs Direct to MDTF 0-.4
PE Personnel 15-25 ED Personnel 12 MDTF Personnel 0-10 PED Personnel Total 25
PE Technology 1-2 ED Technology 1 MDTF Technology 1-2 MDTF Allocation 0-.4
PED Sensitivity Testing Value Ranges
PE ED MDTF Global Parameters
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identified as missing from the executable architecture in Subsection 2.3.2.3. This method 
of simulation is also known as multivariate sensitivity simulation (MVSS). It allows for 
the variation of all designated variables to evaluate their effects on the outputs via hundreds 
or thousands of simulation experiments using the “Law of Large Numbers and other 
methods of statistical inference [150]. With Vensim, this function is built into the 
executable architecture. Because the SD executable architecture is built off a series of 
differential equations, Monte Carlo simulations can be executed in a matter of seconds or 
minutes depending on the number of input and output variables. Either way, this speed 
provides a distinct advantage over other types of EA.  
When developing the Monte Carlo simulation, several design of experiments 
(DOE) exist to adequately sample the multidimensional design space while decreasing 
processing speeds. In a traditional Monte Carlo simulation, input variable values are 
selected randomly within a given range based on probability distributions applied to the 
variables. The outputs values are obtained for every run then analyzed statistically, 
typically for their probability distributions, means and standard deviations [151]. The most 
basic DOE types are factorial sampling designs, either full or partial, but also include 
Packet-Burman Designs, Taguchis Orthogonal arrays, and Response Surface Methods.   
As built in functionality, VensimTM offer six methods of sampling: univariate, 
multivariate, Latin Hypercubes, Latin Grids, and external files. Univariate changes one 
input diameter independently based on the probability distribution applied while holding 
the other values constant. This cycle is repeated for all input variables selected. 
Multivariate changes all of the parameters randomly for each run based upon the 
probability distributions for each variable (traditional Monte Carlo). Latin Grid is a brute 
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force systematic search of every possible combination. Even for SD, large models with 
many input variables and outputs of interest can be computationally expensive and slow 
using the Latin Grid method. The ‘File’ method allows users to build a DOE in external 
software and import it via a tab delimited text file to run in Vensim. Lastly, the Latin 
Hypercube is like the multivariate method, but stratifies the parameter values in each 
dimension. If uniform distribution is applied the input variables (which is typical without 
a priori knowledge of likely values in the range) “a random value is drawn in each of the 
N-hypercube intervals in the min-max range [142] .” 
Latin Hypercubes method of DOE was used for this experiment. While the number 
of parameter for this PED/MDTF example were few and hence computationally 
inexpensive, the combined problem in the subsequent chapter is not.  Latin Hypercubes 
offer the best “all-purpose class of designs” especially when the variables of interest are 
continuous and modelers have a “considerable a priori uncertainty about the response 
[152].” 
5.3.5 Interpreting the Sensitivity Outputs 
Latin Hypercube DOE sampling for 10,000 Monte Carlo multivariate simulations 
was used to evaluate the effects of inputs variables of interest on the MOP/MOE of interest 
defined in Subsection 5.3.3. In the interest of brevity, the discussion will only focus on 
three essential outputs: ‘Total Observables,’ ‘Total Overflow Ratio,’ and MDTF 
Overwork. The other outputs demonstrate similar results but are most clear in these outputs. 
Arguably these three outputs constitute the most important for the system when 
determining the benefit and mix of the MDTF.  
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5.3.5.1 Analysis of Results  
The graph in Figure 132 shows the sensitivity analysis with confidence bounds for 
the ‘Total Observables’ during the 24-hour period. Overlaid on the graph are the line plots 
from previous manual univariate analysis from previous that can provide even further 
insight into the effects.  
 
Figure 132: Total Processed Observable Sensitivity Test Confidence Bounds 
 
As expected, regardless of the values within the selected ranges for the input 
variables from Table 25 there is very little variability for the first 8 hours as inputs do not 
exceed processing capacity of the MDTF or the PE. However, as observables begin to 
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exceed capability depending on the selection of the inputs the variability begins to grow. 
While every combination leads to the same S-shaped growth pattern for consistent output 
behavior, by the end of the 24-hour period, the 95% confidence interval spans a cumulative 
output range of approximately 75 observables and the 100% spans 150 range.    
Unfortunately, the confidence interval plot does not provide insight into which of 
the selected variables in the most influential nor the right combination of effects in the 
larger scheme of operations. Viewing the same results as a trace graph (showing every run 
as an individual line) allows the color plots of the previous manual tests to be more easily 
seen (Figure 133). Insights gathered from the manual manipulations can aid in the 
interpretation of the sensitivity analysis.   
 
Figure 133:Total Processed Observable Sensitivity Test Individual Traces (10000) 
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Looking closely at Figure 133, the blue line indicates the base run (Table 20); the 
green line indicates the MDTF with equal allocations of personnel and observables (Table 
21); the red line indicts the same MDTF allocations with improved technology and 
experience (Table 24). Finally, the orange indicates the average for all the 10,000 runs. 
It can be observed that adding the MDTF increased the productivity, which was 
further increased by the increase of MDTF experience and technology. However, when 
comparing the magnitude of the increase, the simple addition of the MDTF (green) caused 
a greater increase over the baseline (blue) than the technology and experience increase 
(red) did over the MDTF alone (green).  
 
Figure 134: Total Overflow Ratio Sensitivity Test Individual Traces (10000) 
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Recall that Total Overflow is inversely proportional to the Total Observables; 
reduced values are desirable and indicated fewer lost observables. The sensitivity trace plot 
of the Total Overflow Ratio (Figure 134) demonstrates similar behavior in the inverse. 
From these observations, one can deduce that while both improvements in technology and 
experience improve output, the allocations of intelligence and manpower to the MDTF has 
a greater effect on the desired end state.  
 
Figure 135: MDTF Overwork Sensitivity Test Individual Traces (10000) 
 
Finally, the MDTF Overwork shows a huge variability in values over the runs 
(Figure 135). From first look, it provides little insight into which input variables are the 
most influential. However, like previously, the manual variations provide additional insight 
as to the effects of the input variables. For the baseline (blue) there is no overwork; 
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naturally, since the baseline does not include the MDTF. The equal allocation line (green) 
shows an overwork that is slightly greater in magnitude but has lower variance than the 
average (orange). The increase in technology and experience (red) however is flat, 
indicating that the improvements in technology and experience have the largest effect on 
reducing overwork.  
Given that the primary mission of the PED is the production of observables, the 
two most influential parameters are the allocations of observables and manpower. To test 
this deduction, the Monte Carlo simulation can quickly be run again but by setting the 
allocation back to the equal allocation values (20%) and only varying the technology and 
experience of the MDTF. The effects are depicted in the subsequent graphs for the outputs 
of interest.  
 
Figure 136: Total Observable Sensitivity Test - Only Vary Tech and Experience 
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The graphs in Figure 136 and Figure 137 compared to Figure 133 and Figure 
134display a significant decrease in variability and, hence, sensitivity to the selected input 
parameters, as suspected. This observation confirms the assertion that PED subsystem 
productivity (Total Observations and Total Overflow Ratio) is more sensitive to the 
allocations of observables and personnel than it is to experience and technology factors. 
Conversely, while the variability in Figure 138 has reduced in variance compared to Figure 
135, the magnitude peak remained the same. Hence, we can conclude that the experience 
and technology are important in reducing Capacity Utilization and Overwork.  
 




Figure 138: MDTF Overwork Sensitivity Test- Only Vary Tech and Experience 
 
5.3.5.2 Seeking an Optimal Solution 
The sensitivity analysis in the previous section provides important insights to 
decision makers when determining policy and structure as well as allocation decisions to 
support PED operations. Armed with knowledge gained from the sensitivity analysis, 
manual experiments and games may be played in the executable architecture with the 
ability to instantly view effects. However, the sensitivity analysis provides insight 
information, but little in the way of combinatorial specificity. 
Fortunately, Vensim has built in a variety of robust optimization algorithms to 
identify the best combination of selected input variable values to maximize (or minimize) 
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desired outputs. The standard optimization process utilizes a Powell optimizer (a 
derivative-free conjugate direction method), to identify the local of the minimum within a 
specified tolerance value or number of iterations. More advanced optimization methods are 
also available such as Markov Chain Monte Carlo (random walk) for calibration of input 
variables to match externally provided output data and Simulated Annealing for exploring 
payoff surfaces with multiple optima [142].  
For the standard Powell optimizer, the user defines and provides weights (for 
scaling) for “payoff values” and selects the input values of interest. If the single objective 
were to maximize the output of the PED subsystem only, the answer would be trivial—
simply maximize all of the technology, manning, and experience levels, while allocating 
100% of the objectives through the MDTF to completely bypass the legacy federated PED 
architecture. Such a solution, however, does not realize the constraints of real-world 
operations (limited quantity of manning, skill sets, bandwidth, and workstations; increased 
manning in forward areas of operations at risk; lack of available technology; etc.).  
From the sensitivity analysis we know that the allocations of manning and 
observables has the largest influence on the sensitivity of the response. We also know that 
training/experience and technology improves efficiency but mostly affects capacity 
utilization. As an example, assume that the creation of the MDTF is immediate, utilizing 
existing skill sets and technology. How then, should observables and manning be allocated 
to the provisional MDTF to minimize overflow (lost intelligence) and minimize overwork 
of not just the MDTF, but also of the PE and ED? 




Figure 139: PED Optimization Input Parameters and Results 
 
From the results, we can observe that a slightly greater amount of personnel should be 
allocated to the MDTF than observables to find the best balance of total overflow and 
overwork on all the stages. Because we are trying to optimize the best combination of four 
equally weighted output metrics, the output may not be the best in each category but is the 
best combination overall (see Figure 140, Figure 141, Figure 142, and Figure 143). 
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Figure 140: Total Overflow Ratio Comparison with Optimized Inputs 
 
Figure 140 shows the marked improvement on the reduction of the overflow ratio using 
the optimization results values (red) compared to baseline (blue), though it is slightly 
higher than the pure equal 20% distribution of manning and observables (green). Figure 
141 shows the reduction of peak MDTF overwork of 3.4%.  
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Figure 141: MD Total Overflow Ratio Comparison with Optimized Inputs 
 
 
Figure 142: PE Overwork Comparison with Optimized Inputs 
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Figure 142 shows the small increase of 0.9% in the PE Overwork of using the optimization 
results values (red) compared to baseline (blue) and equal 20% distribution of manning and 
observables (green). Figure 143 shows the elimination of ED Overwork. 
 
 
Figure 143: Total Overflow Ratio Comparison with Optimized Inputs 
 
5.4 Summary of Findings for Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 hoped to explore the ability of the executable architecture to 
explore the effects of structural and policy changes on the systems and the systems-of-
systems. To show that the SD executable architecture can effectively evaluate such 
questions, the PED subsystem was utilized to explore specific proposed DOTmLPF-P 
changes including the addition of the MDTF, technology improvements, and 
training/experience improvements.  
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By using a standardized input, the ability to explore input variable and structural 
changes manually to play games and visualize effects was demonstrated using assumed 
value ranges. This allowed the interpretation of effects and the user to make more educated 
assessments as to the impact of variations. The input variables were then assessed over the 
entire span of ranges using Monte Carlo simulation, sped up by the utilization of Latin 
Hypercube DOE sampling for 10,000 combination of input variables with near 
instantaneous results. A method to explore the results via the aid of the initial manual 
methods was introduced. Finally, once the most influential variables were identified, the 
ability to optimize the combination given desired outputs was demonstrated using built in 
Vensim SD functionality.   
For the specific MDTF problem, RQ2.2 asked, given new structure, how intelligence 
and resources should be allocated through the MDTF PED along with additional 
DOTmLPF-P improvement to improve overall mission effectiveness. Following the 
method explained above, the executable architecture was able to explore this question 
given immediate technology and experience values and determine that unequal distribution 
of observables and manpower is best to increase the output of the PED structure while 
reducing total overwork of personnel in the three stages. Additional training/experience 
and technology will moderately increase the total observables process in a given time but 
will have a greater impact on the reduction of overwork with a constrained number of 
personnel.  
While the EA was successful in this realm, it is necessary to explore the effects given 
an operational scenario and the complete SoS to compare how these DOTmLPF-P 
structural and policy changes may be different in the larger context.   
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CHAPTER 6. PROBLEM 3: ALLOCATIONS 
6.1 Problem 3 Summary 
The reader is reminded of the research question this section hopes to address:  
Research Question 1.2 
Can the executable architecture be used to identify elements and values of the SoS 
architecture that have the greatest impact on operational MOP/MOE? 
Hypothesis 1.2: The EA can be used to generate surrogate models to identify the most 
important aspects and optimal values of the SoS variables against operational 
MOP/MOE to inform exploration and investment. 
 
In Chapter 4, the complete executable architecture was developed for the AISR-
PED SoS in a D3A scenario against the air defense and counter battery elements of a 
generic near-peer threat. Chapter 5 took a step into the executable architecture to explore 
how to evaluate structural changes to a system within the SoS. In this chapter, we return to 
the large context to demonstrate how to the executable architecture can be used for the 
larger SoS to rapidly evaluate many alternatives across the entirety of the included systems 
in the larger operational context.  
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Figure 144: Problem 3 Summary 
 
This holistic analysis technique will provide a method to make trades amongst 
multiple stakeholders with competing demands by determining which elements of the 
system are the most influential to meet the operational MOP/MOE. This method will 
demonstrate how to determine optimal values to best meet objects and serve as a starting 
point to play games, make trades, and explore alternatives  and rapidly visualize the results 
if the assumptions and constraints used to make the model change. The Overall Problem, 






6.2 Experiment Design 
6.2.1 The Interactive Dashboard 
For the reader’s convenience, the overall executable models are reproduced below 
though is a reduced scale. Refer to the figures in Figure 113 and Figure 109 respectively 
for larger views.  
 
 




Figure 146: PED & MDTF Subsystem Model 
 
While these executable architectures can be manipulated directly on the stock and 
flow diagrams via the SynthSym function in Vensim, such a view can be cluttered and 
overwhelming. Additionally, unless constructed as an interactive object, graphs have to be 
reviewed individually which can be tedious and make it difficult to visualize changes.  
Even if constructed and interactive graphs, the scaling on them to view such a large model 
makes the graphs difficult to read. Additionally, the multitude of stock and flow diagrams 
and variables linked by causal loop connectors can create an overwhelming, cluttered 
environment for stakeholder discussion and interactions. Hence a dashboard can rapidly be 
created with specific sliders and output graphs to play games and immediately visualize 
the effects. The complete dashboard is depicted in Figure 147, while Figure 148 and Figure 

























Figure 149: Dashboard Instantaneous Output MOP/MOE Graphs  
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6.2.2 Challenges/Observations from Games 
Like with the previous problem, univariate and multivariate manual variation of 
variables along their ranges (particularly at the extreme values) provides valuable insight 
as to their effects on the operational MOP/MOE. For the reader’s convenience, the 
operational MOP and MOE are reproduced below and are reflected in the output graphs 
displayed on the interactive dashboard. 
Table 26: AISR-PED Measures of Performance 
Friendly UAS Losses Over Time 
Friendly HIMARS Losses Over Time 
Friendly Satellite Losses Over Time 
Enemy Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Losses Over Time 
Enemy Artillery Losses Over Time 
Intelligence Processing Rates 
Intelligence Overflow Over Time 
 
Table 27: AISR PED Measures of Effectiveness 
Enemy to Friendly Artillery Loss Ratio Over Time 
Enemy AAA to Friendly UAS Ratio Over Time 
Total Loss Ratio Over Time 
Friendly Loss Percentages Over Time 
Intelligence Overflow Ratios 
Average Intelligence Capacity Utilization 
Intelligence Personnel Overwork 
 
With this many MOP/MOE of interest, finding the appropriate combination for 
input variables becomes a significant challenge. This is especially true due to the number 
of input variables for the overall model (Table 28). Recall that with the PED subsystem 
model’s 10 input variables that could be manipulated just considering which “switches” 
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should be altered leads to 1024 “switch” combinations. The overall model has 41 variables. 
Consider just the number of combinations of “switches” that could be manipulated yields 
2^41 possibilities or approximately 2.2 trillion. Bear in mind that this mind-boggling value 
does not even consider the ranges of the variables and the incremental divisions between 
them, so the actual possible combinations are much greater.  
Table 28: AISR PED D3A Input Variables and Ranges 
 
This curse of dimensionality does not mean that the dashboard is not useful, 
however. As was demonstrated for the smaller PED subsystem in Section 5.3.1, univariate 
extreme value testing provides valuable insight into the influence of the variables. For 
example, the Initial Number of HIMARs alone has a large impact on the attrition rates of 
friendly and enemy assets, the difference of which could result in all enemy being 
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destroyed in the first 48-hour or, conversely, all of the friendlies. The same holds true for 
the percentage of fires focused on the enemy artillery, with the remainder focused on 
enemy AAA. This variable explores the effect of ways, chiefly it explores the question 
How should fires be focused maximize the enemy to friendly loss ratio? Is it better to 
eliminate all of the enemy AAA first to preserve friendly UAS that are critical to providing 
intelligence for targeting? or Is it better to eliminate the enemy artillery first to prevent 
counterbattery fire from destroying our artillery necessary to penetrating the enemy 
defenses? 
Univariate testing also demonstrates the major impact the enemy actions have on 
the MOP/MOE for friendly forces. Particularly, the NOISE SEED, that was discussed in 
Section 4.6.1. This parameter changes the random Poisson Distribution draw (in a 
repeatable manner) for the enemy attacks on friendly assets.   
Lastly, manual multivariate changes also yield useful insight into the effects of 
variables. For example, nine variables influence the UAS Limit which dictates the 
maximum number of UAS that can be overhead. Adjust parameters individually does 
nothing if other variables set the limit. For example, increasing crews to the maximum does 
not yield any effects on the model if the Frequency Limit due to satellites already restricts 





6.3 Determining Sensitivity/Most Influential Factors 
6.3.1 Reducing Dimensionality with Systems Thinking 
Part of the appeal of using SD as the selected modelling and simulation paradigm 
was the ability to learn about the system and yield valuable insights during the development 
of the executable architecture framework. The constraints in the UAS Limit example 
demonstrates the benefit of these insights to make informed changes on the dashboard. 
However, to utilize the executable architecture to make decisions and evaluate means and 
ways alternatives, dimensionality should be reduced.  The first step is manual testing from 
the previous section.  Second is an evaluation of which variables can be influence by 
stakeholders and which are outside of their control. For example, continued replacements 
of enemy from an endless pool will always result in the loss of our limited HIMARS fleet 
in the MDTF Brigade (and any limited replacements from adjacent units in the reserve pool 
if assumed). 
Hit Probability and Kill Probability are two additional variables that can make a 
significant impact on the behaviour of the simulation. However, when comparing the 
effects in the larger SoS context the author feels it is best to use heuristic values since there 
is no interactive simulation between assets. Fixing these variables to set values allows for 
easier comparison of other variables unless specifically trying to answer a question as the 
benefits of more accurate hits and kills, at which point all other variables could be fixed 
values. Alternatively, data or a smaller interactive ABM simulation could be used to refine 
the overall SD executable architecture if desired and time permitting (beyond the scope of 
this thesis) 
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Using these techniques, the input variables of interest were reduced to 25 (see Table 
29) which is still over 35 million “switch” combinations. However, it does aid in narrowing 
down the focus areas for force-on-force engagements.  The selected input variables also 
exercise the relationships in the model and prevent trivial, unrealistic scenarios that do not 
benefit the comparisons such as endless enemy and friendly HIMARS replacements. These 
variables will better highlight how to focus fires and balance kinetic and intelligence 
operations and capabilities. Endless reinforcement would only serve to skew numbers. The 
UAS replacements via the UAS Pool remain because the maximum is fixed and represents 
the UAS spending and acquisition. Finally, the selected variables allow us to expand upon 
what was previously determined for the PED subsystem, but now in the larger context of 
the SoS operations with variable observable input flow rather than an assumed input 
pattern. These variables and ranges provide a good start point for tabletop wargames and 
discussion with SMEs to provide insight.  But what about for analysis? How can improved 
combinations it be found easier and quicker? 
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Table 29: Reduced AISR PED D3A Input Variables and Ranges 
 
 
6.3.2 Accounting for Noise and Many Variables 
6.3.2.1 Building the DOE for Stochasticity 
As with Research Question 2, the variables, ranges, and outputs of interest can be 
selected in Vensim to build a Latin Hypercube DOE to run a Monte Carlo simulation. The 
most influential variables can be identified through detailed comparison of sensitivity 
graphs and the gradual elimination of variables. However, with 25 variables this becomes 
a daunting task, if not fruitless.  
Furthermore, in Problem 2, the input to the PED subsystem model was a predicted 
standardized deterministic shape.  The larger executable architecture includes stochastic 
0 <= Noise Seed <= 2^31 0 <= Initial Number of HIMARS <= 40
0.0 <= % Fires Focused on Enemy Artillery <= 1.0
0.0 <= PE Expertise <= 10.0
1.0 <= PE Technology <= 3.0 0 <= Total UAS in Theater <= 75
0.0 <= MDTF Expertise <= 10.0 2 <= Average Launch and Transit Time <= 6
1.0 <= MDTF Technology <= 3.0 1 <= Initial UAS <= 50
0.0 <= % Obs Direct to MDTF <= 0.5 0 <= Total Crews <= 50
0.0 <= MDTF Allocation <= 0.5 0 <= Ground Control Stations Available <= 50
0.0 <= PED Personnel Total <= 50.0
0.0 <= ED Expertise <= 10.0 1 <= Satellites Available <= 15
1.0 <= ED Technology <= 3.0 1 <= Frequencies Per Satellite <= 10
0.0 <= ED Personnel <= 30.0
1 <= ACE Fusion Expertise <= 10
1 <= ACE Fusion Technology <= 3
1 <= ACE Fusion Personnel <= 30
1 <= Initial Enemy AAA <= 100






AISR PED D3A Input Parameters
Global Parameters HIMARS
 286 
enemy-effects rates. Therefore, the number of enemy targets, UAS, and the observable 
rates vary with respect to time, as do the available HIMARS to prosecute targets. While 
the PED subsystem model had some feedback, it was minimal. The holistic executable 
framework demonstrates the full potential of feedback. Recall, for repeatability, the 
RANDOM POISSON and RANDOM BINOMIAL functions utilize a NOISE SEED 
variable. Manual changes using the dashboard demonstrated that the selected noise seed 
string had a significant influence on the responses. How then do we account for the noise 
to ensure our solutions are robust against unpredictable enemy effects? 
While Vensim allows for the inclusion of the NOISE SEED variable as an input 
that can be varied over a range in the DOE, this is not particularly useful as it only adds 
another dimension to the n-dimensional Latin Hypercube design space. This means that the 
noise seed value will also get sampled with the other variables. What we desire is the 
average values of the outputs for every point in the DOE so that we can attempt to fit 
predictive models regardless of the noise variable selected and add a degree of robustness 
to the solution.  
As was demonstrated previously, a Latin Hypercube DOE was built in Vensim 
without noise to create 2500 points of input variable combinations in the design space. The 
DOE was then exported to a custom-built MATLAB script which replicated the DOE 
points for 410 different noise variable values. This new 1.025,000-point DOE was imported 
back into Vensim using the “file” DOE option to calculate the outputs for the outputs of 
interest (MOP/MOE). This Monte Carlo simulation took approximately 30 minutes to run 
on a laptop computer, demonstrating the benefit of using SD for rapid executable 
architecture analysis. The results were again exported to another MATLAB script that 
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averaged the output values for the 2500 identical points for each of the 410 noise values. 
The result is the same 2500 points in the input design space whose outputs are now the 
average of the 410 noise variables, thus providing robustness.  
6.3.2.2 Using Statistical Software to Gain Insight 
Now that the Monte Carlo simulation was run, a need still existed to determine 
which combinations help us achieve the desired results. The 2500 points with averaged 
output values was exported to a statistical analysis software program (JMP) to help further 
narrow down the most influential inputs (sensitivity analysis) and determine optimal (or at 
least improved) settings. 
 Figure 150 shows a scatterplot matrix of all the multivariate input values. Black 
dots represent the design points from 2500 averaged point DOE. The black, orange, and 
green dots represent points that will be used as training points, validations points, and 
testing points, respectively, for the development of surrogate models. The designations of 
these points were done randomly via the JMP software. This scatterplot serves to provide 
insight into correlation and dependency between inputs variables. Because no clear pattern 
emerges for the entire range of values, no influential correlations are observed. Additional 
scatterplot matrices can be made comparing the inputs to outputs to give us an idea of how 
the ranged of input values effect the magnitude of the outputs of interest (see Figure 151). 
Understanding the relationships via inspection expedites the selection of input ranges for 
which decision makers have the ability in a real-world scenario to manipulate as part of 
wargaming and planning. Large gaps, triangular patterns, etc. are indications of dependent 
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relationships. The more discernable dependencies, the more likely the machine will be able 
to develop surrogate models. 
 
 
Figure 150: Scatterplot of Input Variables 
Viewing Figure 151 first, a few dependencies become relevant for the input ranges 
and PED MOP/MOE. Not by coincidence, these dependencies reinforce the selection of 
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key variables of interest and dependencies observed in the sensitivity analysis for Problem 
2 in 4.6.  The range of values for the many of the input variables has little influence on the 
‘ACE Fusion Overwork’, ‘PE Overflow,’ and ‘PE Overwork Ratio.’  However close 
inspection indicates trends of direct dependencies of ‘Frequencies Per Satellite’, Satellites 
Available, with ‘ED Overflow’, which is logical since more satellites mean more aircraft 
overhead and, thus, more observables. ‘ED Overflow’ also demonstrates an inverse 
relationship with ‘ED Technology’ which is logical; more technology means more efficient 
processing and less lost intelligence. The most obvious correlations on the figure are 
inverse relation of the ‘% Obs Direct to MDTF’ to the ‘PE Overflow Ratio’ and ‘ED 
Overflow Ratio.’ As well its directly proportional relationship to ‘MDTF Overflow Ratio’ 
and ‘MDTF Overflow Total’. ‘ED Overflow’ also shows an inverse relationship with ‘% 
Fires Focused on Enemy Artillery’ meaning the more fires focused on artillery the less 
focused on AAA means more UAS shot down and less intelligence; hence, less overflow 


































Viewing Figure 7.9 for combat MOP/MOEs, not many clear relationships can be 
observed for most of the input and output values. However, four of the input variables 
demonstrate clear correlations. Unlike the PED, the combat MOP/MOE have yet to be 
unexplored in the greater SoS. Therefore, this scatterplot, provides some valuable insights.  
Starting from the first column from the left, “% Obs Direct to MDTF” the following 
relationships are observed: The “% Obs Direct to MDTF” is directly proportional to the 
Total Loss Ratio, AAA Loss Ratio, and the Artillery Loss Ratio. “MDTF Allocation,” 
Column 14 shows the same trends. This tells us that the ratio of enemy destroyed to friendly 
destroyed increases as the percentage of observables that flow through the MDTF 
increases, provided the associated manpower allocated increases as well. This confirms 
findings from the PED subsystem model. This is likely due to the bypassing of delays 
allowing a more rapid execution of kinetic effects on target.  
The second column of Figure 152, “% of Fires Focused on Enemy Artillery” also 
presents some interesting relationships that are a bit more difficult to discern but are worth 
mentioning. As the “% of Fires Focused on Enemy Artillery” increases so too does the 
Enemy Loss Ratio (enemy artillery destroyed versus friendly HIMARs destroyed). This 
result is expected, but interestingly, this input variable does not show the same relationship 
for the ‘Enemy Artillery Percent Loss’ or ‘AAA Percent Loss’ so some another variable is 
coupling and influencing those outputs. The increase of focus on enemy artillery is 
inversely proportional to the HIMARS losses, the ‘HIMARS Percent Loss’ and the ‘AAA 
to UAS Loss Ratio’. Lastly, the ‘Target Overflow’ shows interesting behavior with respect 
to the artillery focus: too little focus on artillery results in heavy overflow as does too much 
but remains low for most of the fires focus range.   
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Figure 152: Scatterplot Matrix of Combat MOP/MOE to Inputs 
 293 
  
JMP also offers a Predictive Profiler that determines the most influential variables 
(Figure 153 and Figure 154). The results of this profiler can be checked against the 
observations from the scatterplot matrices.  
 
 
Figure 153: Input Predictor Screening for PED MOP/MOE 
 
Obviously, different outputs have differences in the most influential factors, but the trends 
are easy to identify.  It is clear the ‘% Obs Direct to MDTF,’ MDTF Allocation, PED 
Personnel Total, Satellites Available, ‘% of Fires Focused on Enemy Artillery, MDTF 
Expertise, and MDTF Technology are the most influential for all of the MOP/MOE. (Recall 
that number of HIMARS was a fixed number for a single MDTF BDE, otherwise it too 





Figure 154: Input Predictor Screening Combat MOP/MOE 
 
6.3.2.3 Developing Surrogate Models 
Armed with the insights from the scatter plots and predictor screenings, surrogate 
models can be generated using JMP with selected inputs to desired outputs. Given the 
stochasticity of the enemy fires, it is unlikely that the most basic surrogate modeling 
paradigm will sufficiently model the SoS, but they do provide additional verification of the 
most influential factors. Figure 155 shows basic fit model using least squares. The fit of 
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the surrogate model is poor, but the information obtains is important. The Effect Summary 
shows the most important input variables (highlighted in blue with p-value less than 0.05%)  
Additionally, under the Parameter Estimates, the VIF (variance inflation factors) 
measure the multicollinearity of the variables. Any value more than 5 is associated with an 
80% correlation between predictors, however, all our input values are approximately 1.  
High correlation creates wrong results and unstable variances.  
 
Figure 155: Results of Method of Least Squares Basic Fit Model 
 As an alternative option, stepwise regression forward was conducted by slowly 
adding variables to see which variable have most correlation/influence on the response. 
While also not a good fit, it also shows the effects of the variables that can be used in other 
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analysis. The two failed surrogates combined with the previous scatterplots and prediction 
profilers can be used to eliminate unnecessary variables and reduce complexity.  
 
Figure 156: Stepwise Regression Example (Enemy AAA Percent Loss) 
 
Such regression fits were completed for a variety of output variables to confirm the most 
influential factors. The following input variables were selected: 
 297 
 
Figure 157: Input Variables for Surrogate Modeling 
Several methods to properly fit surrogate models were attempted, including 
Random Forests, Stepwise Regressions, and Response Surface Methods. However, none 
were able to provide adequate goodness of fit. Therefore, built in artificial neural nets were 
used to create the surrogate models. Ultimately, neural net surrogate models were 
successfully created for key MOP/MOE: Cumulative Overflow, Enemy AAA Percent 
Loss, Enemy AAA to UAS Loss Ratio, Artillery Loss Ratio, Total Loss Ratio, UAS Loss 
Percent, HIMARS Loss Percent.  Surrogates could not be made for the Satellite Percent 
Loss due the nature of the assumed  
Each model was generated using 1500 designated training point then validated 
against an additional 500 validations points (orange), and final confirmed against a 
different set of 500 test points (green). From the 1500 training points, 33% were held back 
as initial validation. The resulting equation was then exported into JMP graph builder to 
test the additional 500 validation and 500 test points (see Figure 159 and Figure 160). 
0.0 <= PE Expertise <= 10.0 0.0 <= % Fires Focused on Enemy Artillery <= 1.0
1.0 <= PE Technology <= 3.0
0.0 <= MDTF Expertise <= 10.0 0 <= Total UAS in Theater <= 75
1.0 <= MDTF Technology <= 3.0 2 <= Average Launch and Transit Time <= 6
0.0 <= % Obs Direct to MDTF <= 0.5 1 <= Initial UAS <= 50
0.0 <= MDTF Allocation <= 0.5 0 <= Total Crews <= 50
0.0 <= PED Personnel Total <= 50.0 0 <= Ground Control Stations Available <= 50
0.0 <= ED Expertise <= 10.0
1.0 <= ED Technology <= 3.0 1 <= Satellites Available <= 15
0.0 <= ED Personnel <= 30.0 1 <= Frequencies Per Satellite <= 10
1 <= ACE Fusion Expertise <= 10
1 <= ACE Fusion Technology <= 3









Figure 158: Neural Net Settings Panel 
The number of nodes at each of the two layers were varied as were the associate 
activation functions associated with those nodes to try and maximize R^2 values 
(coefficients of determination) as close to 1 as a possible for both initial test and holdback 
validation points. All the neural net created surrogate models were able to achieve a 
minimum R^2 value of 0.95 for training, validation, and test values. The goodness of fit 
was evaluated by the actual versus predicted plots and the residuals vs predicted plots as 
well the predicted model fit error.  
For the actual versus predicted plots, goodness of fit is assessed using the 95% 
confidence lines. Ideally the 95% confidence lines should be as close to the fit line as 
possible. Points that lie outside of the confidence line are failed points. Every model had 
clusters of points that failed. However, they were not always the same points in the design 
space. While the 95% confidence lines were farther apart from the fit line than preferred, 
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they ran generally parallel and were not divergent. Most points fell within these confidence 
lines. Creating surrogate predictive models for nonphysical system without closed form 
solutions and large amounts of stochasticity is extremely difficult. For these types of 
problems and for our intended use, the current fits are sufficient.  For models that could 
not obtain suitable R^2 or goodness of fit, surrogate models were made on the natural 




Figure 159: Enemy AAA Percent Loss Actual vs. Predicted  
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Figure 160: Cumulative Overflow (LN Transform) Actual Vs. Predicted 
6.3.3 Optimization of Inputs Using Surrogate Models 
For a simulation paradigm like SD, one may wonder why surrogate models should 
be made at all. Typically, surrogate models are used to replace computational inexpensive 
simulation by creating instantly executable mathematical relationships between input and 
output variables of interest for statistical exploration.  For something as computationally 
inexpensive as SD, the creation of surrogate models may seem unnecessary. However, 
because of the dimensionality of the executable architecture, the surrogate models and 
statistical analysis help establish ideal values for the most desirable outcomes. These can 
serve as benchmarks for acquisition efforts or as start points for model exploration. The 
predictive profiler was created for the surrogate models (see Figure 161). The rows show 
outputs and the columns represent the inputs; each has a specified numeric range. The black 



























Flat lines indicate that there is little or no change in an output variable regardless of the 
value of the input variable. The curved lines indicated dependency. Note that the input 
variables with the generally flat lines are the same inputs predicted in previous analysis.  
 With the prediction profiler we can optimize the input values by maximizing the 
desirability of the outputs.  In Figure 161 has 8 outputs, some of which may appear 
redundant. For example, the loss ratio of friendly to enemy assets itself accounts for the 
ratio of enemy to friendly loss percentages. However, stakeholders may want to maximize 
the loss ratio but also minimize friendly loss percent which may not be the same priority. 
For the optimization settings, it is imperative to prioritize objective functions. This requires 
not only interviews with stakeholders or SMEs to determine priorities, but also for the end 
user to understand the effects of the relationships on the optimization.  
Two examples are provided to demonstrate this point. For the first analysis, the 
following outputs selected in order of importance from highest to lowest: Total Loss Ratio 
(maximize), Cumulative Overflow (minimize), HIMARS Percent Loss (minimize), UAS 
Percent Loss (minimize). This order means that the end user wants to destroy a higher 
percentage of enemy than the percentage of friendly destroyed; minimize the amount of 
information lost during processing; preserve limited assets (HIMARS); and finally 
preserve ‘attritable’ assets (UAS). The desirability column is added to the end and 
desirability values were set to the conditions specified. The optimization then resets the 





































Table 30: Maximized Desirability Input Values Case 1 
 
Note that the surrogate models treat all values as continuous so unrealistic decimal 
values may result. The sliders on the prediction profiler can be slide manually to instantly 
see the effects on all other variables when rounding to nearest integers or adjusting sliders 
to attainable, present day values (i.e targetable technology goals). The importance of 
selecting appropriate MOP and MOE as the objective functions and applying the proper 
desirability cannot be understated. The optimization algorithm seeks to find the local 
optimum desirable solution and does not use human logic to understand the implications 
of the mathematical solution. Thus, it is imperative that the solutions not be taken at face-
value and be transferred back into the executable architecture visualization to see the 
effects over time. Different prioritization and inclusion of output variables will yield very 
different results.  
For comparison case, the following outputs selected in order of importance from 
highest to lowest: Total Loss Ratio (maximize), Predicted Enemy Artillery Percent Loss 
(maximize), Predicted Enemy AAA Percent Loss (maximize), HIMARS Percent Loss 
(minimize), UAS Percent Loss (minimize). Cumulative Overflow (minimize). Like the 
previous case, this order means that the end user wants to destroy a higher percentage of 







































Table 31: Maximized Desirability Input Values Case 2 
 
Table 32: Comparison of Desirability Runs shows the recommended outputs of 
both runs.  The values have been rounded to realistic integer as applicable. Those values 
with the greatest differences between runs have been highlighted in yellow.  The 
ramifications of these differences and the reasons for them is discussed in the next section.   
Table 32: Comparison of Desirability Runs 
 
PE Expertise = 1.205 MDTF Allocation = 0.285 ACE Fusion Expertise = 3.910 % Fires Focused on Enemy Artillery = 0.097 Total UAS in Theater = 75.000
PE Technology = 1.000 PED Personnel Total = 39.898 ACE Fusion Technology = 2.990 Average Launch and Transit Time = 2.060
MDTF Expertise = 2.998 ED Expertise = 3.990 ACE Fusion Personnel = 18.000 Satellites Available = 5.624 Initial UAS = 20.409
MDTF Technology = 2.524 ED Technology = 3.270 Frequencies Per Satellite = 4.948 Total Crews = 49.990






6.4 Adjustments and Visualization 
Now that initial desirable settings have been identified, they can be reintroduced 
into the SD executable architecture to visualize the effects over time and against the random 
effects of enemy fires (by varying NOISE SEED). The uncertainty from the enemy noise 
is difficult to capture in surrogate models. The intent is for the output solution to be robust 
enough that the desired MOE maintain close to the same ratio even if the MOP vary.  
The input values from each of the cases were updated in the executable architecture. 
The MOP/MOE graphs shown side-by-side for comparison for the runs are shown in Figure 
164, Figure 165, Figure 166, and Figure 167. The need for proper selection and 
prioritization of optimization objective functions and the need to visualize the effects over 
time becomes apparent. The first optimization case prioritized the loss ratio but also sought 
to reduce the observable overflow as the second priority. The numeric optimization has no 
understanding of the actual operational environment. In order to maximize the loss ratio 
and minimize the lost observables, the solution to the optimization of the surrogate models 
simply minimized the number of UAS and satellites overhead, resulting in fewer friendly 
destroyed (reducing the denominator).and less intelligence collected. While the settings did 
meet the objective requirements, it fails to meet actual operational requirements. The 
second case, while also prioritizing the loss ratio, added the maximization of enemy loss 
percentages as second priorities to drive up the numerator. The observable overflow was 
placed as the lowest priority. As a result, more friendly assets were employed, enemy AAA 
were eliminated, and enemy artillery driven towards zero.  
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Figure 164: Comparison of Operational MOP/MOE A (Case 1 Left) (Case 2 Right)  
Figure 164 shows that the reduced number of satellites from Case 1, result in a 
complete loss of UAS capacity and as consequently the loss of key observables to target 
enemy artillery at the 17-hour mark. Despite having only 10% of fires focused on enemy 
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counter battery compared to 40% in Case 1, Case 2 was more effective in destroying enemy 
artillery, albeit over a longer period. 
 
Figure 165: Comparison of Operational MOP/MOE B (Case 1 Left)( Case 2 Right) 
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Figure 165 shows the benefit of prioritizing the numerator of the loss ratio. Case 2 
had a higher loss ratio overall, equal UAS loss percentages, and only slightly higher 
HIMARS loss percentages. 
  
Figure 166: Comparison of Operational MOP/MOE C (Case 1 Left)( Case 2 Right) 
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Figure 166 shows that Case 2 resulted in only slightly higher observable overflows 
despite having more assets overhead for longer periods of time with only slightly more 
capacity utilization and no overwork (Figure 167). This is due to the increased PED 
personnel required from the optimization.  
  
Figure 167: Comparison of Operational MOP/MOE D (Case 1 Left)( Case 2 Right) 
These two cases provide numerically generated inputs based on desirability, but 
they are not absolutes, nor do they guarantee global maximum. The benefit of the 
executable architecture is that these values can serve as starting points to manual 
adjustments of values based on current conditions/capabilities and allow immediate 
visualization of effects or fine tuning to change all outputs.  
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6.5 Results and Findings for Research Question 3 
Research Question 3 sought to demonstrate the ability of the executable architecture 
could be used to identify elements and values of the larger SoS architecture that have the 
greatest impact on operational MOP/MOE. Unlike Research Question 2, the larger SoS 
had many feedback loops requiring a means to compare trades and observe the effects of 
multiple subsystems that were built in Section 4.3. While Research Question 2 showed the 
ability to conduct sensitivity analysis and optimization to find ideal settings for the smaller 
system, the overall SoS executable architecture had far more variables and the inclusion of 
stochastic enemy actions that induced highly influential noise.  
To account for stochasticity in normally deterministic M&S paradigm, the two 
cases provide numerically generated inputs based on desirability, but they are not 
absolutes, nor do they guarantee global maximum. A Latin Hypercube DOE was 
constructed to include the same 2500 points in the design space for 410 noise variables.  
The averages of the results for each point were used to construct surrogate models using 
artificial neural nets. Two cases with different priorities and desirability of MOP/MOE 
yielded drastically different results to demonstrate the importance of proper MOP/MOE 
desirability selection. The results were input back into the SD executable architecture as 
start values to visualize and evaluate the effects over time while making univariate changes 
to adjust value to realistic or feasible goals. If desired, the overall system could be 
optimized again in the SD executable architecture by provide narrowed ranges around the 
values output from the optimization of the surrogate models. This type of optimization was 
demonstrated in RQ2 and was not repeated in the interest of brevity.  
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Several key takeaways were observed. First, when placed in the larger operational 
context against operational MOP/MOE without a standardized input the PED manning, 
technology, and experience levels varied significantly from the values found in RQ2. Most 
namely, the allocation of observables and the allocation of MDTF PED personnel. This 
example highlights the necessity to evaluate SoS holistically in the larger operational 
context when discerning manning, asset, and technology allocations. The SD executable 
architecture provides a rapid means to do so with multiple stakeholders.   
The use of surrogate models and statistical analysis tools allowed for several 
different means to identify of the most influential variables and the inputs for the 
executable architecture. By comparing the very different behaviors for two different sets 
of recommended inputs base on prioritization of MOP/MOE yields insight into how 
influential the variables selected are. The variables highlighted in yellow in Table 32 
indicate values that changed the most between Case 1 and Case 2, but they do not necessary 
indicate these variables are the most influential of the influential variables. The variables 
that did not change between Case 1 and Case 2 are just as important but have more certainty 
in their values. Thus, when returning to the SD executable architecture those values can be 
fixed as targetable values and only those highlighted in yellow should be undergo 
univariate change as necessary to obtain the desired behavior.  
All the variables used in the cases were identified in Section 6.3. Interestingly, these 
variables spanned the DOTmLPF-P spectrum (Figure 168: Important Variables Across 
DOTmLPF-P Figure 168)   
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Figure 168: Important Variables Across DOTmLPF-P Spectrum 
Two major exceptions of note were the number of crews and the number of ground 
control stations. Because of the way that the SD executable architecture is constructed to 
reflect real limit on real operations, 5 items limit the number of UAS overhead at any given 
time: Initial UAS (UAS desired overhead); crew limit, ground control station limit, the 
frequency limit, and the UAS Pool level (see Section 4.6.1). This constraint is not reflected 
in the surrogate models, as logic cannot be applied. From Table 32, it can be seen that Case 
1 and Case 2 call for a significantly different number of Total Crews (30 versus 50 ) and 
Ground Control Stations Available (29 versus 50 ). However, the frequency limit (satellites 
multiplied by frequencies per satellite) were much lower (15 versus 35) and were thus the 
limiting factor. Therefore, any number of crews or ground control stations greater than the 
most restrictive limit has no effect whatsoever on the behavior of the system. If, however, 
crew or ground control stations were the limiting constraint, they would have set the 
maximum for the number of UAS Overhead (at least in initially) and had a significant 
impact on the behavior of the system over time. This observation highlights the importance 
of having an executable architecture that is both interactive and is built with SMEs and/or 
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stakeholders to improve their knowledge of the system interactions rather than just rely on 
a data-in, data-out methodology. 
This framework also yielded other interesting observations from comparison of the 
two cases. To obtain maximized enemy to friendly loss ratios, both cases called for 
maximum UAS in theater (75) but also both called for only 20 Initial UAS. For Case 1, the 
UAS Overhead were limited to 15 due to the frequency limit, as discussed. In Case 2, 
however, the frequency limit was 35. The Initial UAS was the limiting value for UAS 
Overhead. This is significant because it provides a valuable insight that goes against 
assumed doctrine. To maximize immediate observables and targeting, one could logically 
expect to put the maximum amount of UAS overhead, but the effect of capping the UAS 
overhead allowed a longer use of the reserve pool until satellite attrition limited UAS 
overhead.  
Additionally, comparison of the two cases provided insight into proper targeting 
prioritization with regards to HIMARs focus. In both cases, less than 40% of fires were 
directed at enemy counter battery, which means most fires were directed at the enemy 
AAA. This confirms the strategy of first eliminating enemy AAA even if the UAS are 
attritable, as they are vital to the targeting process. This fact is clearly visible in the Case 1 
Graphs in Figure 164.  
Lastly, like in Research Question 2, both cases clearly proved the importance of the 
MDTF to reduce delays and expedite data to the HIMARS element.  
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Summary of Overall Research Problem 
 
To support the hypothesis for the overall problem addressed in this thesis, the 
author’s objective was to develop and demonstrate an efficient and holistic framework for 
a complex system-of-systems to allow for means and ways trades and enable multiple 
stakeholders to conduct electronic design reviews on an existing system-of-systems in 
order to analyze technological benefits, limitations and policy impacts for future 
investment and strategy. To accomplish this task, the author identified three sub-problems 
that, the author believes, satisfy the overall problem, and sufficiently support the overall 
hypothesis: how to develop system architecture, ability to evaluate policy and structural 
changes to the architecture, and ability to determine proper allocations and key elements 
of the system.  
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In Section 3.1, the author defined common system engineering terms, introduced the 
concept of system-of-systems, examined systems thinking, and IPPD (Figure 45). In 
Section 2.2, Modeling and Simulation in the Military, the author examined the basic 
concepts of M&S uses in the military, noting the spectrum of analysis (Figure 7) methods 
available to Army decision-makers spanning from game theory models at highest 
abstraction levels exercises at the highest end of realism (though absent of ground truth). 
In the center of this spectrum sat Monte Carlo simulations and wargames are listed just shy 
of exercises in realism. An overview of the four most common M&S paradigms was 
reviewed and discussed in an overview regarding Petri Nets in Section 4.5.2, regarding 
DES in Section 3.3.2, regarding ABM in Section 3.3.3, and regarding SD in Section 3.3.4. 
Additionally, the proven method of wargames was examined and compared to 
modern M&S methods, noting that wargames provide an educational aspect to military 
leaders in the ability to visualize the effects of their decision, and also by providing an 
unpredictable opposition force, compared to modern M&S that is mostly used at 
department-level operations research that, depending on the simulation level (Figure 8: 
DOD Modeling Hierarchy from [35]) offers little in the way of rapid trades of means and 
ways due to computing power requirements. Research into the history of DoD M&S found 
great value in its use, but little appreciable use by operational decision makers as they lack 
the interactive learning provided by wargames and are black boxes to those outside of 
operations research. The research into DOD M&S also exposed a significant lack of any 
discussion of SD as a potential paradigm and found that examination of C4ISR was limited 
to DES of the computer signals.  
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Various modeling methodologies were reviewed, namely those of Arnold and Wade 
(Figure 38: Systems Thinking Systemigram from [67]), Sterman (Figure 48: Sterman's 
Iterative Modeling Process), Forrester (Figure 47: Forrester's 6-Step SD Modeling Process 
recreated from [69]) and Ford. In addition to IPPD principles from Schrage and Mavris 
(Figure 45: Georgia Tech IPPD Approach Flowcharts from [75]). With all of this in mind, 
the concepts are reflected in the framework that was utilized throughout the document. 
 
Figure 169: Overall Framework Diagram 
 
 The author feels, having, completed the thesis, that the framework developed is 




7.1.1 Problem 1 
Problem one addressed the heart of the problem. Creating executable architecture 
is an ongoing field of study. However, the author identified that current proposed means to 
develop executable architecture fell into two categories: manually developed and 
autogenerated. The manual methods were primarily used to evaluate sections of a system 
for against design measures of performance such as evaluating data flow to identify choke 
points. The primary methods used were DES and Petri Nets which can be computational 
expensive and provide little in the way of interaction and insight like wargames. 
Alternatively, some researchers have looked at programming autogenerated executable 
architecture via SysML™. However, such proposals only look at checking completeness 
and connectivity of the architecture and rely on a single modeling paradigm that may not 
be suitable for all problems. Furthermore, they require complete DoDAF models to 
generate.  However, lack of standardization within DoDAF itself means that not all 
documents needed will have been completed nor have many DoDAF for existing SoS even 
been made in SysML™. 
Therefore, a need exists for a holistic method to rapidly develop executable 
architecture for existing complex SoS to experiment with both means and ways trades with 
available existing DoDAF products and limited data.   
Question 1.1 asked what means were available to aid in the use of systems thinking 
to understand the system structure as the first step of conceptualizing the model. The author 
hypothesized that three primary sources of information recommended by Forrester [134] 
[141] for creating M&S for an executable architecture: the mental database, the written 
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database, and the numeric database were sufficient. The author felt that SME input, and 
DoDAF models could satisfy the first two requirements. Using the work of previous 
research as a starting point, DoDAF static architecture viewpoints were mapped to an SD 
stock and flow diagram (Figure 76: Final Proposed DoDAF Mapping). SME input was 
added as the mental database to fill in any gaps, constraints, and relationships not identified 
in the DoDAF. In the absence of data due to classification concerns, parametric ranges 
were applied to all the variables. Variables were included in the model even if accurate 
numerical data did not exist or could not be found so as not to overlook any potential 
influencer on the system behavior. 
The author then walked through a step-by-step construction of the SD model for 
each system and the method by which the final executable architecture was stitched 
together (Figure 113: Complete ISR PED D3A Model) to include mathematical 
relationships and major constraints and equations. 
Research Question 1.2 sought to demonstrate a method to compare and evaluate 
different major modeling and simulation paradigms. Each paradigm was described in more 
detail, reviewing general principles and examples of use. The different paradigms were 
then be compared against criteria developed from Army modeling and simulation 
guidance, developed from observations made in CHAPTER 1 regarding desirable traits of 
executable architectures, regarding stakeholder requirements (Figure 82: Pugh Selection of 
M&S Paradigm). 
The author determined that System Dynamics could provide an overarching M&S 
architecture that could capture key aspects of the system and enable understanding of 
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technology benefits and limitations, policy impacts, and the likely outcome of future 
investment strategies as an overarching simulation paradigm. If necessary, the SD model 
could be supplemented by smaller less aggregated models (ABM, DES). However, having 
SD serve as the overall wrapper reduced computing requirements significantly. 
The author feels the work in Chapter 4 sufficiently addresses the question, supports 
the selection of SD as the overarching modeling type, and adequately maps the DoDAF to 
develop an executable architecture with available products through both theoretical 
mappings and clear demonstration of the mapping through the construction of the 
executable architecture for the AISR PED in a D3A environment use case.  
7.1.2 Problem 2 
Research Question 2 hoped to explore the ability of the executable architecture to 
explore the effects of structural and policy changes on the systems and the systems-of-
systems. To show that the SD executable architecture can effectively evaluate such 
questions, the PED subsystem was utilized to explore specific proposed DOTmLPF-P 
changes including the addition of the MDTF, technology improvements, and 
training/experience improvements.  
By using a standardized input, the ability to explore input variable and structural 
changes manually to play games and visualize effects was demonstrated using assumed 
value ranges. This allowed the interpretation of effects and the user to make more educated 
assessments as to the impact of variations. The input variables were then assessed over the 
entire span of ranges using Monte Carlo simulation, sped up by the utilization of Latin 
Hypercube DOE sampling for 10,000 combination of input variables with near 
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instantaneous results. A method to explore the results via the aid of the initial manual 
methods was introduced. Finally, once the most influential variables were identified, the 
ability to optimize the combination given desired outputs was demonstrated using built in 
Vensim SD functionality.   
For the specific MDTF problem, RQ2.2 asked, given new structure, how 
intelligence and resources should be allocated through the MDTF PED along with 
additional DOTmLPF-P improvement to improve overall mission effectiveness. Following 
the method explained above, the executable architecture was able to explore this question 
given immediate technology and experience values and determine that unequal distribution 
of observables and manpower is best to increase the output of the PED structure while 
reducing total overwork of personnel in the three stages. Additional training/experience 
and technology will moderately increase the total observables process in a given time but 
will have a greater impact on the reduction of overwork with a constrained number of 
personnel.  
While the EA was successful in this realm, it is necessary to explore the effects 
given an operational scenario and the complete SoS to compare how these DOTmLPF-P 
structural and policy changes may be different in the larger context. 
7.1.3 Problem 3 
Research Question 3 sought to demonstrate the ability of the executable architecture 
could be used to identify elements and values of the larger SoS architecture that have the 
greatest impact on operational MOP/MOE. Unlike Research Question 2, the larger SoS 
had many feedback loops requiring a means to compare trades and observe the effects of 
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multiple subsystems that were built in Section 5.4. While Research Question 2 showed the 
ability to conduct sensitivity analysis and optimization to find ideal settings for the smaller 
system, the overall SoS executable architecture had far more variables and the inclusion of 
stochastic enemy actions that induced highly influential noise.  
To account for stochasticity in normally deterministic M&S paradigm, the two 
cases provide numerically generated inputs based on desirability, but they are not 
absolutes, nor do they guarantee global maximum. A Latin Hypercube DOE was 
constructed to include the same 2500 points in the design space for 410 noise variables.  
The averages of the results for each point were used to construct surrogate models using 
artificial neural nets. Two cases with different priorities and desirability of MOP/MOE 
yielded drastically different results to demonstrate the importance of proper MOP/MOE 
desirability selection. The results were input back into the SD executable architecture as 
start values to visualize and evaluate the effects over time while making univariate changes 
to adjust value to realistic or feasible goals. If desired, the overall system could be 
optimized again in the SD executable architecture by provide narrowed ranges around the 
values output from the optimization of the surrogate models. This type of optimization was 
demonstrated in RQ2 and was not repeated in the interest of brevity.  
Several key takeaways were observed. First, when placed in the larger operational 
context against operational MOP/MOE without a standardized input the PED manning, 
technology, and experience levels varied significantly from the values found in RQ2. Most 
namely, the allocation of observables and the allocation of MDTF PED personnel. This 
example highlights the necessity to evaluate SoS holistically in the larger operational 
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context when discerning manning, asset, and technology allocations. The SD executable 
architecture provides a rapid means to do so with multiple stakeholders.   
The use of surrogate models and statistical analysis tools allowed for several 
different means to identify of the most influential variables and the inputs for the 
executable architecture. By comparing the very different behaviors for two different sets 
of recommended inputs base on prioritization of MOP/MOE yields insight into how 
influential the variables selected are. The variables highlighted in yellow in Table 32 
indicate values that changed the most between Case 1 and Case 2, but they do not necessary 
indicate these variables are the most influential of the influential variables. The variables 
that did not change between Case 1 and Case 2 are just as important but have more certainty 
in their values. Thus, when returning to the SD executable architecture those values can be 
fixed as targetable values and only those highlighted in yellow should be undergo 
univariate change as necessary to obtain the desired behavior.  
All the variables used in the cases were identified in Section 6.3. Interestingly, these 
variables spanned the DOTmLPF-P spectrum (Figure 168: Important Variables Across 
DOTmLPF-P Figure 168)   
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Figure 170: Important Variables Across DOTmLPF-P Sepectrum 
 
Two major exceptions of note were the number of crews and the number of ground 
control stations. Because of the way that the SD executable architecture is constructed to 
reflect real limit on real operations, 5 items limit the number of UAS overhead at any given 
time: Initial UAS (UAS desired overhead); crew limit, ground control station limit, the 
frequency limit, and the UAS Pool level (see Section 4.6.1). This constraint is not reflected 
in the surrogate models, as logic cannot be applied. From Table 32, it can be seen that Case 
1 and Case 2 call for a significantly different number of Total Crews (30 versus 50 ) and 
Ground Control Stations Available (29 versus 50 ). However, the frequency limit (satellites 
multiplied by frequencies per satellite) were much lower (15 versus 35) and were thus the 
limiting factor. Therefore, any number of crews or ground control stations greater than the 
most restrictive limit has no effect whatsoever on the behavior of the system. If, however, 
crew or ground control stations were the limiting constraint, they would have set the 
maximum for the number of UAS Overhead (at least in initially) and had a significant 
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impact on the behavior of the system over time. This observation highlights the importance 
of having an executable architecture that is both interactive and is built with SMEs and/or 
stakeholders to improve their knowledge of the system interactions rather than just rely on 
a data-in, data-out methodology. 
This framework also yielded other interesting observations from comparison of the 
two cases. To obtain maximized enemy to friendly loss ratios, both cases called for 
maximum UAS in theater (75) but also both called for only 20 Initial UAS. For Case 1, the 
UAS Overhead were limited to 15 due to the frequency limit, as discussed. In Case 2, 
however, the frequency limit was 35. The Initial UAS was the limiting value for UAS 
Overhead. This is significant because it provides a valuable insight that goes against 
assumed doctrine. To maximize immediate observables and targeting, one could logically 
expect to put the maximum amount of UAS overhead, but the effect of capping the UAS 
overhead allowed a longer use of the reserve pool until satellite attrition limited UAS 
overhead.  
Additionally, comparison of the two cases provided insight into proper targeting 
prioritization with regards to HIMARs focus. In both cases, less than 40% of fires were 
directed at enemy counter battery, which means most fires were directed at the enemy 
AAA. This confirms the strategy of first eliminating enemy AAA even if the UAS are 
attritable, as they are vital to the targeting process. This fact is clearly visible in the Case 1 
Graphs in Figure 164.  
Lastly, like in Research Question 2, both cases clearly proved the importance of the 
MDTF to reduce delays and expedite data to the HIMARS element.  
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 The author feels the practical assessments of the use case for the entire SoS in 
conjunction with the surrogate models to identify the most influential elements of the SoS 
clearly demonstrates the executable architecture to not only dynamically model system 
behavior over time, but identify areas for further research.  All of this is accomplished in 
an easy to understand, rapidly developed, interactive simulation paradigm that provides 
visualization and aids in understanding of the connections, policies, interactions, and their 
effects, providing a learning element like wargaming  that is mission from straign campaign 
analysis or data driven analytics. ,  
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7.2 Summary of Contributions 
The end goal was to explore and demonstrate a means to develop a rapid, ubiquitous 
executable architecture that serves as both means to evaluate system-of-system architecture 
and to easily communicate information to decision-makers (technical orientation and 
management orientation) using AISR PED architecture as a use case.  
This research successfully built upon prior research that explored means by which 
executable architecture could developed utilizing static DoDAF models. Prior methods 
either explored Systems Dynamics as a theoretical alternative without creating an 
executable model or dismissed it entirety based on the false premises that it is solely 
deterministic or a false equivalency to Discrete Event Simulation. Additionally, previous 
research constructed simulations as a data-driven output tool within the larger context of a 
decision-making methodology without consideration of the ability to consider the 
management orientation and abilities for SMEs to interact with the simulation to observe 
trends and inform decisions without considerable variation to the models.  
This research demonstrates the ability to leverage SD to provide a holistic top-down 
method and a balance between no simulation and advance simulation for rapid 
development and assessment. This method is computationally inexpensive and can easily 
modified to customize to the problem and provide the ability to make trades, generate, 
repeatable traceable results and add scientific reasoning that current SME generated 
capabilities assessments often lack. In addition, it allows for the visualization of the second 
and third order effects and contributions that are otherwise impossible for the human mind 
to comprehend. It provides a wargame-like interactive experience that can add the 
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managerial element and inform decision makers in a way that is easily communicated and 
understood and is developed through the combination of SME intuition/experience, 
existing DoDAF models/products, and limited data.  
Beyond executable architecture through simulation, this research demonstrates the 
benefits of incorporating repeatable stochastic effects into SD models to represent combat 
environments. Additionally, it demonstrates a means to conduct sensitivity analysis using 
Monte Carlo simulations that had previously identified as a lacking in static DoDAF 
models. Additionally, using artificial neural networks, demonstrates the ability to generate 
surrogate models for instantaneous analysis against operational MOP/MOE. 
Expands upon previous body of research of System Dynamics PED analysis 
previously completed for the Army. This previous research conducted by researchers at 
Charles River Analytics focused on future PED support systems but did not include the 
larger operating environment or the experimental Multi-Domain Task Force PED element. 
Lastly, prior research did not incorporate long range precision fires or enemy activities 
which are included in this research to provide a more holistic analysis and ability to 
evaluate operational effectiveness rather than just system performance.  
7.3 Future Work 
The intent of this thesis was to explore the ability to create a rapidly developed, 
computationally inexpensive holistic executable architecture for complex systems of 
system architecture against operational MOP/MOE using existing DoDAF models, SME 
expertise, and limited data to enable the development and scientific backing of an initial 
capabilities document during the capabilities-based analysis phase of the Joint Capabilities 
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Integration and Development System. While this research demonstrated the efficacy of 
using System Dynamics (namely the commercial platform Vensim) combined with 
statistical analysis software (JMP) for the AISR PED D3A use case, it relied on global 
assumptions and imposed stochastic probability models to account for enemy and friendly 
engagements. While this is suitable for a time-constrained problem set, if time permits, the 
author feels like the integration of an agent-based simulation paradigm either internally to 
the SD model or externally and providing data to the SD model would strengthen the global 
relationships and provide a greater level of realism.  Additionally, a Petri Net model or 
Discrete Event Simulation would aid in the accuracy of the PED to more accurately account 
for data processing in a less aggregated form. While SD aggregation is sufficient for 
addressing behavior trends to the overall system-of-systems, it may not be able to account 
for more nuanced delays and refinement of the data transport and analysis. The ability to 
rapidly include these features along with the ability to calibrate the model against classified 
data would prove to be a desirable area of future study.  
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APPENDIX A. AISR BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A.1  AISR PED D3A Architecture 
Legacy Army AISR systems, particularly the Army’s manned and unmanned 
aircraft, provided intelligence directly to an assigned customer based on a tasked collection 
deck through a process called collection management from organic assets or assigned 
assets from higher echelons. Depending on the asset, information may have been passed 
via direct communication with troops on the ground, their tactical operations center (TOC) 
or via post mission reports sent to the higher tasking authority All-Source Collection 
Element (ACE) for fusion with other sources of intelligence for use by that command and 
its subordinates. 
Depending on the sensor payloads, the processing of data for exploitation and the 
production of products was either conducted onboard or post-mission by intelligence 
analysts belonging to the unit conducting the AISR. With the introduction of full-motion 
video (FMV) the feed was initially broadcast to the TOC of the supported unit for situation 
awareness and decision making via tactical common data links (TCDL). Later 
technological developments allowed the feeds to also be sent to the troops on the ground 
via One System Remote Video Terminals (OSRVT) and broadcast on the regional 
computer network using commercial video software. However, the large amounts of video 




Figure 171: Direct Support UAS Architecture from [126] 
This method of operation, while advantageous to the unit directly supported by the 
assets, limited the distribution of intelligence in a classic stovepipe fashion. Despite assets 
flying in certain areas from all services, the information collected was not available to other 
units or services in the area who did not have access to it; there was a significant lack of 
sharing of resources and information across platforms; some assets suffered from a lack of 
available analysts to conduct PED while others had too many; and the demand for AISR 
increased to cover intelligence gaps. The inability to conduct tailored data-sharing meant 
that even if uploaded to a various systems and databases, analysists were required to sift 
through an overwhelming amount of data resulting in missed information. Intelligence is 
only useful if it gets to the right people at the right time. Of course, as demand increased 
so too did the number of assets, the architecture to support it. As an attempt to improve 
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intelligence, the DOD developed the reach-back architecture, federated PED enterprise, 
and the distributed common ground station (DCGS) for information sharing. 
Though not clearly depicted in the diagram, both manned and unmanned assets can 
provide sensor data directly to a line-of-site (LOS) gateway or directly to the tactical 
consumer. However, the only sensor data immediately usable by the tactical consumer is 
near real-time FMV for situation awareness and rapid decisive decision making on the 
tactical battlefield. FMV alone, though, is not a complete fused intelligence product. 
 
Figure 172: High-Level Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) 
Operational Overview (OV-1) of ISR System-of-Systems [126] 
Once in the enterprise gateway, the raw data is transferred over the Defense 
Information Systems Network (DISN) transport and Internet Protocol (IP) net-centric 
services. These systems enable both the BLOS control of UAS and the global distribution 
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of the raw data to Enterprise Data Centers (EDC), Processing Exploitation and 
Dissemination (PED) sites, and are distributed to the strategic consumers and the 
distributed common ground system (DCGS) sites at the operationally deployed units. It is 
important to note that AISR in only part of the data that enters the intelligence enterprise, 
the others are space systems and surface systems, both ground and maritime, generating a 
massive amount of data [126]. In the 2013 publicly released information briefing Army 
Intelligence 2020 and Beyond, the Department of the Army’s Intelligence Directorate (DA-
G2), the slide summarizing the Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A) 
(Figure 173) depicts this massive amount of accessible data through which intelligence 
professionals at both the distributed PED sites (depicted on the map) and the operational 
units must sift, analyze and fuse in a timely manner [153].  
 
Figure 173: DA-G2 DSGS-A Overview[153] 
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A.2  Decision Advantage 
Over the past 18 years of operations, the used of manned and unmanned AISR has 
increased exponentially to support urgent Combatant Command (CCMD) requirements 
throughout the globe [126, 154, 155]. So much so, that the presence of AISR and FMV are 
virtually assumed. The counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
demonstrated that the AISR platforms:  
have potential strategic and operational impacts requiring near real-time 
delivery of video and other sensor data to theater operations centers and rear 
area headquarters to support urgent targeting and force protection decisions 
[11]. 
War by nature is complex and dynamic, so too is the current AISR PED distributed 
architecture. When facing A2AD environments, some argue that our current AISR UAS 
fleet will become obsolete. For the past 18 years the United States military has had the 
luxury of air supremacy. In a near-peer environment we will likely have only air parity, or 
possibly air denial or incapability. Some fear that our current unmanned aircraft are too 
slow and are thus vulnerable to attack by enemy fighters and air defense arrays. However, 
it is these same concerns that make it more likely that the United States military will use 
UAS in environments where the risk to manned aircraft is too high. In fact, the DOD 
Unmanned Systems Integration Roadmap 2017-2014 states that “[t]o ensure our military 
advantage, emphasis should be placed on the evolution, availability, and employment of 
unmanned technology”[11] The Joint Operational Planning Process describes five phases 
of a notional strategic war as shown in Figure 177 . They are as follows: Phase 0: Shape, 
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Phase I: Phase II: Seize the Initiative, Phase III: Dominate, Phase IV Stabilize, and Phase 
V: Enable Civil Authority.[135] AISR will be critical in all of these phases, but will be 
especially crucial in the Phases 0-1 before hostilities begin as a means to shape future 
operations and deter threats without leading to unnecessary escalation in the event of a 
shoot down as was demonstrated in recent war games conducted at MIT.[12] Should 
hostilities begin, AISR will be crucial to direct long-range precision fires against enemy 
artillery and air defenses Phase II (Seize the Initiative). to make way for follow-on 
dominating activities while reducing the friendly casualties. 
 
Figure 174: Operational Phases of War from [135] 
It is critically important that AISR activities, investments and modernizations 
efforts be synchronized for economy of force of highly demand but limited assets. As noted 
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in the preceding quotation from the DOD Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2017-2042, the 
requirements of the CCMDs, while primarily for full-motion video (FMV), also required a 
variety of sensor mixes to include measurement and signals intelligence (MASINT), 
signals intelligence (SIGINT), and electronic intelligence (ELINT) [149, 156]. These 
intelligence capabilities and associated analytics have proven critical to provide combatant 
commanders with a common operating picture needed to make timely decisions and 
provide a significant advantage on the battlefield.  
The 2028 vision for the future of Army AISR lies not in a single collection platform 
but in a “family of integrated flying systems” deemed the Multi-Domain Sensing System 
(MDSS) These UAS will be collectively layered at various altitudes and support a variety 
of consumers at all echelons while providing Multi-INT PED fusion of information for a 
common operating picture at echelons above brigade. The first priority for the development 
of MDSS is AISR support to targeting for long-range precision fires (LRPF). This 
challenge has five elements: sensors; platforms; integration of intelligence, electronic 
warfare, and cyberspace; data transport, and PED. [124] 
For information and data to be used as intelligence and for targeting, the raw data 
must be processed and exploited before being disseminated. This process can be timely 
depending on the intelligence type and the desired layering of products to generate a 
complete intelligence picture. The PED process is what drives the intelligence mission 
across the Joint enterprise [157]. Delays anywhere in the pathway o include the PED, can 
result in missed opportunities, failed operations/strikes, and, in the worst case, the loss of 
friendly lives.  
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“Optimal use of ISR now requires much more innovative exploitation skills and 
accompanying PED technology improvements” 
-MG(R) Eugene Haase 
Distributed Common Ground System-Future[158]  
Figure 175: Key Takeaway 
A.3  Increasing Demand and Data Overload 
The prevailing attitude from key decision makers and historic trend data from the 
last 18 years indicated a tendency towards continuously increasing the number of AISR 
assets to satisfy the ever-growing requirements for AISR throughout the globe. In fiscal 
year 2018, the military had an estimated 3,187 UAS in the projected inventory, though this 
quantity is based solely on budget documents and is not the complete inventory of aircraft 
but systems (many of which include 3-4 aircraft per system). For the projected FY18 orders 
the DOD requested an additional 792 UAS, though 94% of those acquisitions were small 
Group 1 UAS.[159] In 2013, the DOD had over 11,000 UAS aircraft alone. [126]  
In the publicly released information briefing Army Intelligence 2020 and Beyond, the 
Department of the Army’s Intelligence Directorate (DA-G2) notes that between 2005 and 
2013 the number of aerial collection hours flown per month for the Army’s AISR assets, 
operated by subordinated units of the United States Army Intelligence and Security 
Command (INSCOM), quadrupled.[153] This figure doesn’t even include the collection 
hours flown by Army Shadow (RQ-7) and Gray Eagle (MQ-1C) assets assigned the Army’s 
eleven active duty Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) performing reconnaissance, 
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surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) roles. Nor does this figure include AISR from 
the U.S. Air Force, U.S Navy, or the U.S. Marine Corps, which far outnumber Army assets.  
In fact, in the year 2016, the Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper UAS 
alone flew a combined 351,000 combat hours and conducted over 40% of kinetic 
airstrikes.[159] Assuming an equivalent number of FMV collection hours, those two assets 
collected 40 years’ worth of video in a one-year timespan all of which need to be processed, 
exploited, and disseminated. Obviously, this amount of FMV data alone is unmanageable 
and is further hindered by lack of tools to correlate and visualize the data, lack of cross-
cueing, inadequate sharing, and the inability to aggregate data and reports. Currently, 
intelligence analysts at supported commands must ‘pull’ information from data which is 
typically segregated by type of source, service, and region instead of having relevant 
reports and data “pushed” to them.[160] This challenge has led to the call for new 
technologies such as big data analytics, machine learning and artificial intelligence to be 
infused. To address this issue the DOD has also established the Joint Artificial Intelligence 
Center (JIAC) and the Army has established the Army Artificial Intelligence Task Force 
(AAI-TF).[161] Additionally, the Army has proposed the MDTF introduced in section 0 
as an alternative structure to redirect targeting specific information to maneuver units and 
LRPF elements before the LTIOV.  
A.4  Major Monetary Investment 
According to the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College’s annual reports: 
Drones in the Defense Budget, Navigating the Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request and 
Summary of Drone Spending in the FY19 Defense Budget Request, the DOD requested 
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$6.97 billion in the 2018 budget for all autonomous systems (commonly referred to in 
civilian terms as “drones”) related expenditures and $9.39 billion in 2019—a 26% increase. 
AISR, particularly in the terms of UAS, is a major portion of that expense for the United 
States DOD. In 2018, $5 billion (71%) of the $6.97 billion was budgeted for UAS. Of that 
$5 billion, $4.1 billion was allocated toward operational systems; namely the RQ-11 
Raven, RQ-4 Global Hawk, and the MQ-8 Fire Scout. In 2019 $6.05 billion (64%) of the 
$9.39 billion was budgeted for UAS. Therefore, while total UAS expenditure has increased 
by $1 billion, the portion of the “drone” budget has decreased. This decreasing percentage 
of the overall drone budget has been the trend since 2016 as major procurements peaked in 
2014. However, though not forecasted in the 2013 UAS roadmap, the Army and the Air 
Force did request an additional 16 new MQ-9 Reapers for the Air Force and an additional 
11 new MQ-1C Gray Eagles for the Army in 2018. In 2019, the Air Force has requested 
an additional 29 MQ-9 Reapers and 120 new RQ-20 Pumas while the Army has requested 
10 new MQ-1C Gray Eagles, 600 new RQ-11 Ravens, 10 new RQ-7 Shadows and 1084 
new Soldier Borne Sensors (SBS), totaling approximately 3,070; in terms of numbers, it is 
the largest procurement in six years. Of note, the SBS will be a short-range micro UAS and 
is still in development. It is envisioned to be a lightweight aircraft, potentially commercial 
off the shelf (COTS) that can be carried by individual members of infantry squads and 
easily deployed for quick-look reconnaissance at a lower cost than the RQ-11 Ravens 
which cost $180,400 each. [159, 162] Like the RQ-11 Raven the SBS is for immediate use 
at the tactical level and will not be connected to the reach-back architecture into the larger 
federated PED enterprise.  
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It is important to understand that the expenses discussed refer to funds needed to 
develop, test, procure, field, operate and maintain the UAS and their associated support 
equipment. These numbers do not include the development of the PED Architecture, the 
analytical framework to conduct the analysis, or the investment in AI to address the data 
overload. To date, the Army has spent over $3 billion dollars on DCGS-A which is 
necessary for intelligence professionals to gather and analyze all the information. But the 
information is too overwhelming, the system is too cumbersome, and it requires a steep 
learning curve to be effective. In March 2019, the Army announced it would grant 
commercial company Palantir an $800 million dollar contract to replace the custom-built 
platform in an effort to improve the end user ability to organize and make use of all of the 
intelligence data.[163] Lastly, in the fiscal year 2019 budget, the Pentagon has increased 




APPENDIX B. VENSIM EQUATIONS AND UNITS 
B.1  Primary AISR PED D3A Architecture 
B.1.1 Global Parameters 




Units: dmnl  
Range: [0,500,1] 
 
TIME STEP = 0.0625 
Units: Hour  
Range: [0,?] 
B.1.2 Friendly UAS Equations 
Average Launch and Transit Time=3 
Units: Hour  
Range: [2,6,0.5] 
 




Crew Limit= Crews Available*UAS Per Crew  
Units: UAS [0,?,1] 
 
Crews Available=20 
Units: Crew [0,50,1] 
 
Detection Rate= UAS Overhead*Observable Output(Target Saturation Ratio) 
Units: observables/Hour  
 
Enemy Satellite Attack= RANDOM POISSON (0, Satellites Overhead, 0.002*Satellites 




Enemy Anti Aircraft Fire= IF THEN ELSE (UAS Overhead>0:AND: Enemy Anti 
Aircraft >= 1, RANDOM POISSON(0, UAS Overhead, 0.0125*UAS Overhead*Enemy 
AAA Ratio , 0 ,1 , 0)/TIME STEP,0) 
Units: UAS/Hour 
 
Frequencies Per Satellite=2 
Units: frequency/sat  
Range: [1,10,1] 
 
Frequency Limit= Controllable UAS per Frequency*Number of Frequencies Available 
Units: UAS 
 
Ground Control Station Limit= Ground Control Station UAS Capacity*Ground 
Control Stations Available 
Units: UAS 
 
Ground Control Station UAS Capacity=1 
Units: UAS/GCS  
Range: [1,5,1] 
 





Units: UAS  
Range: [1,50,1] 
 
Network Load Capacity=0.75 
Units: dmnl  
Range: [0,1,0.1] 
 
Number of Frequencies Available= Frequencies Per Satellite*Satellites Overhead 
Units: frequency 
Range:  [0,?] 
 




Units: dmnl  
Range: [0,1,0.05] 
 
Satellites Available= 10 




Satellites Overhead= INTEG (-Enemy Satellite Attack, Satellites Available) 
Units: sat 
 
Target Saturation Ratio=INTEGER(ZIDZ(INTEGER(Enemy Anti Aircraft+Enemy 
Artillery),INTEGER(UAS Overhead))*UAS per Target) 
Units: dmnl 
 
Total Observables Rate=Detection Rate*Network Load Capacity 
Units: observables/Hour 
 
Total UAS in Theater=50 
Units: UAS 
Range:  [0,75,1] 
 
UAS Capacity Loss= IF THEN ELSE (UAS Limit<=UAS Overhead, PULSE (Time, 
TIME STEP)*(UAS Overhead -UAS Limit)/TIME STEP, 0 ) 
Units: UAS/Hour 
 
UAS Limit=(MIN((MIN(Crew Limit, Ground Control Station Limit)), MIN(Frequency 
Limit, Initial UAS) )) 
Units: UAS 
 
UAS Overhead= INTEG (UAS Replacement Rate-Enemy Anti Aircraft Fire-UAS 
Capacity Loss, UAS Limit) 
Units: UAS 
 
UAS Per Crew= 1 
Units: UAS/Crew  
Range: [1,4,1] 
 
UAS per Target=1 
Units: UAS/targets [1,1,1] 
 
UAS Pool= INTEG (-UAS Replacement Rate, IF THEN ELSE(Total UAS in 
Theater*OR Rate-UAS Limit<=0, 0 , Total UAS in Theater *OR Rate-UAS Limit )) 
Units: UAS 
 
UAS Replacement Delay= DELAY FIXED (Enemy Anti Aircraft Fire, Average Launch 
and Transit Time, 0) 
Units: UAS/Hour 
 
UAS Replacement Rate=IF THEN ELSE( UAS Overhead<UAS Limit :AND: UAS 




B.1.3 Friendly Fires Equations 
"% Fires Focused on Enemy AAA"= 1-"% of Fires Focused on Enemy Artillery" 
Units: dmnl 
 




AAA Targeting Rate= IF THEN ELSE( Enemy Anti Aircraft>0:AND:Targets>=1 , 
MIN((RANDOM BINOMIAL(0, MIN( Targets , Max Engagements ) , Fire Accuracy, 
MIN( Targets , Max Engagements) , 0, "% Fires Focused on Enemy AAA" , 0 )/TIME 
STEP),"% Fires Focused on Enemy AAA" *Targets/TIME STEP) , 0 )  
Units: targets/Hour 
 
Artillery Targeting Rate= IF THEN ELSE (Enemy Artillery>0: AND: Targets>=1, 
MIN ((RANDOM BINOMIAL (0, MIN (Targets, Max Engagements ) , Fire Accuracy, 
MIN (Targets, Max Engagements), 0, "% of Fires Focused on Enemy Artillery" , 
0)/TIME STEP),"% of Fires Focused on Enemy Artillery"*Targets/TIME STEP) , 0 ) 
Units: targets/Hour  
 
Fire Accuracy= Hit Probability*Kill Probability 
Units: dmnl  
Range: [0,1,0.02] 
 




Initial Number of HIMARS=20 






Max Engagements= Max Rate of Fire*Number of HIMARS 
Units: targets 
 
Max Rate of Fire=4 
Units: targets/system  
Range: [1,6,1] 
 






B.1.4 Fusion Equations 




ACE Fusion Capacity Utilization= Capacity Utilization Graph (ACE Fusion Ratio) 
Units: 1/Hour 
 
ACE Fusion Expertise=3 
Units: products/(personnel) 
  Range: [0,10,0.5] 




ACE Fusion Overwork= SMOOTH (IF THEN ELSE (ACE Fusion Capacity 
Utilization>=Overwork Threshold, ACE Fusion Capacity Utilization-Overwork 
Threshold, 0), time to average) 
Units: 1/Hour 
 
ACE Fusion Personnel=20 
Units: personnel  
Range: [1,30,1] 
 
ACE Fusion Ratio=ZIDZ (Disseminated Intel Backlog, ACE Fusion Limit) 
Units: 1 
 




AVG Observables per Product=3 
Units: observables/products 
 
AVG Product per Target=3 
Units: products/targets 
 








Disseminated Intel Backlog= INTEG (((ED/AVG Observables per Product)-DI 
Overflow Rate-Fusion Rate),0) 
Units: products [0,?] 
 
Disseminated Intel Overflow= INTEG (DI Overflow Rate,0) 
Units: products 
 
ED= ED Limit*ED Capacity Utilization 
Units: observables/Hour 
 
Fusion Rate= ACE Fusion Capacity Utilization*ACE Fusion Limit 
Units: products/Hour 
 
MDTF PEF=MDTF Capacity Utilization*MDTF PE Limit 
Units: observables/Hour 
 





Range:  [0.75,1,0.5] 
 
Target Overflow= INTEG (Target Overflow Rate,0) 
Units: targets 
 
Target Overflow Rate=IF THEN ELSE(AAA Targeting Rate=0 :AND: Artillery 
Targeting Rate =0 :OR: Targets> Max Engagements , PULSE TRAIN( Time , TIME 
STEP , 1 , FINAL TIME )*INTEGER("% Targets Expired per Hour" 
*Targets)/TIME STEP , 0 ) 
Units: targets/Hour 
 
Targets= INTEG ((((Fusion Rate+MDTF PEF)/AVG Product per Target)-AAA 
Targeting Rate-Artillery Targeting Rate-Target Overflow Rate) 0) 
Units: targets  
Range: [0,?] 
 
time to average= 1 
Units: Hour 
Range: [0.5,2,0.5] 
B.1.5 Enemy Assets Equations 




Ability to Replace=0 
Units: dmnl  
Range: [0,1,0.05] 
 




Enemy AAA Ratio= ZIDZ(Enemy Anti Aircraft,Initial Enemy AAA) 
Units: 1 
 
Enemy Anti Aircraft= INTEG (Rate of Replacement AAA-AAA Destruction Rate, 




Enemy Artillery= INTEG (Rate of Replacement Artillery-Artillery Destruction Rate, 
Initial Enemy Artillery) 
Units: targets  
Range: [0,100,1] 
 
Enemy Artillery Ratio=ZIDZ (Enemy Artillery, Initial Enemy Artillery) 
Units: 1 
 
Enemy Counter Battery Fire=IF THEN ELSE (Enemy Artillery>=1:AND: Number of 
HIMARS> 0, RANDOM POISSON (0, Number of HIMARS, 0.007*Number of 
HIMARS*Enemy Artillery Ratio , 0 , 1, 0)/TIME STEP ,0) 
Units: system/Hour 
 
Enemy Delay Interval=3 
Units: Hour  
Range: [0,10,0.5] 
 
Enemy Destroyed= INTEG (AAA Destruction Rate + Artillery Destruction Rate,0) 
Units: targets 
 
Enemy Replacement Delay AAA=DELAY FIXED (AAA Destruction Rate, Enemy 
Delay Interval, 0) 
Units: targets/Hour 
 
Enemy Replacement Delay Artillery= DELAY FIXED (Artillery Destruction Rate, 




Initial Enemy AAA=75 
Units: targets  
Range: [0,100,1] 
 




Rate of Replacement AAA= Ability to Replace*Enemy Replacement Delay AAA 
Units: targets/Hour 
 




B.2  PED Sub-Model Architecture 
B.2.1 Processing Exploitation 
PE=PE Capacity Utilization*PE Limit 
Units: observables/Hour 
 
PE Avg Cap Utilization=SMOOTH(PE Capacity Utilization, time to average ) 
Units: 1/Hour 
 




Units: observables/(personnel) [0,10,0.5] 
 
PE Limit=PE Personnel*PE Expertise*PE Technology 
Units: observables 
 
PE Observables= INTEG (PE-ED-ED Overflow,0) 
Units: observables 
 
PE Observables Ratio=ZIDZ(Observables Backlog, PE Limit) 
Units: dmnl 
 





PE Overflow Ratio=ZIDZ (PE Overflow Total, Observables Total) 
Units: 1 
 
PE Overflow Total= INTEG (PE Overflow,0) 
Units: observables 
 
PE Overwork=SMOOTH(IF THEN ELSE( PE Capacity Utilization>=Overwork 
Threshold , PE Capacity Utilization-Overwork Threshold , 0 ), time to average ) 
Units: 1/Hour 
 
PE Personnel=PED Personnel Total-MDTF PEF Personnel 




Units: dmnl  
Range: [1,3,0.1] 
 
PED Observables=Total Observables Rate*(1-"% Obs Direct to MDTF") 
Units: observables/Hour 
 
PED Personnel Total=25 
Units: personnel  
Range: [0,50,1] 
 
B.2.2 Exploitation Dissemination 
ED=ED Limit*ED Capacity Utilization 
Units: observables/Hour 
 
ED Avg Cap Utilization=SMOOTH(ED Capacity Utilization, time to average ) 
Units: 1/Hour 
 




Units: observables/(personnel)  
Range: [0,10,0.5] 
 
ED Limit=ED Expertise*ED Personnel*ED Technology 
Units: observables 
 




ED Observables Ratio=ZIDZ(PE Observables, ED Limit) 
Units: dmnl 
 
ED Overflow=PE Observables*Overflow Graph(ED Observables Ratio) 
Units: observables/Hour 
 
ED Overflow Ratio=ZIDZ(ED Overflow Total, Observables Total) 
Units: 1 
 
ED Overflow Total= INTEG (ED Overflow,0) 
Units: observables 
 
ED Overwork=SMOOTH(IF THEN ELSE( ED Capacity Utilization>=Overwork 











B.2.3 Multi-Domain Task Force 
"% Obs Direct to MDTF"=0.3 
Units: dmnl 
Range:  [0,1,0.01] 
 
MDTF Allocation=0.25 
Units: dmnl [0,1,0.01] 
 
MDTF Avg Cap Utilization=SMOOTH(MDTF Capacity Utilization, time to average ) 
Units: 1/Hour 
 
MDTF Capacity Utilization=Capacity Utilization Graph(MDTF PEF Obs Ratio) 
Units: 1/Hour 
 








MDTF Overflow Ratio=ZIDZ(MDTF Overflow Total,Obervables Total) 
Units: 1 
 
MDTF Overflow Total= INTEG (MDTF Overflow,0) 
Units: observables 
 
MDTF Overwork=SMOOTH(IF THEN ELSE( MDTF Capacity 
Utilization>=Overwork Threshold , MDTF Capacity Utilization 
-Overwork Threshold , 0 ), time to average ) 
Units: 1/Hour 
 




MDTF PEF=MDTF Capacity Utilization*MDTF PE Limit 
Units: observables/Hour 
 
MDTF PEF Expertise=2 
Units: observables/personnel 
 
MDTF PEF Obs Ratio=ZIDZ(MDTF Observable Backlog,MDTF PE Limit) 
Units: dmnl 
 
MDTF PEF Personnel=PED Personnel Total*MDTF Allocation 
Units: personnel [0,50,1] 
 
MDTF PEF Technology=1 
Units: dmnl 
 
MDTF Priority Observables="% Obs Direct to MDTF"*Total Observables Rate 
Units: observables/Hour 
 












Observables Backlog= INTEG (PED Observables-PE-PE Overflow,0) 
Units: observables 
 







Units: 1/Hour [0.75,1,0.5] 
 
time to average=1 
Units: Hour [0.5,2,0.5] 
 
Total Observables Rate=Detection Rate*Network Load Capacity 
Units: observables/Hour 
  




B.3  Measures of Interest Output Direct Calculations 
AAA to UAS Loss Ratio=XIDZ(Enemy AAA Losses,Friendly UAS Losses,Enemy 
AAA Losses/Unit UAS) 
Units: targets/UAS 
 














Enemy AAA Percent Loss=ZIDZ(Enemy AAA Losses,Initial Enemy AAA)*100 
Units: 1 
 
Enemy Artillery Losses= INTEG (Artillery Destruction Rate,0) 
Units: targets 
 




Friendly UAS Losses= INTEG (Enemy Anti Aircraft Fire,0) 
Units: UAS 
 
HIMARS Losses= INTEG (Enemy Counter Battery Fire,0) 
Units: system 
 
HIMARS Percent Loss=ZIDZ(HIMARS Losses,Initial Number of HIMARS)*100 
Units: dmnl 
 
Satellite Percent Loss=ZIDZ(Satellite Losses, Satellites Available)*100 
Units: dmnl 
 
Time to Eliminate Enemy AAA=IF THEN ELSE(Enemy Anti Aircraft=0, 1 , 0) 
Units: 1 
 
Time to Eliminate Enemy Artillery=IF THEN ELSE(Enemy Artillery=0, 1 , 0) 
Units: 1 
 
Total Loss Ratio=XIDZ((Enemy AAA Losses+Enemy Artillery Losses),(HIMARS 
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